The Forgotten Jurisprudential Debate: Catholic Legal Thought\u27s Response to Legal Realism by Breen, John M. & Strang, Lee J.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 98
Issue 3 Spring 2015 Article 5
The Forgotten Jurisprudential Debate: Catholic
Legal Thought's Response to Legal Realism
John M. Breen
Lee J. Strang
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Religion
Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
John M. Breen and Lee J. Strang, The Forgotten Jurisprudential Debate: Catholic Legal Thought's Response to Legal Realism, 98 Marq. L.
Rev. 1203 (2015).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol98/iss3/5
  
THE FORGOTTEN  
JURISPRUDENTIAL DEBATE:  
CATHOLIC LEGAL THOUGHT’S 
RESPONSE TO LEGAL REALISM* 
JOHN M. BREEN** 
LEE J. STRANG*** 
I.  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1205 
II.  THE RECEIVED WISDOM IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY:  
  WE’RE ALL REALISTS NOW, AND RIGHTLY SO .......................... 1209 
A.  The Dominant Narrative: The Triumph of Legal Realism ... 1209 
B.  The Nonexistent or Weak Rejoinder to Legal  
  Realism by Catholic Legal Scholars ....................................... 1210 
III.  THE RISE OF LEGAL REALISM AND CATHOLIC LEGAL  
  THOUGHT’S RESPONSE .................................................................... 1217 
A.  The Rise of Legal Realism ........................................................ 1217 
B.  Catholic Legal Thought’s Response to Legal Realism .......... 1227 
1.  The Forgotten Jurisprudential Debate .......................... 1227 
2.  Three Major Catholic Legal Scholars ............................ 1228 
a.  Brendan F. Brown ................................................... 1228 
b.  Walter B. Kennedy .................................................. 1230 
c.  Miriam Theresa Rooney ......................................... 1232 
d.  Clergy Serving on Catholic Law Faculties ............ 1236 
 
*  The authors wish to thank the participants at the Creighton University School of 
Law workshop, the University of Dayton School of Law workshop, the University of Detroit 
Mercy School of Law workshop, the Duquesne University School of Law workshop, the 
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law workshop, the St. Mary’s University School 
of Law workshop, the participants at the Joseph T. McCullen Symposium on Catholic Social 
Thought and Law at Villanova University School of Law, and Professor Dan Ernst for their 
comments and suggestions.  We also gratefully acknowledge the work of Joel Graczyk and his 
colleagues at Marquette Law Review in the preparation of this Article. 
**  Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A., 1985, University 
of Notre Dame; J.D., 1988, Harvard University. 
*** Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law; B.A., 1997, Loras College; 
J.D., 2001, University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University.  Professors Strang and Breen wish 
to thank the University of Toledo College of Law and Loyola University Chicago School of 
Law for their financial support for this Article. 
 1204 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:1203 
e.  Summary of the Catholic Respondents  
  to Realism  ....................................................... 1237 
3.  The Architectonic Role of the Neo-Scholastic  
  Revival  ......................................................................... 1238 
4.  Catholic Legal Scholars’ Critique of Legal  
  Realism  ......................................................................... 1243 
5.  The Attempted Institutionalization of Catholic  
  Legal Thought’s Response ............................................. 1253 
C.  Summary of the Catholic Response to Realism ...................... 1256 
IV.  THE UNTOLD STORY: EXPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF  
  CATHOLIC LEGAL THOUGHT IN THE HISTORIES OF  
  AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM ......................................................... 1257 
A.  The Relatively Insubstantial Amount of Catholic  
  Legal Scholarship Published in Response to  
  Legal Realism ........................................................................... 1257 
B.  The Good Faith Exercise of Historical Judgment .................. 1262 
C.  Three Factors Behind the Standard Narrative:  
  The Contemporary Rejection of Natural Law,  
  the Confounding of Natural Law and Religion,  
  and the Prevalence of Secularism and  
  Anti-Catholicism in American Society  
  and Academic Culture ............................................................. 1265 
1.  Skepticism of Natural Law .............................................. 1271 
2.  The Confounding of Natural Law and Religion .......... 1274 
3.  Secularism and Anti-Catholicism in American  
  Society and Academic Culture ...................................... 1281 
a.  Anti-Catholicism at the Time of the  
  Catholic Response to Legal Realism..................... 1284 
b.  Anti-Catholicism in the Historical  
  Accounts of Legal Realism in the  
  Post-JFK Era  ....................................................... 1293 
i.  The Passage of Time Since the First  
  Histories of American Legal Realism......... 1294 
ii.  The Persistence of Anti-Catholic Bias  
  in American Society ..................................... 1295 
iii.  The Presence of Anti-Catholic Bias in  
  American Academic Culture ....................... 1303 
V.  CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 1310 
 
 2015] THE FORGOTTEN JURISPRUDENTIAL DEBATE 1205 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Jerome Frank was one of the leading lights of Legal Realism and 
also one of its most extreme proponents.1  He stunned the American 
legal academy with the publication of his 1930 seminal Realist text,2 
Law and the Modern Mind.3  Utilizing a Freudian perspective,4 Frank 
argued that the existing legal profession and academy sought an 
unattainable5 legal certainty.6  In doing so, the legal profession deceived 
the public and itself7 because it was playing out an emotional need for 
permanence and stability, seeking an authoritative father figure: 
The Law . . . inevitably becomes a partial substitute for the 
Father-as-Infallible-Judge.  That is, the desire persists in grown 
men to recapture, through a rediscovery of a father, a childish, 
completely controllable universe, and that desire seeks 
satisfaction in a partial, unconscious, anthropomorphizing of 
Law, in ascribing to the Law some of the characteristics of the 
child’s Father-Judge.  That childish longing is an important 
element in the explanation of the absurdly unrealistic notion that 
law is, or can be made, entirely certain and definitely 
predictable.8  
 
1.  See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: 
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 81–82, 85 (1973) (describing Frank as 
“one of the most extreme realists” who, nonetheless, “had an immediate impact”); see also 
Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
267, 269 (1997) (describing two phenomena—first, “the now dominant tendency to treat 
Jerome Frank’s particular interpretation of the Core Claim as identical to Realism,” and 
second, the idea that “Frank’s view represented a particular sort of extreme”). 
2.  See Bruce A. Ackerman, Law and the Modern Mind by Jerome Frank, 103 
DAEDALUS 119, 119, 121–22 (1974) (“Jerome Frank’s book, Law and the Modern Mind, . . . is 
probably the most comprehensive Realist effort to expose the fallacies involved in the 
Classical effort to state legal rules clearly and to systematize them around fundamental legal 
principles.” (footnote omitted)). 
3.  JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). 
4.  Id. at 326 n.1 (discussing Freud).  Frank had undergone six months of psychoanalysis.  
Walter E. Volkomer, Frank, Jerome N. (1889–1957), in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL 
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 201, 201 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009). 
5.  See FRANK, supra note 3, at 6 (“The law always has been, is now, and will ever 
continue to be, largely vague and variable.”). 
6.  See id. at 7 (“Lawyers do not merely sustain the vulgar notion that law is capable of 
being made entirely stable and unvarying; they seem bent on creating the impression that, on 
the whole, it is already established and certain.”). 
7.  Id. at 9. 
8.  Id. at 18; see also id. at 203 (claiming that “the continued craving for excessive legal 
stability” can be found in the “undisposed of childish longings for a father-substitute, longings 
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Frank’s critique of existing legal perspectives was based on a deep-
seated skepticism concerning the existence of moral absolutes.9 
Thus, Frank devoted an entire chapter to deriding the “blighting 
medieval prepossession” of “Scholasticism.”10  According to Frank “[i]n 
no other field of human thought [was] that prepossession to be found in 
a more exaggerated and persistent form” than in legal thinking.11  Frank 
rejected the “vague, abstract, sky-swelling, super-experiential principles 
and rules of law” that constitute “Absolutism” and “Fundamentalism” 
in legal thought.12 
However, fifteen years later, Frank published Fate and Freedom, 
where he reversed some of his earlier views: 
The word “Scholasticism” is sometimes used to indicate a 
patronizing attitude towards the aridity of the subjects to which 
the Scholastics devoted themselves.  The charge of aridity is not 
too well founded, for many of these scholars busied themselves 
with matters of government and economics, often, as in the case 
of Thomas Aquinas, in a distinguished manner.  Moreover, they 
achieved skills in the techniques of analytic thinking for which 
we moderns are still much in their debt.  And, through them and 
otherwise, the medieval Church fostered the ideal of social 
solidarity and a “sense of the community”—values which were 
subsequently too much neglected.13 
Frank continued to express his newfound admiration for natural law, 
which culminated with his admonition, “I do not understand how any 
decent man today can refuse to adopt, as the basis of modern 
 
which play their part in religion as in law”); id. at 252 (“Modern civilization demands a mind 
free of father-governance.  To remain father-governed in adult years is peculiarly the modern 
sin.  The modern mind is a mind free of childish emotional drags, a mature mind.  And law, if it 
is to meet the need of modern civilization must adapt itself to the modern mind.”). 
9.  See id. at 17–20, 69–83; see also id. at 93 (“Consider, for instance, the case of Plato 
himself.  Before his time Greek science had made rapid strides.  Relativism and healthy 
skepticism were developing, men were being freed from bondage to authority . . . .”). 
10.  Id. at 57–68 (quoting Herman Oliphant & Abram Hewitt, Introduction to JACQUES 
RUEFF, FROM THE PHYSICAL TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, at ix, x (1929)). 
11.  Id. at 63 (quoting Oliphant & Hewitt, supra note 10, at x) (internal quotation mark 
omitted). 
12.  Id. at 57. 
13.  JEROME FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM: A PHILOSOPHY FOR FREE AMERICANS 99 
(1945) (footnote omitted); see also PURCELL, supra note 1, at 173 (“Frank had always been 
committed to . . . [democracy], and during the early forties he looked increasingly for its 
moral justification and seemed to find it in the Thomistic concept of natural law.”). 
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civilization, the fundamental principles of Natural Law, relative to 
human conduct, as stated by Thomas Aquinas.”14 
What accounts for Frank’s about-face, his near-180 degree turn 
toward natural law, in such a short period of time?  Undoubtedly, a 
number of factors influenced Frank’s and others’ reappraisal of the 
natural law position.15  For example, the shattering effect of World 
War II could partially explain Frank’s re-evaluation of Realism,16 but it 
cannot account for his turn toward a Thomistic conception of natural 
law.  Instead, as we detail in this Article, Frank may have been 
prompted to reconsider his views by the widespread and thoughtful 
intellectual response to Legal Realism set forth by leading Catholic legal 
scholars during the 1920s–1940s. 
Although the scholarship on the Legal Realist movement is 
voluminous, this literature has either ignored, or casually dismissed, the 
contributions of these contemporary critics.17  This gap is surprising 
because, as we show, the critiques offered by Catholic legal scholars 
constituted the single largest body of criticism directed at Legal 
Realism.18  This gap is doubly surprising because the arguments offered 
by these scholars were generally thoughtful and nuanced, in large 
measure because they built on the worldwide revival of the thought of 
St. Thomas Aquinas then taking place.19  This Article provides a more 
balanced account of what these authors said and thereby reintroduces 
their critiques into the still ongoing conversation concerning Legal 
Realism and its legacy. 
In doing so, we describe these Catholic legal scholars as a 
jurisprudential movement, similar to their Legal Realist interlocutors.  
We describe some of the major figures in this movement and how their 
work drew upon, reflected, and facilitated the revival of Thomistic 
philosophy known as Neo-Thomism or, more broadly, Neo-
Scholasticism.  Like other intellectual movements, these scholars sought 
 
14.  Jerome Frank, Preface to Sixth Printing of JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE 
MODERN MIND, at viii, xx (Anchor Books ed. 1963). 
15.  See PURCELL, supra note 1, at 172–74 (describing a number of Realists who moved 
toward natural law). 
16.  See John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, The Road Not Taken: Catholic Legal Education 
at the Middle of the Twentieth Century, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 553, 629–33 (2011) (describing 
some of the reasons that Realism faltered). 
17.  See infra Part II. 
18.  See infra Part III. 
19.  See infra Part III.B.4. 
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to solidify and perpetuate their contributions to the scholarly 
conversation by giving their movement institutional form in various 
ways.  As we illustrate, their ultimate failure to do so helped lead to 
their movement’s eclipse and subsequent collapse in the late 1950s.20 
In Part II of this Article, we begin by portraying the received 
wisdom: that Legal Realism vanquished all of its adversaries from the 
field of intellectual combat.  The conventional story is that the Realists 
encountered little, if any, cogent intellectual resistance and that their 
arguments carried the day. 
In Part III, we argue that this nearly universally accepted picture 
leaves out the single-biggest source of criticism: Catholic legal scholars 
writing as part of the Neo-Scholastic revival.  These scholars drew on 
the Thomistic natural law tradition to powerfully critique Realist claims 
while, at the same time, acknowledging Realist insights.21  Significantly, 
Catholic legal scholars did not suggest restoration of the formalism 
against which the Realists powerfully rebelled.  Like any other 
intellectual movement (including Realism itself), Catholic legal scholars 
made use of their own conceptual apparatus to present their arguments.  
Unlike the formalists, however, they denied that there was “an ideal 
system of human positive law, springing from reason and existing 
external, immutable, and equally applicable to all times and places.”22 
In Part IV, we suggest why later historians have failed to either 
acknowledge or appreciate the contributions made by Catholic legal 
scholars during this period.  We argue, based on these historians’ own 
statements and other circumstances, that this absence is best explained 
by the marginal place of Catholicism in American intellectual life, as 
well as the historians’ own differing philosophical, jurisprudential, and 
religious commitments.   
 
20.  See infra Part III.B.5. 
21.  In Breen & Strang, supra note 16, we tied this movement in Catholic legal thought 
to the contemporaneous widespread call for reform of Catholic legal education. 
22.  Brendan F. Brown, Natural Law and the Law-Making Function in American 
Jurisprudence, 15 NOTRE DAME LAW. 9, 13 (1939). 
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II. THE RECEIVED WISDOM IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY:  
WE’RE ALL REALISTS NOW, AND RIGHTLY SO 
A. The Dominant Narrative: The Triumph of Legal Realism 
The received wisdom in American legal history is that Legal Realism 
arrived, swept the field of formalist adversaries, and permanently 
transformed American law, legal practice, and legal education.  
Professor Brian Tamanaha has nicely summarized this familiar 
narrative: 
Perspectives on judging in the United States are dominated 
by a story about the formalists and the realists. . . .  [T]he legal 
realists discredited legal formalism, demonstrating that the law is 
filled with gaps and contradictions, that the law is indeterminate, 
that there are exceptions for almost every legal rule or principle, 
and that legal principles and precedents can support different 
results.23 
With few dissenting voices,24 scholars of jurisprudence and American 
legal history chronicle the same basic tale of “classical orthodoxy” and 
its demise.25  Legal formalism, with a few prominent exceptions,26 
dominated American legal thought from the post-Civil War era until the 
1920s.27  Then—or so the story goes—building on the insights of a 
handful of earlier, path-breaking thinkers,28 a relatively unorganized 
 
23.  BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF 
POLITICS IN JUDGING 1 (2010); see also BRIAN LEITER, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a 
Naturalized Jurisprudence, in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN 
LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 15, 16 (2007) [hereinafter 
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE] (describing the “Received View of Realism”). 
24.  Professor Tamanaha is the most prominent dissenting voice from this narrative.  
TAMANAHA, supra note 23, at 3.  Tamanaha argued that the dominant narrative is a post-hoc 
invention of progressive legal scholars in the 1970s seeking to legitimate their own 
jurisprudential claims.  Id. at 6, 107, 200–02.  For a moderately critical review of Tamanaha’s 
book, see Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL 
THEORY 111 (2010). 
25.  MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: 
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 156–57 (1992). 
26.  The most frequently cited is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.  See, e.g., id. at 109–
43 (describing Justice Holmes’s evolution into the intellectual father of Legal Realism). 
27.  See id. at 9–31, 169–212. 
28.  The most frequently cited, in addition to Justice Holmes, is Dean Roscoe Pound.  
See, e.g., id. at 169–71. 
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movement of legal scholars began to develop in the 1920s,29 centered at 
Columbia and Yale Law Schools.30  These scholars criticized the then-
regnant formalism31 according to which the state was a neutral arbiter 
that avoided “taking sides in conflicts between religions, social classes, 
or interest groups.”32  The law was “a system of processes and principles 
that could be shared even in the absence of agreed-upon ends,”33 and 
legal decision-making involved deduction and analytical reasoning that 
manifested “certainty and logical inexorability.”34  In its place, the 
Realists offered an alternative jurisprudential approach that 
fundamentally changed American legal thought to such an extent that35 
it is a cliché to say, “We are all realists now.”36 
B. The Nonexistent or Weak Rejoinder to Legal Realism by Catholic 
Legal Scholars 
In the standard historical account, the Legal Realists overcame all 
challengers in the jurisprudential field, with little—at least little 
cogent—critical response.37  According to most legal histories of the 
period,38 the opponents of Realism faced the insurmountable task of 
overcoming the theoretical,39 sociological,40 professional,41 and political42 
 
29.  Id. at 169. 
30.  Id.; see also LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960 (1986) 
(describing Realism’s prominence at Yale). 
31.  See HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 170 (“[A]bove all, Realism is a continuation of the 
Progressive attack on the attempt of late-nineteenth-century Classical Legal Thought . . . .”). 
32.  Id. at 19. 
33.  Id. at 16. 
34.  Id. 
35.  NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 92 (1995). 
36.  KALMAN, supra note 30, at 229; see also WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN 
AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 382 (1973) (saying that the “uncontroversial nature of the 
core of realism” is reflected in “a well-known incantation: ‘Realism is dead; we are all realists 
now’”). 
37.  See, e.g., JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 3 (1995) (describing “criticism of Realism” as “often, . . . really awful” and 
“often, . . . really frivolous”). 
38.  Again, TAMANAHA, supra note 23, is a prominent exception to this claim. 
39.  See DUXBURY, supra note 35, at 69, 79–82 (“American legal realism . . . was 
nurtured under the wing of the social sciences . . . .”); id. at 127–30 (tying realism to 
pragmatism); STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM 
TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 109–10, 113 (2000) (citing the rise of 
empirical social science as a reason for the rise of realism); JAMES E. HERGET, AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE, 1870–1970: A HISTORY 1 (1990) (“There is no doubt that from 1870 to 
1940 the principal motivation for most theorists was to make scholarly work in law 
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changes—advances, in the scholars’ eyes43—that Realism reflected and 
furthered.  Critics who did not embrace the move toward a naturalized, 
theoretical perspective were either ignored44 or marginalized by 
historians.45  And some scholars both ignored and marginalized the 
contributions of Catholic legal scholars.46 
The prominent role played by Catholic legal scholars in the 
jurisprudential debates of the 1920s–1940s is conspicuously absent from 
most historical accounts, dismissed out of hand in others, and, at best, 
given short-shrift in a few.47  For example, in his description of post-
World War II legal thought, Morton Horwitz devotes all of half of one 
 
‘scientific.’”); HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 157, 181–82, 210 (tying Realism to the rise of 
modern social sciences and rejection of natural law/natural rights); id. at 140 (tying Justice 
Holmes’s early Realism to adoption of legal positivism); PURCELL, supra note 1, at 159 (“Into 
that traditional field [of law] a scientific naturalism had entered, first as sociological 
jurisprudence and then as legal realism.”); SCHLEGEL, supra note 37, at 4–5 (arguing that the 
Realists tried to utilize empirical science as a model for law). 
40.  See DUXBURY, supra note 35, at 94 (“Early realist social thought was inspired by 
the experience of the Civil War and the powerful nationalist sentiments which it aroused, and 
also by escalating industrialism . . . .”); FELDMAN, supra note 39, at 109 (identifying “laissez-
faire capitalism and mass industrialization”); HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 65, 80–85, 95, 131, 
188 (citing to the “enormous upsurge of social change and class struggle in the late nineteenth 
century”). 
41.  See DUXBURY, supra note 35, at 116; HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 188 (citing to the 
“enormous similarities between the changes in the governing premises of philosophy, history, 
economics, and other social sciences”); SCHLEGEL, supra note 37, at 38–80. 
42.  See DUXBURY, supra note 35, at 116; FELDMAN, supra note 39, at 109–10 (tying 
Legal Realism to progressivism and the New Deal); HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 169–70 
(tying Realism to “the reformist agenda of early-twentieth-century Progressivism” and the 
New Deal). 
43.  See BRIAN LEITER, Postscript to Part I: Interpreting Legal Realism, in 
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 23, at 103, 107 & n.20 (describing Catholic legal 
scholars’ critical engagement with Realism as “Catholic lawyers enacting one of the many 
iterations of the Church’s resistance to modernity” (citing Ben W. Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes 
and Hitler, 31 A.B.A. J. 569 (1945))). 
44.  See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 39, at 105–23 (describing Legal Realism’s rise and 
demise, including criticisms of Realism, without noting Catholic legal scholars’ critiques). 
45.  See, e.g., Neil Duxbury, The Reinvention of American Legal Realism, 12 LEGAL 
STUD. 137, 169–70 (1992). 
46.  Compare DUXBURY, supra note 35, at 212–23 (describing the critical response to 
Realism, without noting Catholic legal scholars’ similar critiques), with Duxbury, supra note 
45, at 144–49 (describing “anti-realists,” including negative citation to Catholic legal scholars). 
47.  See generally David H. Burton, Justice Holmes and the Jesuits, 27 AM. J. JURIS. 32 
(1982) (describing the role of American Jesuits in the 1940s–1950s who criticized Justice 
Holmes and, in doing so, undermined his reputation and sparked a decades-long debate over 
Justice Holmes’s legacy).  Burton’s article touches primarily on only one facet of the Catholic 
legal scholar–Realist debate: Catholic criticism of Justice Holmes. 
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sentence to the Catholic legal scholars’ critiques and then quickly leaves 
them behind.48  Similarly, John Schlegel’s otherwise informative survey 
of Realist thought begins by derisively noting that critics of Realism 
existed, including Catholic legal scholars.49  He then dismisses the 
contributions of these scholars in a single sentence: “[C]atholic critics of 
Realism . . . were so far out of the mainstream of American legal 
education as to be essentially irrelevant to the debate over Realism.”50 
The lengthiest treatment paid to Catholic legal scholars’ 
contributions appears in a 1992 article, The Reinvention of American 
Legal Realism, by Neil Duxbury.51  However, Duxbury’s judgment is 
unstintingly harsh.  Using labels like, “outbursts,”52 “hysteria,”53 and 
“diatribe,”54 to depict Catholic legal scholars’ responses to Realism, 
Duxbury summarizes their efforts as “little more than crude attempts at 
proselytisation.”55  Duxbury’s description of Catholic legal scholars’ 
claims is also, at best, uncharitable.  For Duxbury, the “message” of 
these authors was that “natural law was the embodiment of the good 
and Legal Realism the epitome of evil.”56  Given his one-dimensional 
portrait of Catholic legal scholars as crude moralizers,57 it is not 
surprising to see Duxbury petulantly remark that mere “repetition of 
the argument . . . hardly blessed [these scholars’] collective labours with 
an air of sophistication.”58  
Two historical accounts stand out as partial exceptions to the 
tendency of legal historians to ignore or dismiss out-of-hand the 
Catholic legal scholars’ critique of Legal Realism.  The first is Edward 
Purcell’s masterful book, The Crisis of Democratic Theory.59  Purcell 
 
48.  See HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 250 (“While one school of thought, mainly Catholic, 
sought to blame moral relativism for the spread of a ‘might makes right’ philosophy, others 
wished to show instead that an absolutist mindset was actually more conducive to the growth 
of totalitarianism.”). 
49.  SCHLEGEL, supra note 37, at 3. 
50.  Id. at 6. 
51.  Duxbury, supra note 45, at 162–73. 
52.  Id. at 163. 
53.  Id. 
54.  Id. at 164. 
55.  Id. at 170. 
56.  Id. at 168. 
57.  See id. at 173 (describing the “majority” of Catholic legal scholars as “repetitive[] 
and . . . sanctimonious[]”). 
58.  Id. at 170. 
59.  PURCELL, supra note 1. 
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powerfully argues that the rise of scientific naturalism in the nineteenth 
century precipitated crises in many areas of American intellectual life, 
including law.60  After describing Realism, Purcell reviews prominent 
criticisms and critics, beginning with Roscoe Pound and Lon Fuller, 
followed by a review of Catholic legal scholars.61  Purcell fairly describes 
the contributions of some of the major Catholic writers, their connection 
to the then-flourishing worldwide Neo-Scholastic movement, their core 
claims, and their attempts at institution building.62   
However, when Purcell turns to an evaluation of Catholic legal 
scholars’ claims, he lapses into caricature.  Purcell’s appraisal hinges on 
characterizing Catholic legal scholars as being immunized from the crisis 
of democratic theory by their “deepest articles of religious faith and 
emotional conviction.”63  Purcell claims that Catholic legal scholars’ 
arguments failed because of the “inextricable intertwining of their 
rational philosophy with their particular theology,” which “raised doubts 
as to where the one began and the other left off.”64  Unlike other 
American intellectuals whom Purcell regards as more mature,65 Purcell 
contends that American Catholics “never faced the crisis of democratic 
theory” because “they had a ready justification for democracy . . . based 
on theology, philosophy, and simple religious faith.”66  As such, Catholic 
legal scholars simply were not capable of experiencing the anxiety of the 
age.67  Instead, they were like “the great majority of Americans who 
 
60.  Id. at 5. 
61.  Id. at 159–78. 
62.  Id. at 164–78. 
63.  Id. at 169. 
64.  Id. 
65.  Perhaps ironically, one of the key Catholic legal scholars during this period, Francis 
E. Lucey, S.J., experienced similar claims made against him.  Burton, supra note 47, at 40–42.  
Lucey saw his critics objecting that he was not a fit participant in the debate over Justice 
Holmes’s legacy: “For some unknown reason theologians are supposed to be incompetent 
witnesses.  It is suggested that their minds are warped by preconceived and misconceived 
ideas.  They suffer from fixations.  They live in a cloud of misty abstractions.  They have not 
reached the psychoanalysts, adult stage.  They are not realists.”  Francis E. Lucey, S.J., 
Holmes—Liberal—Humanitarian—Believer in Democracy?, 39 GEO. L.J. 523, 558 (1951) 
(responding to critics, including Mark DeWolfe Howe). 
66.  PURCELL, supra note 1, at 169. 
67.  Id. 
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simply accepted democracy as an ethical good on grounds of tradition, 
faith, habit, and necessity.”68 
The most sustained and judicious historical account of Catholic legal 
scholars’ contributions to the debate is found in James Herget’s book, 
American Jurisprudence.69  After briefly noting the contributions by 
prominent Catholic legal scholar Walter B. Kennedy, during the 1920s–
1930s,70 Herget devotes approximately ten pages to several Catholic 
authors prominent in the 1940s–1950s.71  He identifies the debt that 
American Catholic legal scholars owed to international Neo-Scholastics, 
such as Jacques Maritain and Heinrich Rommen,72 and the efforts of 
these legal scholars to institutionalize their movement, including the 
founding of the Catholic Lawyer at St. John’s University and Notre 
Dame’s Natural Law Institute.73  Herget also correctly identifies the 
development of “relativism and scientism,” the rise of totalitarianism, 
and the horrors of World War II as factors that contributed to the 
 
68.  Id.  Professor Dan Ernst suggested, in a brief blog post commenting on an earlier 
version of this Article, that our characterization of Purcell’s treatment of Catholic legal 
scholars was inaccurate.  Dan Ernst, Breen and Strang on the Forgotten Catholic Legal 
Response to Legal Realism, LEGAL HIST. BLOG (Mar. 28, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://legalhistory
blog.blogspot.com/2014/03/breen-and-strang-on-forgotten-catholic.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/K76P-ZNEE.  Professor Ernst argued that “‘simple’ doesn’t mean ‘simple-
minded.’”  Id. 
Without attributing any ill-will to Purcell, we do not believe Ernst’s description fits 
Purcell’s argument.  Purcell’s argument hinged on the characterization of Catholic legal 
scholars as—unlike their Realist interlocutors—having a “particular theology,” “religious 
faith,” “their religious faith,” “simple religious faith,” “faith,” and “deepest articles of 
religious faith.”  PURCELL, supra note 1, at 169.  That characteristic alone, according to 
Purcell, distinguished them from “other American intellectuals.”  Id.  Furthermore, we 
believe that, when one scholar describes another scholar as having “a ready justification” for 
some disputed point(s), the description is not flattering.  Instead, “ready” has the connotation 
of unthinking or simple-minded.  Id. 
Ernst suggested that Purcell argued that Catholic legal scholars did not experience the 
crisis of democratic theory because of their “Thomist rationalism.”  Ernst, supra.  We believe 
that accurately describes Catholic legal scholars.  However, we do not believe that was 
Purcell’s description.  Instead, Purcell claimed that, because of the “inextricable intertwining 
of their rational philosophy . . . [and] their particular theology,” as well as “the close union 
between their religious faith and their philosophical training,” it was, in Purcell’s mind, the 
Catholic legal scholars’ “simple religious faith” that prevented them from perceiving the crisis 
their non-Catholic peers experienced.  PURCELL, supra note 1, at 169. 
69.  HERGET, supra note 39. 
70.  Id. at 175–76, 180.   
71.  Id. at 230–39.   
72.  Id. at 235–36.   
73.  Id. at 237–38. 
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relatively warmer reception received by Catholic legal scholars during 
this later period, in contrast to the 1920s–1930s, when Realism first 
emerged.74 
Despite his fair and relatively robust treatment of Catholic 
contributions to the debate, Herget’s narrative nevertheless remains 
thin.  First, Herget focuses much of his treatment on only one book by 
one relatively minor Catholic scholar.75  The most prominent scholars 
(discussed in Part III.B, below) are either not mentioned or are noted 
only in passing.76  Second, Herget fails to show Catholic legal scholars’ 
broad and deep engagement with Realist claims.  Instead, Herget 
identifies two failed strategies that Catholic legal scholars futilely 
employed: “Holmes-bashing” and the “rewriting of history,” in which 
these scholars recast America’s Founding Fathers as Thomistic natural 
lawyers.77   
Third, Herget’s explanation for Catholic legal scholars’ ultimate 
failure is an exceedingly brief and shallow account of the phenomenon it 
purports to explain.  For example, Herget argues that Neo-Scholasticism 
failed because it advanced “a doctrine . . . that had historically justified a 
feudal system, slavery (in Aristotle’s time), and an ultra-authoritative, 
antidemocratic church structure.”78  Putting to one side the descriptive 
accuracy of Herget’s claims, there are many plausible countervailing 
reasons that Herget did not entertain.  For example, Herget cannot 
account for the intellectual “conversions” to the natural law tradition by 
prominent Legal Realists such as Robert Maynard Hutchins79 and 
Jerome Frank (which were not religious conversions).80  Surely Herget 
does not mean to suggest that, in coming to embrace the natural law 
tradition, these thinkers also came to embrace slavery and reject 
democracy. 
 
74.  Id. at 229–30. 
75.  See id. at 232–35 (discussing one book by Karl Kreilkamp).  Kreilkamp was a 
philosophy professor at the University of Notre Dame and later at George Mason University. 
76.  Id. at 230–39. 
77.  Id. at 236–39. 
78.  Id. at 238–39. 
79.  See KALMAN, supra note 30, at 42, 104–15. 
80.  See, e.g., Frank, supra note 14, at xix–xx (“I do not understand how any decent man 
today can refuse to adopt, as the basis of modern civilization, the fundamental principles of 
Natural Law, relative to human conduct, as stated by Thomas Aquinas.”); see also Karl L. 
Llewellyn, One “Realist’s” View of Natural Law for Judges, 15 NOTRE DAME LAW. 3, 8 
(1939) (“[T]his ‘realist’ welcomes the modern Natural Law movement . . . .”). 
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By contrast, the historical treatment accorded those non-Catholic 
scholars who accepted modernity, yet criticized Realism without 
endorsing the natural law tradition, has been favorable.  For example, 
Horwitz repeatedly identifies Lon Fuller as a cogent critic of Realism, a 
critic whose comments were “extraordinarily perceptive,” in part 
because Fuller agreed with many of the Realists’ premises.81  Similarly, 
Stephen Feldman singles out Fuller as exemplary of the legal process 
school of thought, a post-Realist phenomenon that accepted the 
dominant intellectual trends and worked within them to ground the rule 
of law and democracy.82  Likewise, according to Duxbury, “[o]nly Lon 
Fuller, of all the anti-Realists of the 1930s and 1940s, attempted to take 
Realism seriously as a set of jurisprudential premises.”83 
As we demonstrate below, these historians’ accounts—including 
Purcell’s and Herget’s—do not do justice to the multifaceted, complex, 
nuanced, and generally thoughtful arguments wielded by numerous 
Catholic legal scholars during this period.84  Indeed, the Catholic legal 
scholars’ critiques were powerful enough to elicit several thoughtful 
responses and even to bring about a change of mind on the part of 
several prominent Realists toward a natural law perspective.85  But this 
and other evidence is inexplicable on Herget’s and Purcell’s historical 
accounts and simply unintelligible from Duxbury’s perspective.86 
 
81.  HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 183–84, 202, 211. 
82.  FELDMAN, supra note 39, at 119–20, 122–23; see also DUXBURY, supra note 35, at 
223–32. 
83.  Duxbury, supra note 45, at 149. 
84.  See infra Part III. 
85.  Duxbury, supra note 45, at 173–75. 
86.  Duxbury notes these movements but fails to provide an explanation other than 
“bridge-building” and “lip-service,” id. at 173–75, and Duxbury dismisses Jerome Frank’s 
“conversion” to natural law by suggesting that Frank later in life repudiated his earlier 
conversion, id. at 174–75.  Our reading of the cited source, Jerome N. Frank, Some Reflections 
on Judge Learned Hand, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 704 (1957), is not that “Frank was candid 
enough to confess that he had never, in fact, placed much store in the Thomist critique of 
realism,” Duxbury, supra note 45, at 175, even assuming that a later repudiation of an earlier 
conversion would establish that the earlier conversion did not, in fact, occur. 
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III. THE RISE OF LEGAL REALISM 
AND CATHOLIC LEGAL THOUGHT’S RESPONSE 
A. The Rise of Legal Realism 
The natural law tradition was the consensus jurisprudence prior to 
the sixteenth century.87  This tradition was the product of a long and 
distinguished pedigree in Western thought, stretching back to Plato, 
Aristotle, and Cicero, and extending through Augustine, Aquinas, and 
Suarez, among others.88  Following the Reformation and through the 
Enlightenment, the classical understanding of natural law continued, 
albeit modified by a new line of thought that emphasized natural rights 
and combined with a form of contractarianism.89  It was this 
jurisprudence that, as interpreted by Locke, greatly influenced the 
American Founders.90 
By the close of the nineteenth century, however, natural law of all 
stripes had suffered a remarkable collapse, such that, at least in the eyes 
of elites, it was no longer “seriously entertained.”91  Its influence waned 
 
87.  See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 117 (2d ed. 1984) (“[I]t was because a 
moral tradition of which Aristotle’s thought was the intellectual core was repudiated during 
the transitions of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries that the Enlightenment project of 
discovering new rational secular foundations for morality had to be undertaken.”); see also 
JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 7 
(1991) (“By the mid-eighteenth century . . . philosophy had lost its hold on the schools and on 
educated people alike.”); HERGET, supra note 39, at 8 (“Theories of natural law . . . were 
dominant in Europe down to the end of the eighteenth century . . . .”); BRIAN Z. 
TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 1, 11–12, 20–23 
(2006) (describing the dominance and then decline of Aristotelian natural law). 
88.  See FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL 
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1985); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 14 (1984); Geoffrey Sayre-
McCord, Introduction: The Many Moral Realisms, in ESSAYS IN MORAL REALISM, at 1 
(Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988). 
89.  See Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 
102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993). 
90.  See MCDONALD, supra note 88, at 3, 7 (describing the large body of Enlightenment 
political theory as one of four factors that guided and limited the Framers and referring 
specifically to David Hume, James Harrington, John Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone). 
91.  HERGET, supra note 39, at 31, 229 (stating that, in the United States by 1870, “the 
moral paradigm was not seriously entertained”); HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 156 (stating 
that, “by the late eighteenth century [Thomistic natural law] . . . had been largely 
marginalized by English jurists”); Russell Hittinger, Introduction to HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, 
THE NATURAL LAW, at xi, xv (1998) (“[I]n the first decades of this century, American 
thinkers had given relatively little attention to natural law.”); see also Neil MacCormick, 
Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: 
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until, by the advent of the twentieth century in the United States, 
natural law was practically nonexistent,92 except in Catholic circles.93  
The causes of this decline were multifarious, involving broad 
intellectual, religious, and social movements of enormous consequence.  
These included the Protestant Reformation94 and the rise of modern 
science,95 including, perhaps most importantly, evolutionary theory.96  
The various instantiations of Enlightenment thought—the 
epistemological skepticism of Descartes and Hume, Kant’s reinvention 
of metaphysics and his deontological ethics, Bentham’s utilitarianism, 
Mill’s theory of liberty based on the harm principle, and Nietzsche’s 
proclamation of the death of God and his purported move beyond good 
and evil—profoundly challenged the intellectual foundation and 
certainty of classical metaphysics and virtue ethics. 
The United States was the ultimate Protestant nation, a creature 
born of the Enlightenment.97  It was, after all, a country founded by 
groups of Christian reformers who had themselves broken from an 
established Protestant church.  It was founded by people steeped in and 
upon the Enlightenment ideas of equality and individual liberty, the 
innate power of human reason, and the promise of democratic 
government.98  The country was later heavily influenced by the practical 
 
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 105, 105 (Robert P. George ed., 1992) [hereinafter NATURAL LAW 
THEORY] (stating that natural law theory, prior to the 1980s, was “dismissed as an ancient 
and exploded fallacy kept alive only as the theological dogmatics of an authoritarian 
church”). 
92.  See sources cited supra note 91. 
93.  See LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 7 (1953) (“The issue of natural 
rights presents itself today as a matter of party allegiance.  Looking around us, we see two 
hostile camps, heavily fortified and strictly guarded.  One is occupied by the liberals of 
various descriptions, the other by the Catholic and non-Catholic disciples of Thomas 
Aquinas.”). 
94.  HERGET, supra note 39, at 228. 
95.  Id. 
96.  MACINTYRE, supra note 87, at 39–50, 53–55, 110–14, 165; MURPHY & COLEMAN, 
supra note 88, at 15 (“We now, of course, live in the post-Darwinian world and are 
accustomed to viewing nature (even human nature) in terms of mechanistic causation, and 
thus we are generally inclined to view teleological worldviews as quaintly pre-scientific.  The 
modern mind finds it difficult to accept that people have ends or purposes other than those 
they have set or accepted for themselves.”). 
97.  See PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 20, 38–41, 108–17 
(1997). 
98.  BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
27 (1967); GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 5 
(1969); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 243 (2005) 
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accomplishments of scientific innovation and technology,99 and the loss 
of a sense of permanence and teleological certainty brought on by 
Darwin’s theory of evolution.100  Furthermore, the vision of the 
expanding nature of the cosmos and a universe in constant flux revealed 
through modern astronomy led many “to doubt the existence of eternal, 
universal, and unchanging natural law principles.”101  The jurisprudential 
ideas that filled the gap left by the abandonment of natural law theory in 
the United States102 became the focus of criticism by Catholic legal 
educators.   
The roots of the ideas that go under the banner “Legal Realism,” to 
which Catholic legal educators responded beginning in the 1920s and 
1930s,103 are complex and contested.104  Here we set them out in 
abbreviated form.  Although the label usually attached to these ideas is 
“Legal Realism,” the significance of the label is disputed, as is its 
accuracy.105  This is in part due to the fact that the movement in 
American law known as Legal Realism was a disparate collection of 
legal figures106 united around common themes.107  They constituted “a 
 
(describing a “general commitment to Enlightenment values” in the Constitution); JOHNSON, 
supra note 97, at 25 (recounting John Locke’s influence in the Mayflower Compact). 
99.  See HERGET, supra note 39, at 11–12, 228 (arguing that natural law theories 
declined because “[t]hey are nonempirical, unscientific, and carry with them unwanted 
metaphysical baggage”). 
100.  See sources cited supra note 96. 
101.  FELDMAN, supra note 39, at 90. 
102.  See HERGET, supra note 39, at 9 (“With the exception of sporadic expositions of 
the Thomistic version by scholars at Roman Catholic institutions, the old moral paradigm did 
not really receive any intellectual support in American jurisprudence until around 1940.”). 
103.  ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 77 
(1998). 
104.  For a small sampling of works focusing on American jurisprudence, including 
Legal Realism, see DUXBURY, supra note 35; HERGET, supra note 39; SCHLEGEL, supra note 
37; SEBOK, supra note 103; TAMANAHA, supra note 23; see also SCHLEGEL, supra note 37, at 
1–2 (“The questions of who were the Realists and what was Realism are not trivial and are 
still contested.”). 
105.  See SEBOK, supra note 103, at 77 (“[I]t is difficult to discuss realism because it is 
difficult to define who the realists were and when they wrote.”); see also Brian Z. Tamanaha, 
Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 733–34 (2009) (arguing that “beneath the 
label there was nothing distinctive—nothing unique or unifying—about the Legal Realist[]” 
label). 
106.  HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 169 (“Legal Realism was neither a coherent 
intellectual movement nor a consistent or systematic jurisprudence.  It expressed more an 
intellectual mood . . . .”). 
107.  See id. at 170 (arguing that the central theme of Realism was a critique of Classical 
Legal Thought’s “attempt . . . to create a sharp distinction between law and politics and to 
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loosely defined group of judges, lawyers, and scholars, who marked the 
difference between the ‘law in action’ and the ‘law in books’ and 
formulated early versions of what is now called ‘the indeterminacy 
thesis.’”108  Catholic legal scholars recognized the multifarious nature of 
this phenomenon.109 
Persons commonly identified as prominent Legal Realists110 include 
Karl Llewellyn, Benjamin Cardozo, Louis Brandeis, Jerome Frank, 
Walter Wheeler Cook, Arthur L. Corbin, Thurmond Arnold, Underhill 
Moore, William O. Douglas, and Felix Cohen.111  Many regard Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr.,112 and Roscoe Pound113 as the movement’s two 
most formative scholarly influences. 
Justice Holmes’s influence on American legal thought was and 
continues to be tremendous.114  Although he penned many scholarly 
 
portray law as neutral, natural, and apolitical”); see also Wilfrid E. Rumble, The Legal 
Positivism of John Austin and the Realist Movement in American Jurisprudence, 66 CORNELL 
L. REV. 986, 988 (1981) (arguing that “one can discern certain tendencies in the work of men 
generally acknowledged to be legal realists”). 
108.  Lawrence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of Formalism: False Necessity and 
American Legal Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2465 (2014) (reviewing LEE EPSTEIN, 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013)) (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910); 
Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminancy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 462, 462 (1987)). 
109.  See Walter B. Kennedy, Realism, What Next? (pt. 1), 7 FORDHAM L. REV. 203, 203 
n.2 (1938) [hereinafter Kennedy, Realism, What Next?] (“As the years go by, it is becoming 
increasingly evident that realism, the leftist movement in the law, is itself divisible into left, 
center and right groups.”).   
110.  Many of the figures in this grouping are frequently given related labels such as 
“pre-realists.”  SEBOK, supra note 103, at 77. 
111.  Given the lack of consensus on what constituted Legal Realism, it is not surprising 
that there is similarly “no universal standard for determining who is a legal realist.”  Rumble, 
supra note 107, at 987. 
112.  See HERGET, supra note 39, at 37 (stating that Justice Holmes “offered a clearer 
and fuller expression of some new jurisprudential ideas”). 
113.  See id. at 147 (describing Pound as the “person most instrumental in welding this 
new view of the legal world into a whole and of developing it further”). 
114.  See ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND 
LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 1 (2000) (concluding that Justice Holmes, “more than any 
other individual, shaped the law of the twentieth century”); LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN 
QUEST OF ITSELF 117 (1940) (citing Justice Holmes’s “enormous influence”); Harry W. 
Jones, Legal Realism and Natural Law, in THE NATURE OF LAW: READINGS IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY 261, 262 (M.P. Golding ed., 1966) (describing Justice Holmes as the “hero 
figure of the” Realists); see also CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS: 
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tracts and hundreds of judicial opinions, perhaps his most influential 
work was The Path of the Law, a speech Holmes delivered that was later 
published as a law review article in 1897.115  Indeed, some regard The 
Path of the Law as “the single most important essay ever written by an 
American on the law.”116   
Here Holmes set forth in germ form many ideas that would become 
Legal Realism’s core tenets.117  Justice Holmes began by offering his 
famous court-centered definition of law: “The prophecies of what the 
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by 
the law.”118  This pragmatic definition of law corresponded to Holmes’s 
consequentialist test for judging the law,119 namely the attainment of 
“social advantage.”120  For Holmes, the law was out of step with the 
rapidly changing society because it was too tied to its historical origins.121  
Given this court-centered jurisprudence122 and his contention that the 
law was indeterminate,123 Holmes counseled judges to use modern 
empirical science to mold legal doctrine to fit current societal 
conditions.124  For Holmes, the future lawyer would be “the man of 
statistics and the master of economics,” not the lawyer who slavishly 
followed precedent because “it was laid down in the time of Henry 
IV.”125  As we describe below, Holmes became a special target of 
Catholic legal scholars following the posthumous release of his private 
correspondence.126 
Roscoe Pound articulated, in the early twentieth century, a school of 
thought known variously as Sociological Jurisprudence or Progressive 
 
JUSTICE HOLMES AND HIS FAMILY (1944) (providing an early hagiographical portrait of 
Justice Holmes). 
115.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
116.  Sanford Levinson, Strolling Down the Path of the Law (and Toward Critical Legal 
Studies?): The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1221, 1228 (1991) (book 
review). 
117.  Holmes, supra note 115, at 457; see also Levinson, supra note 116, at 1228. 
118.  Holmes, supra note 115, at 461. 
119.  Id. at 466–67. 
120.  Id. at 467–68. 
121.  Id. at 468–69. 
122.  Id. at 457. 
123.  Id. at 465, 467. 
124.  Id. at 465–66, 469–70, 474. 
125.  Id. at 469. 
126.  See, e.g., James Thomas Connor, Some Catholic Law School Objectives, 36 CATH. 
EDUC. REV. 161, 162–63 (1938) (criticizing the Holmesian conception of law). 
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Jurisprudence.  Pound’s tremendous prestige in the academy, owing to 
his position as dean of the Harvard Law School and his prodigious 
scholarly output, exerted immense influence on American legal 
thought.127  In his famous law review article titled Mechanical 
Jurisprudence, published in 1908, Pound laid the groundwork for his 
own and Legal Realism’s agenda.128  For Pound, the time had come to 
accomplish “the same task in jurisprudence that has been achieved in 
philosophy, in the natural sciences and in politics,” namely, “to rid 
ourselves of . . . legality and to attain a pragmatic, a sociological legal 
science.”129 
Pound critiqued the received legal practice as “mechanical 
jurisprudence,” wherein “[c]onceptions are fixed”  and “premises are no 
longer . . . examined,” where “[e]verything is reduced to simple 
deduction from them” and “[p]rinciples cease to have importance,” so 
that law becomes a mere “body of rules.”130  A judge deciding a case in a 
“mechanical” fashion disposes of the matter by making use of legal 
categories “used, not as premises from which to reason, but as ultimate 
solutions” such that they “cease to be conceptions and become empty 
words.”131  Behaving in this fashion, courts and legislatures continued to 
parrot the previous generation’s legal conclusions despite their patent 
inconsistency with modern social realities.132   
 
127.  See HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 171 (characterizing Pound as “the only world-class 
American legal thinker since Holmes”). 
128.  Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. Rev. 605 (1908) 
[hereinafter Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence].  In a series of three articles published in 1911 
and 1912, Pound fleshed out his claims.  Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of 
Sociological Jurisprudence (pts. 1 & 2–3), 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 
140, 489 (1911–1912).  After laboriously cataloguing different jurisprudential schools that, he 
claimed, were merging into sociological jurisprudence, Pound gave six characteristics for 
sociological jurisprudence.  Id. (pt. 3) at 513–16.  The most significant difference from 
Mechanical Jurisprudence is Pound’s explicit suggestion that judges have and should exercise 
discretion “to meet the demands of justice.”  Id. at 515.  Pound’s belief in judicial discretion 
was present, however, in Mechanical Jurisprudence in the form of his criticism of American 
judges for choosing to abide by a sterile “jurisprudence of conceptions.”  Pound, Mechanical 
Jurisprudence, supra, at 611. 
129.  Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 128, at 609.  According to one 
commentator, Pound’s jurisprudential writings had four overarching themes: 
(1) jurisprudential focus on the courts; (2) philosophical pragmatism; (3) a belief in interest-
group politics; and (4) emphasis on social sciences supplying at least part of the data upon 
which judges decide cases.  HERGET, supra note 39, at 148. 
130.  Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 128, at 612. 
131.  Id. at 620–21. 
132.  Id. at 606–07, 612–14. 
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In its place, Pound proposed what has become known as Sociological 
Jurisprudence, a philosophy of law that would adjust “principles and 
doctrines to the human conditions they are to govern rather than to 
assumed first principles.”133  It would, he said, “make rules fit cases 
instead of making cases fit rules.”134  Sociological Jurisprudence 
recognized that law is not independent of its host society.135  Under this 
approach, whether a legal regime or doctrine is appropriate is measured 
by the “results it achieves” and the “practical utility” it exhibits in 
adapting to “human needs.”136  Finally, lawmakers, especially legislators, 
must take account of sociological facts and construct a “jurisprudence of 
ends” to ameliorate the disjunction between law as currently practiced 
and society’s needs.137 
Informed by the earlier critical work of men like Holmes and Pound, 
a number of legal scholars in the 1920s–1940s began to think and write 
about law in a new way.138  Again, although the exact composition of the 
Legal Realist movement is contested, the Realists’ core claims are 
commonly understood to be as follows: (1) the law is neither neutral 
with respect to the good nor independent of politics;139 (2) the law 
should be judged based on its consequences;140 (3) the law in its current 
form is grossly out of touch with social reality so that it is often morally 
 
133.  Id. at 609–10. 
134.  Id. at 613; see also James A. Gardner, The Sociological Jurisprudence of Roscoe 
Pound (pt. 1), 7 VILL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1961) (arguing that Pound understood law as “an 
instrument of social control, backed by the authority of the state, and the ends towards which 
it is directed and the methods for achieving these ends may be enlarged and improved 
through a consciously deliberate effort,” and that sociological jurisprudence was not a legal 
philosophy but “a method which attempts to use the various social sciences to study the role 
of the law as a living force in society and seeks to control force for social betterment”). 
135.  Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 128, at 609–10. 
136.  Id. at 605, 609. 
137.  Id. at 609, 611–14, 621–22. 
138.  HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 169–71. 
139.  Id. at 170, 189–90; see also K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW 
AND ITS STUDY 12–13 (1951) (“And so to my mind the main thing is seeing what officials do, 
do about disputes, or about anything else; and seeing that there is a certain regularity in their 
doing—a regularity which makes possible prediction of what they and other officials are 
about to do tomorrow.”). 
140.  See HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 200 (“Just as pragmatism had attacked the 
essentialist claims of philosophical idealism . . . , so did the Realists treat the value of concepts 
and categories in terms of the results that they produced.”); Pound, Mechanical 
Jurisprudence, supra note 128, at 605; Rumble, supra note 106, at 992 (describing the Realists 
as “pragmatic” and “instrumentalists”). 
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perverse;141 (4) the law is indeterminate, hence factors other than, or in 
addition to, the law resolve legal disputes;142 and (5) judges should 
utilize non-legal sources, especially modern, empirical, social sciences, to 
aid them in deciding cases.143 
One of the key unifying themes of Legal Realism was its opposition 
to what has become known as legal orthodoxy, legal formalism, or 
Classical Legal Thought (CLT).144  In American legal history, the period 
beginning roughly in the 1880s up to 1937, is commonly regarded as the 
era of CLT.145  One of the main characteristics of CLT, through which its 
proponents sought to achieve the rule of law, was the separation of law 
from politics.146  A second characteristic that showed CLT aspiring to 
the rule of law was the model of law as science.147  To work in a 
“scientific” fashion, however, CLT had to ensure that the resolution of 
concrete disputes was law-determined: that the neutral law, and not one 
of the contested visions of the good (employed through a judge’s 
exercise of discretion), determined the outcome of the dispute.148 
The first part of the Realist critique of CLT was that law was not 
neutral between competing visions of the good.149  Instead, law was a 
product of the society in which it existed and should reflect the social 
realities facing it.150  For instance, then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo argued 
that the law “is not found, but made,” and that judges and legislators 
have “analog[ous]” functions.151  The Realists argued that the substance 
of American law was the result of substantive policy decisions.152  When 
 
141.  See HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 187 (“All Realists shared one basic premise—that 
the law had come to be out of touch with reality.”). 
142.  Id. at 170, 176–78, 189–90; Rumble, supra note 107, at 997, 999; see also FRANK, 
supra note 3, at 18–19 (arguing that the fear of uncertainty hindered many from correctly 
perceiving the discretion wielded by judges). 
143.  HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 209. 
144.  Professor Tamanaha argued that there was no such thing as Classical Legal 
Thought.  TAMAHANA, supra note 23, at 4–6. 
145.  HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 9–10. 
146.  Id. at 9. 
147.  See id. at 10 (“[T]he orthodox view that law is a science and that legal reasoning is 
inherently different from political reasoning.”). 
148.  See id. at 9–10. 
149.  Id. at 170, 189–90. 
150.  Id. at 187–88. 
151.  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 115, 119 
(1921). 
152.  See HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 200 (“Realists . . . insisted that legal classifications 
and categories were not natural but social constructs.  The way to determine whether a legal 
 
 2015] THE FORGOTTEN JURISPRUDENTIAL DEBATE 1225 
those policies no longer served society well, new legal doctrines should 
be substituted.153 
Second, beginning with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,154 Realism 
tended to take a pragmatic approach to legal questions.155  “Most 
Realists seemed content to borrow from early twentieth-century 
pragmatis[ts],” such as John Dewey.156  According to the Legal Realists, 
when faced with the frequent indeterminacy of legal doctrine, a judge 
should ask: What rule or result would produce the most desirable 
effects?157 
Third, Legal Realists, like their Progressive Era forerunners, argued 
that the legal system was significantly unjust.158  In this they were 
responding to tremendous societal changes including urbanization, 
industrialization, wealth concentration, and economic complexity.159  
Thus, for example, Karl Llewellyn worked to “unhorse” the law of 
sales—“to bring it forward from the face-to-face bargains struck with 
cash in hand over a cracker barrel at the general store, to the faceless, 
impersonal, credit-driven, transcontinental, industrial transactions of 
modern day.”160  The Realists claimed that the legal system had not kept 
 
classification was good or not depended on the purposes for which the category was 
created.”). 
153.  See id. at 200, 209. 
154.  Id. at 182; Rumble, supra note 107, at 992; see also FELIX S. COHEN, 
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE: 
SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 33, 62 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed., 1960) (“A good deal 
of fruitless controversy has arisen out of attempts to show that [a] . . . definition of law . . . is 
either true or false.  A definition of law is useful or useless.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote 
omitted)). 
155.  See HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 200 (“Just as pragmatism had attacked the 
essentialist claims of philosophical idealism . . . , so did the Realists treat the value of concepts 
and categories in terms of the results they produced.”); see also ROSCOE POUND, 
INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 157 (1923) (“[T]he essence of good is simply to 
satisfy demand.”). 
156.  SEBOK, supra note 103, at 116. 
157.  Id.; see also CARDOZO, supra note 151, at 102 (“This means, of course, that the 
juristic philosophy of the common law is at bottom the philosophy of pragmatism.”). 
158.  See HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 187. 
159.  Id. at 188. 
160.  John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretation and the Lessons of Llewellyn, 33 LOYOLA 
L.A. L. REV. 263, 313 (2000) (citing K.N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. 
REV. 725 (1939); K.N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV. 873 
(1939)). 
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pace with this change, and hence a dramatic disparity between social 
reality and legal norms had developed, often resulting in injustice.161 
The fourth part of the Realist critique was that judges possessed 
discretion in the application of law.162  Legal doctrine did not itself 
determine the outcome of concrete disputes—certainly not as often or 
in the way portrayed by CLT.  Instead, factors other than, or in addition 
to, legal doctrine moved judges to make decisions.163  Realists, like their 
CLT antagonists, still sought to show American law reaching its 
aspiration to the rule of law.164  Instead of legal doctrine alone, however, 
the Realists often argued that judges should use social science to guide 
their discretion to the result that would advance the best social policy.165 
Fifth, the Realists also attempted to incorporate the techniques of 
the early social sciences into law.166  Building on Justice Holmes’s 
influential aphorism that “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in 
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law,”167 the 
Realists sought to employ the techniques of empirical science to achieve 
accurate prediction of court action and hence an accurate knowledge of 
the “law.”168  Walter Wheeler Cook stated, “As lawyers we are 
interested in knowing how certain officials of society—judges, 
legislators, and others—have behaved in the past, in order that we may 
make a prediction of their probable behavior in the future.”169 
 
161.  A major instance of the Realist, and before it the progressive, challenge to the 
substance of American law was in the context of economic relations.  HORWITZ, supra note 
25, at 194.  Realists argued that legal doctrines governing economic relations did not fit the 
facts of an increasingly stratified society.  Id.  Assumptions of equal bargaining power 
between employer and employees, for instance, failed to recognize the dramatic disparity 
between a large-scale industrial employer and low-skilled laborers.  See id. at 15, 195 (noting 
how Realist critics of CLT argued that the market was not natural and neutral, and that 
instead “the organization of the market [was an] . . . entirely debatable social choice[] that 
could not be justified in scientific terms”). 
162.  Id. at 176–78, 190; see also FRANK, supra note 3, at 18–19 (arguing that the fear of 
uncertainty hindered many from correctly perceiving the discretion wielded by judges). 
163.  See HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 176–78, 190. 
164.  See id. at 4, 208–09. 
165.  Id. at 209; see also LLEWELLYN, supra note 139, at 13 (“And so to my mind the 
main thing is seeing what officials do, do about disputes, or about anything else; and seeing 
that there is a certain regularity in their doing—a regularity which makes possible prediction 
of what they and other officials are about to do tomorrow.”). 
166.  HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 181. 
167.  Holmes, supra note 115, at 461. 
168.  SCHLEGEL, supra note 37, at 1. 
169.  Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 
YALE L.J. 457, 475 (1924). 
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The Realists also urged judges to employ the modern empirical 
social sciences as aids in choosing which legal rule or doctrine to employ 
in a particular case.  Benjamin Cardozo, for example, argued that judges 
should employ “the method of sociology” to help them utilize their 
discretion in the manner that best advances “the welfare of society.”170  
The Realists “employed social scientific methods to describe and 
explain those regularities to enhance the predictability of the law.”171 
B. Catholic Legal Thought’s Response to Legal Realism 
1. The Forgotten Jurisprudential Debate 
By the 1930s, Legal Realism had come into its short-lived adulthood.  
Similarly, Catholic legal education was completing its formative stage 
and coming to maturity.172  The intellectual challenge posed by Realism 
was recognized by a significant number of Catholic legal academics and 
their colleagues in philosophy and political theory.173  A major 
component of the overall opposition to Legal Realism originated in the 
ranks of faculty at Catholic law schools.174  These Catholic legal 
educators saw themselves as protecting, preserving, and expounding an 
accurate understanding of law, as set forth in the Neo-Scholastic natural 
law tradition.175  At the same time, they challenged Legal Realist claims 
about the law because they believed these claims were erroneous.176  
Often just as important, however, Neo-Scholastic scholars rebutted 
Legal Realism because they believed that it was the jurisprudential 
symptom of the West’s deeper philosophical malaise, an illness that led 
to the rise of totalitarian ideologies and, ultimately, the horrors of 
World War II.177 
 
170.  CARDOZO, supra note 151, at 66–67. 
171.  STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 5 (1992).   
172.  See Brendan F. Brown, The Place of the Catholic Law School in American 
Education, 5 U. DET. L.J. 1, 4 (1941) (describing the year 1929 as approximately the year 
when Catholic legal education ended its formative stage and began maturity).   
173.  See ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, FORDHAM UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW: A 
HISTORY 145–47 (2012). 
174.  See id. at 146–49. 
175.  See id. at 144–46. 
176.  Id. at 146. 
177.  See Connor, supra note 126, at 161 (“In a day when so many fundamental legal and 
governmental principles have been placed on trial and have been threatened with extinction, 
a splendid opportunity is presented for a school of Catholic Lego-Philosophical thought, i.e., a 
restatement of Scholastic Philosophy in light of modern development . . . .”). 
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2. Three Major Catholic Legal Scholars 
The three most prominent Catholic legal scholars to challenge Legal 
Realism were Brendan F. Brown, Walter B. Kennedy, and Miriam 
Theresa Rooney.  According to the dominant narrative in American 
history, the Legal Realists were “an exceptionally brilliant group” who 
could “have run intellectual rings around” the lesser lights at Catholic 
schools.178  Yet, these Catholic thinkers were able opponents of Realism, 
with significant jurisprudential learning, keen minds, educational 
attainment, prodigious scholarly output, and, occasionally, wit.  Of 
course, there were many others, both Catholic179 and non-Catholic,180 in 
and outside of the legal academy, who disputed Realist claims and 
advocated a natural law perspective.181  We briefly detail the lives and 
careers of Brown, Kennedy, and Rooney to provide a representative 
flavor of the people involved. 
a. Brendan F. Brown 
Brendan F. Brown was a luminous star in the Catholic legal 
educational firmament for nearly half a century.  He was educated by 
and wrote in the heart of Catholic legal education.  Brown received his 
A.B. and LL.B. from Creighton University in 1921 and 1924, 
respectively, and from there, he went to Catholic University, where he 
received his LL.M., J.U.L., and J.U.D.  He received his D.Phil. in Law 
 
178.  KALMAN, supra note 30, at 267–68 n.101. 
179.  Other Catholic legal scholars, who contributed, to a lesser degree, to the vigorous 
jurisprudential debate over Legal Realism, included Anton-Hermann Chroust, Professor of 
Law, Philosophy, and History at the University of Notre Dame; William F. Clarke, Dean of 
DePaul University College of Law; James Thomas Connor, Dean of Loyola New Orleans 
School of Law; Frederick J. DeSloovere at N.Y.U. School of Law; Bernard J. Feeney, 
Instructor at Notre Dame Law School; Karl Kreilkamp, Professor of Philosophy at Notre 
Dame; Paul L. Gregg, S.J., Regent and Professor at Creighton Law School; Linus A. Lilly, 
S.J., Regent at Saint Louis University School of Law; and Francis E. Lucey, S.J., Regent and 
Professor at Georgetown University School of Law.  See also John C. Ford, S.J., The 
Fundamentals of Holmes’ Juristic Philosophy, 11 FORDHAM L. REV. 255, 275 (1942) 
(criticizing Justice Holmes from the perspective of a professor of moral theology). 
180.  See Brown, supra note 22, at 20 (acknowledging the contributions made by scholars 
outside the Catholic legal academy, such as Mortimer Adler). 
181.  Perhaps the most prominent non-Catholic in the legal academy to challenge Legal 
Realism was Lon Fuller.  See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 114; see also Mortimer J. Adler, Legal 
Certainty, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1931) (contributing to a symposium dedicated to Jerome 
Frank’s Law and the Modern Mind); Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. 
REV. 429 (1934).  Non-Catholic critics of Realism also included Morris Cohen and Philip 
Meacham. 
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from Oxford University in 1932.182  Brown taught at Catholic University 
from 1926 to 1954,183 where he was dean from 1949 to 1954, and Loyola 
University New Orleans from 1954 to 1973.184  Memorial lecture series at 
Catholic University and Loyola New Orleans, named in Brown’s honor, 
are a testament to his influence at these institutions.185 
Brown’s two related foci were Catholic legal education and natural 
law.186  He saw a connection between the two, arguing that church-
sponsored law schools should undertake “to develop and present . . . a 
legal culture . . . under the influence of Neo-Scholastic philosophy.”187  
Brown’s work on natural law included two books188 and numerous 
articles.189  It is clear that Brown saw himself as an apologist for the 
natural law tradition because the bulk of his writing attempted to 
present a clear picture of Thomistic natural law to an audience 
unfamiliar with the tradition and often hostile to it.190   
Brown wrote Natural Law and the Law-Making Function in 
American Jurisprudence in 1939, during the heart of the natural law 
criticism of Realism.191  There, Brown challenged the core Realist 
claims.  First, building on St. Thomas’ insights, Brown argued that 
natural law was distinct from positive law and that natural law was 
neutral, objective, and independent of human will.192  Brown claimed 
 
182.  Oliver B. Pollak, The Professors: Pages from the Law School’s Centennial History, 
CREIGHTON MAG., Winter 2004, at 13; see also A.E. Papale, A Tribute to Dr. Brendan F. 
Brown, 21 LOY. L. REV. 803 (1975) (reviewing Brown’s life). 
183.  With an absence for his studies at Oxford between 1927 and 1932.  See Papale, 
supra note 182, at 803–04. 
184.  Pollak, supra note 182, at 13. 
185.  Id.; Special Lecture Series, CATH. U. AM.,  http://www.law.edu/Announcements/Sp
ecialLectureSeries.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5LKP-43TM. 
186.  See Papale, supra note 182, at 804. 
187.  Brendan F. Brown, Jurisprudential Aims of Church Law Schools in the United 
States, A Survey, 13 NOTRE DAME LAW. 163, 167 (1938) (emphasis omitted).  Indeed, Brown 
recognized that the “revival of natural law jurisprudence in the theo-philosophical sense will 
be short lived unless it is reinforced by the active support of the faculties of Church law 
schools.”  Brown, supra note 22, at 21.  See generally Breen & Strang, supra note 16. 
188.  BRENDAN FRANCIS BROWN, AROUND THE WORLD IN SEVENTY DAYS ON THE 
BEAM OF THE NATURAL LAW, A PROGRAM FOR PEACE (1976); THE NATURAL LAW 
READER (Brendan F. Brown ed., 1960). 
189.  See, e.g., Brown, supra note 22; Brown, supra note 172; Brown, supra note 187. 
190.  For example, Brown repeatedly argued that Thomistic natural law is not the 
erroneous “natural law” that its critics rightly rejected.  Brown, supra note 22, at 12–14, 18. 
191.  Brown, supra note 22. 
192.  Id. at 9, 13. 
 1230 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:1203 
that the non-Thomistic “natural law” that the Legal Realists—
rightfully—criticized was an ersatz natural law, not the “Thomistic–
Aristotelian” natural law that he and others sought to defend.193  The 
baleful result of the prominence of this counterfeit natural law, Brown 
agreed with the Realists, was that “judges began to speak of the 
absolute rights of property, freedom of contract, [and] exemption from 
taxation.”194  Brown also argued that injustice had resulted from the 
failure to use natural law as the metric by which to judge current legal 
practice.195 
That being said, Brown believed that the American legal system was, 
at its core, just.196  Like the Realists, Brown acknowledged that the 
positive law was open-textured.197  Unlike the Realists, however, whom 
he characterized as “moving toward nowhere” and “fall[ing] into . . . 
error,” he believed that “an adequately comprehensive teleological 
idealism” would supply the necessary judicial guidance.198 
b. Walter B. Kennedy 
Walter B. Kennedy was, during this period, the most prolific 
proponent of Thomistic natural law in the American legal academy199 
and one of Legal Realism’s most tenacious critics.200  Kennedy was born 
 
193.  Id. at 13. 
194.  Id. at 14 (footnote omitted). 
195.  Id. at 16. 
196.  Id. at 11–12, 18. 
197.  Id. at 22. 
198.  Id. 
199.  He was also the Catholic legal scholar-critic of Realism most frequently noted by 
historians.  It is unclear whether this is the result of the power of Kennedy’s arguments or, as 
we think is more likely, a combination of the quantity of Kennedy’s scholarship in relatively 
accessible—to legal scholars, at least—law reviews and some level of path dependence 
created by earlier scholars’ citations to Kennedy’s work, particularly in PURCELL, supra note 
1, at 165 (describing Kennedy as “perhaps the most widely respected Catholic legal scholar in 
the country”). 
200.  Kennedy wrote at least seventeen article-length pieces of scholarship advocating 
natural law, critiquing Legal Realism, or doing both.  Walter B. Kennedy, in MY 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 145 (1941) [hereinafter 
Kennedy, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW]; Walter B. Kennedy, Another Job for Jurisprudence, 8 
MOD. L. REV. 18 (1945); Walter B. Kennedy, The Bethlehem Steel Case—A Test of the New 
Constitutionalism (pt. 1), 11 FORDHAM L. REV. 133 (1942) [hereinafter Kennedy, Bethlehem 
Steel]; Walter B. Kennedy, Functional Nonsense and the Transcendental Approach, 5 
FORDHAM L. REV. 272 (1936) [hereinafter Kennedy, Functional Nonsense]; Walter B. 
Kennedy, Law Reviews “As Usual”?, 12 FORDHAM L. REV. 50 (1943); Walter B. Kennedy, 
Men or Laws, 2 BROOK. L. REV. 11 (1932) [hereinafter Kennedy, Men or Laws]; Walter B. 
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in 1885 and reared in Massachusetts.201  He received his A.B. and A.M. 
from Holy Cross College in Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1906 and 1912, 
respectively, and his LL.B. from Harvard Law School.202  After three 
years of private practice in Worcester, Kennedy joined the faculty of 
Catholic University of America School of Law, where he taught for 
eleven years.203  Beginning in 1923, Kennedy then spent a long career at 
Fordham Law School,204 including a stint as acting dean.205  Today, he is 
remembered at Fordham with an annual award in his name.206   
Kennedy created a significant body of work in which he critically 
appraised Legal Realism.207  In part because his scholarly output was 
tremendous, Kennedy was an effective and, increasingly over time, 
aggressive critic of Legal Realism, and a passable exponent of the 
natural law tradition. 
 
Kennedy, More Functional Nonsense—A Reply to Felix S. Cohen, 6 FORDHAM L. REV. 75 
(1937) [hereinafter Kennedy, More Functional Nonsense]; Walter B. Kennedy, The New Deal 
in the Law, 68 U.S. L. REV. 533 (1934) [hereinafter Kennedy, The New Deal in the Law]; 
Walter B. Kennedy, Portrait of the New Supreme Court (pts. 1 & 2), 13 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 
14 FORDHAM L. REV. 8 (1944–1945) [hereinafter Kennedy, Portrait]; Walter B. Kennedy, 
Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Law, 9 MARQ. L. REV. 63 (1924) [hereinafter Kennedy, 
Pragmatism]; Walter B. Kennedy, Principles or Facts?, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 53 (1935) 
[hereinafter Kennedy, Principles or Facts?]; Walter B. Kennedy, Psychologism in the Law, 29 
GEO. L.J. 139 (1941); Walter B. Kennedy, Realism, What Next? (pts. 1 & 2), 7 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 203, 8 FORDHAM L. REV. 45 (1938–1939); Walter B. Kennedy, A Review of Legal 
Realism, 9 FORDHAM L. REV. 362 (1940) [hereinafter Kennedy, A Review of Legal Realism]; 
see also Walter B. Kennedy, The Scientific Approach in the Law, 70 U.S. L. REV. 75 (1936); 
Walter B. Kennedy, Comment, The Cult of the Robe: A Dissent, 14 FORDHAM L. REV. 192 
(1945) [hereinafter Kennedy, Cult of the Robe]. 
Kennedy’s scholarly output was especially pronounced relative to the time period and 
the paucity of resources with which Catholic law faculty contended. 
201.  Walter B. Kennedy (1885–1945), 15 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1946). 
202.  Id. 
203.  Id. 
204.  Id. 
205.  Id. 
206.  Awards, FORDHAM UNIV., www.law.fordham.edu/office-of-student-affairs/16978.h
tm (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/394Z-ETVH. 
207.  This is in addition to his significant scholarship in the areas of labor law and 
property law.  E.g., WALTER B. KENNEDY, CASES ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
(1932); Walter B. Kennedy, Garnishment of Intangible Debts in New York, 35 YALE L.J. 689 
(1926); Walter B. Kennedy, Law and the Railroad Labor Problem, 32 YALE L.J. 553 (1923) 
[hereinafter Kennedy, Law and the Railroad Labor Problem]; Walter B. Kennedy, The 
Schneiderman Case—Some Legal Aspects, 12 FORDHAM L. REV. 231 (1943). 
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When Kennedy began writing about Legal Realism in the early 
1920s,208 his initial appraisal of the nascent movement had a tone of 
appreciative yet critical engagement.209  Later, especially after the rise of 
totalitarian regimes, Kennedy came to view Legal Realism—at least in 
some of its radical manifestations—as a totalitarian fellow traveler,210 
though he continued to acknowledge its valuable contributions.211 
Kennedy tended to focus his critical attention on the negative results 
that followed from adoption of Legal Realism as the regnant legal 
philosophy.  For instance, Kennedy tied the Supreme Court’s sudden 
rejection of broad swaths of precedent during the New Deal to 
Realism’s embrace of pragmatism.212  Kennedy argued that Realism’s 
embrace of legal pragmatism led its adherents on the Court to an 
unprincipled and poorly justified rejection of traditional legal doctrines 
along with the hasty adoption of new ones.213  In another piece, Kennedy 
maintained that the rule of law was a casualty of the Realists’ excessive 
emphasis on law’s indeterminacy.214  Legal Realism therefore called into 
question the relative certainty and stability of the legal system, which, as 
an aspect of the common good, Catholic legal theory held was a core 
purpose of law.215   
c. Miriam Theresa Rooney 
Miriam Theresa Rooney has the most interesting personal story of 
the three Catholic legal scholars we detail.  Though she came from 
modest origins in Boston’s working-class Irish neighborhood, Rooney 
 
208.  Kennedy, Pragmatism, supra note 200, at 63. 
209.  See id. at 64 (“The truth is that this criticism of the law [by Realists], while often 
intemperate and extreme, contains a degree of validity.”). 
210.  Kennedy, A Review of Legal Realism, supra note 200, at 373 & nn. 48–50; see also 
Francis E. Lucey, S.J., Natural Law and American Legal Realism: Their Respective 
Contributions to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society, 30 GEO. L.J. 493 (1942) (providing 
an unsympathetic description of Realism). 
211.  Kennedy, A Review of Legal Realism, supra note 200, at 363 (“I do not deny that 
Realism has made many worthwhile contributions to the science of law.”); see also id. at 373 
(“Out of the commendable beginning of realism with its objective of true scientific research 
came forth increasing doubt as to the utility of the rule of law, now terminating in absolute 
despair of a juristic order.”). 
212.  Kennedy, Portrait (pt. 1), supra note 200, at 1, 13. 
213.  Id. at 13–14. 
214.  Kennedy, A Review of Legal Realism, supra note 200, at 372–73. 
215.  See id. at 370, 373–74. 
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excelled academically at Boston’s Girls’ Latin School.216  After Rooney’s 
mother passed away,217 she pursued higher education while doing 
clerical work for the State Department in Washington D.C.218  She 
received her A.B., her M.A.,219 and her Ph.D. from Catholic University.  
In 1937, Rooney succeeded in publishing her dissertation as a book, 
Lawlessness, Law, and Sanction.220 
In this book, Rooney made extensive use of the writings of St. 
Thomas Aquinas.221  Writing self-consciously as part of the 
Neo-Scholastic revival,222 Rooney argued in favor of the Thomistic 
conception of legal obligation—that law was binding on the conscience 
when it was an ordinance of reason, promulgated by legitimate 
authority, and directed toward the common good.223  This theory of 
obligation was, she said, better than competing, contemporary 
conceptions that relied on the threat of force, while also meeting the 
needs of a modern legal system.224  In Lawlessness, Law, and Sanction, 
Rooney also compared and contrasted the thought of St. Thomas 
Aquinas with that of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,225 
demonstrating both keen analysis and a thorough knowledge of each 
writer.226 
Rooney’s dissertation exemplified the Neo-Scholastic approach 
during this period.  First, Rooney identified a problem: the breakdown 
of the rule of law caused, she claimed, by an inadequate conception of 
legal obligation which, in turn, was the result of an incorrect conception 
 
216.  Interview by Lee J. Strang with Michael Risinger, John J. Gibbons Professor of 
Law, Seton Hall Law School (Aug. 6, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview by 
Lee J. Strang with Michael Risinger].  The authors thank Professor Risinger for his valuable 
assistance gathering information on Dr. Rooney’s life. 
217.  Rooney cared for her mother after high school and before college.  Id. 
218.  Id. 
219.  Id. 
220.  MIRIAM THERESA ROONEY, LAWLESSNESS, LAW, AND SANCTION (1937). 
221.  See id. at 20–58 (relying almost exclusively on St. Thomas to articulate Rooney’s 
conception of sanction). 
222.  Id. at 8; see also id. at 6 (quoting a passage from Aeterni Patris on the need for 
Scholastic philosophy). 
223.  Id. at 13–14. 
224.  Id. at 7–8. 
225.  Id. at 114–36 
226.  It appears that Rooney utilized her own translations of St. Thomas’ and others’ 
Latin writings. 
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of legal sanction.227  “In such moments of bewilderment as we live in, 
Scholastic philosophy presents an unmistakable, clear, strong voice 
which may well be listened to if we are to solve the problem of the 
sanction of law, to reduce lawlessness, and to maintain peace and 
preserve civilization.”228  Second, she restated, for a modern audience, 
the—correct—Scholastic conception of legal obligation and sanction, 
emphasizing St. Thomas’ writings.229  Rooney argued that “the 
Scholastic concept of sanction . . . marks the highest point civilization 
has attained in solving the problem of extending the reign of law.”230  
Third, Rooney described a falling-away over the centuries, giving rise to 
Justice Holmes’s influential claims.231  Lawlessness, Law, and Sanction 
culminates in Rooney’s summary of how replacing malformed, modern 
conceptions of sanction with the Neo-Scholastic conception would 
restore the rule of law, along with specific recommendations of how to 
make that happen.232 
Though her Ph.D. and scholarship opened some doors, primarily in 
Catholic philosophical circles, she was unable to obtain an academic 
appointment.  Rooney then went to law school, graduating from George 
Washington University Law School in 1942.233  After graduation, 
Rooney returned to the State Department, this time working as a 
lawyer.234 
Finally, in 1948, Rooney secured a position as an Associate Professor 
of Law and Librarian at Catholic University under the deanship of 
Brendan Brown.235  During her time at Catholic, Rooney publicly 
worked for the fuller realization of distinctively Catholic legal education 
in her scholarship236 and in work contributing to various institutions.237 
 
227.  Id. at 11–12, 17–18. 
228.  Id. at 19. 
229.  Id. at 20–76. 
230.  Id. at 18. 
231.  Id. at 77–136. 
232.  Id. at 137–147. 
233.  Herma Hill Kay, Women Law School Deans: A Different Breed, or Just One of the 
Boys?, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 219, 222 (2002). 
234.  Interview by Lee J. Strang with Michael Risinger, supra note 216. 
235.  Kay, supra note 233, at 222.   
236.  For instance, Rooney advocated for the production of curricular materials 
grounded in the Neo-Scholastic tradition.  See, e.g., Miriam Theresa Rooney, The Movement 
for a Neo-Scholastic Philosophy of Law in America: Special Report of the Committee on the 
Philosophy of Law and Government—1932 to 1942, 18 PROC. AM. CATH. PHIL. ASS’N 185 
(1942).  
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Rooney also privately thought and planned how to construct a 
distinctively Catholic law school.238  Her opportunity came in July 1950, 
when the President of Seton Hall University, Monsignor John McNulty, 
met with Rooney about starting a law school.239  At that meeting, 
Rooney agreed to become the founding dean of Seton Hall School of 
Law240—and the first woman dean of an ABA-approved law school.241  
Wishing the law school to be distinctively Catholic, Rooney planned it 
from the ground up, including the school’s curriculum, faculty hiring,242 
ABA accreditation, and student recruitment and placement.243  She 
successfully led the school for over a decade.244 
Rooney was as productive scholar.  In addition to her published 
dissertation, Rooney frequently published articles in legal,245 
philosophical,246 and other outlets.247  However, Rooney’s major 
 
237.  For instance, Rooney continued her work on the Jurisprudence Section in the 
American Catholic Philosophical Association.  Id.  She was also an associate editor of The 
New Scholasticism, from 1945–1948.  See, e.g., Miriam Theresa Rooney, Law as an Instrument 
of Social Policy—The Brandeis Theory, 22 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 52 (1947) [hereinafter 
Rooney, Law as an Instrument]. 
238.  Interview by Lee J. Strang with Michael Risinger, supra note 216. 
239.  Id.; The History of Seton Hall University School of Law: 1951–Present, SETON 
HALL L., http://law.shu.edu/About/history_of_seton_hall_law.cfm (last visited Mar. 27, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/75EB-CFNB. 
240.  See The History of Seton Hall University School of Law: 1951–Present, supra 
note 239. 
241.  First Woman Dean Was at Seton Hall, SYLLABUS, Mar. 1985, at 3.  
242.  The History of Seton Hall University School of Law: 1951–Present, supra note 239.  
Rooney’s major hire was Dr. John C.H. Wu.  Interview by Lee J. Strang with Michael 
Risinger, supra note 216; see also John C.H. Wu, The Natural Law and Our Common Law, 23 
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 13 (1954) (indicating that Professor Wu was on the Seton Hall law 
faculty). 
243.  Interview by Lee J. Strang with Michael Risinger, supra note 216. 
244.  Id.  Among other post-decanal roles, Rooney was Professor of Law at the Center 
of Comparative Law, in Saigon, South Vietnam, 12 NAT. L.F. iii (1967), and part of the office 
of the Vatican’s United Nations observer, Interview by Lee J. Strang with Michael Risinger, 
supra note 216. 
245.  E.g., Miriam Theresa Rooney, Law and the New Logic, 4 U. DET. L.J. 126 (1941); 
Rooney, Law as an Instrument, supra note 237; Miriam Theresa Rooney, Law Without 
Justice?—The Kelsen and Hall Theories Compared, 23 NOTRE DAME LAW. 140 (1947); 
Miriam Theresa Rooney, Natural Law Gobbledygook, 5 LOY. L. REV. 1 (1949); Miriam 
Theresa Rooney, Planning Law and the New Frontier, 25 NOTRE DAME LAW. 52 (1949). 
246.  E.g., Miriam Theresa Rooney, Law as an Instrument of Social Policy: The 
Brandeis Theory, 22 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 34 (1948); Miriam Theresa Rooney, Pluralism and 
the Law, 13 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 301 (1939); Miriam Theresa Rooney, Book Review, 
21 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 343 (1947); Miriam Theresa Rooney, Book Review, 16 NEW 
SCHOLASTICISM 102 (1942); Miriam Theresa Rooney, Book Review, 16 NEW 
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contribution was her efforts to institutionalize the movement of Catholic 
legal scholars.248  Before Rooney served as the founding dean of Seton 
Hall, she worked to institutionalize Neo-Scholasticism in the American 
legal academy.249  Most prominent was her role in the leadership of the 
American Catholic Philosophical Association’s Section on Law,250 the 
goal of which was to advance “a Neo-Scholastic Philosophy of Law in 
America.”251  Through her efforts, the Section sponsored a forum for the 
presentation of papers and roundtable discussions, which provided those 
interested in the Neo-Thomistic project with an opportunity to 
dialogue.252  Later, Rooney served on the editorial board for the Natural 
Law Forum, when it was launched in 1956.253   
Rooney is remembered today254 with endowed scholarships at 
Catholic University,255 and a named professorship256 and award at Seton 
Hall.257 
d. Clergy Serving on Catholic Law Faculties 
The foregoing discussion of Brown, Kennedy, and Rooney was 
designed to introduce some of the more prominent figures who featured 
 
SCHOLASTICISM 99 (1942); Miriam Theresa Rooney, Book Review, 16 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 
86 (1942); Miriam Theresa Rooney, Book Review, 15 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 394 (1941); 
Miriam Theresa Rooney, Book Review, 15 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 291 (1941). 
247.  E.g., Miriam T. Rooney, The Philosophy of Natural Law of St. Thomas Aquinas, 2 
CATH. LAW. 22 (1956). 
248.  See Rooney, supra note 236, at 186. 
249.  See id. at 185. 
250.  The Section on Law went by a number of different labels over the years, including 
the Section on Legal Philosophy, the Section on Jurisprudence, and the Committee on the 
Philosophy of Law. 
251.  Rooney, supra note 236, at 185–86. 
252.  Id. at 185–203. 
253.  Editorial Board, 1 NAT. L.F. iv (1956). 
254.  As with both Brown and Kennedy, contemporary Catholic legal education and 
scholars most frequently do not remember Rooney.  In fact, our research on the biographies 
of these leading lights of Catholic legal education in the early to mid-twentieth century was 
challenging because so little is remembered about them. 
255.  THE CATHOLIC UNIV. OF AM., ENDOWED LAW SCHOOL SCHOLARSHIPS, http://s
ba.law.edu/res/docs/committees/graduation/giftdesignation.pdf,  archived at  http://perma.cc/E
G28-BLFY. 
256.  Timothy P. Glynn, Miriam T. Rooney Professor of Law and Director of US 
Healthcare Compliance Certification Program, SETON HALL L., http://law.shu.edu/Faculty/ful
ltime_faculty/Timothy-Glynn.cfm (last visited Mar. 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/AC8
A-ME6W. 
257.  Interview by Lee J. Strang with Michael Risinger, supra note 216. 
 2015] THE FORGOTTEN JURISPRUDENTIAL DEBATE 1237 
in the Catholic Neo-Scholastic response to Legal Realism.  Such an 
introduction would be incomplete, however, if mention were not made 
of the various Catholic priests who wrote in the area of jurisprudence.  
Virtually every law school operating under Catholic auspices at this time 
had a priest on the faculty (who may or may not have been a lawyer) 
who taught a jurisprudence course in the Thomistic natural law 
tradition.258  Typically, these priests were members “of the religious 
order that sponsored the host university.”259  The written contributions 
of these men, particularly members of the Society of Jesus, were an 
important component of the Catholic legal scholars’ movement during 
this period. 
Of the total quantity of Catholic legal scholars engaged in 
jurisprudential debates from the 1920s–1940s,260 members of religious 
orders were close to a majority.  Most of these Catholic legal scholars’ 
initial training had been in theology or philosophy, which, at the time, 
strongly reflected Neo-Scholastic thought.261  Some of them, like Francis 
Lucey, S.J. and Paul Gregg, S.J. later acquired an LL.B. or LL.M, which 
helped make them more conversant in American civil law.262  Most of 
these scholarly contributions reflected the backgrounds and interests of 
their authors, so they tended to be relatively abstract and philosophical 
in nature,263 unlike, for example, Kennedy’s mixture of the abstract and 
the concrete. 
e. Summary of the Catholic Respondents to Realism 
The prominent Catholic legal scholars introduced above brought to 
their scholarship a shared perspective that reflected both their 
 
258.  See Breen & Strang, supra note 16, at 586, 591; see, e.g., KACZOROWSKI, supra 
note 173, at 17. 
259.  See Breen & Strang, supra note 16, at 586, 591. 
260.  Here, broadly conceived to include scholars who taught outside of the legal 
academy but who commented on jurisprudential issues.  E.g., Ford, supra note 179. 
261.  See GERALD A. MCCOOL, S.J., FROM UNITY TO PLURALISM 5 (1989) (“Neo-
Thomism acquired . . . [a] privileged place . . . in Catholic thought and education until the 
Second Vatican Council.”). 
262.  For example, Fr. Paul Gregg, S.J.’s initial education was an A.B., and A.M., 
followed by an LL.B. and LL.M.  Paul L. Gregg, S.J., The Pragmatism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 
31 GEO. L.J. 262, 262 (1943); Lucey, supra note 210, at 493. 
263.  See, e.g., id. at 262–63.  Of course, much scholarship by members of religious orders 
also bridged the abstract with the concrete.  See, e.g., Francis E. Lucey, S.J., Liability Without 
Fault and the Natural Law, 24 TENN. L. REV. 952 (1957) (arguing that liability without fault 
was compatible with the natural law tradition). 
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backgrounds and common conception of law.  Each received some or all 
of his or her education in Catholic institutions, which, during the period 
of their education, offered a relatively standard—though distinct from 
other American educational institutions—educational program.264  They 
were well educated, with advanced degrees.  Each also was—and 
perceived himself or herself to be—a relative outsider in the American 
legal academy.  The most important commonality, discussed 
immediately below, is that Brown, Kennedy, and Rooney drew upon, 
advocated, and furthered the Neo-Scholastic renaissance then occurring 
around the globe. 
3. The Architectonic Role of the Neo-Scholastic Revival 
The core jurisprudential perspective of Catholic critics of Legal 
Realism was the natural law tradition.265  Beginning in the late-
nineteenth century, through the early decades of the twentieth century, 
and into the 1940s, there was a widespread, well-known, and influential 
revival in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, often labeled the 
Neo-Scholastic or Neo-Thomistic revival, of which natural law was a key 
component.266  Catholic legal scholars at work in the field of 
jurisprudence universally embraced the natural law tradition.  They 
sought to defend it and articulate its claims, and they urged its 
desirability over its jurisprudential rivals.267 
 
264.  PHILIP GLEASON, CONTENDING WITH MODERNITY: CATHOLIC HIGHER 
EDUCATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 4–6, 16–17, 49, 51–61, 105–23, 136–66 (1995); see 
also JAMES TUNSTEAD BURTCHAELL, C.S.C., THE DYING OF THE LIGHT: THE 
DISENGAGEMENT OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES FROM THEIR CHRISTIAN CHURCHES 
577 (1998) (“The undergraduate curriculum at Boston College was stamped with another 
Jesuit hallmark, one borne by the professional programs as well.  This was the intensive study 
of scholastic philosophy.  Philip Gleason has shown persuasively how Neo-Thomist 
philosophy served as the sturdy armature on which American Catholic higher education 
found its distinctive intellectual shape in the first half of this century.”).   
265.  See, e.g., Brendan F. Brown, Foreword, 1 CATH. U. L. REV. ix, ix–xii (1950) 
(stating that the Catholic University of America Law Review would emphasize “scholastic 
jurisprudence”); id. at x (stating that the law review would be the “voice of The School of 
Natural Law Jurisprudence in America”); Rooney, supra note 236, at 185–86 (detailing the 
goals, successes, and failures of the efforts by Catholic legal scholars to advance 
Neo-Scholasticism in American law). 
266.  See GERALD A. MCCOOL, THE NEO-THOMISTS 9–11, 31–45, 151–57 (1994) 
[hereinafter MCCOOL, THE NEO-THOMISTS] (describing the worldwide revival in natural 
law); MCCOOL, supra note 261, at 209–30 (same); Hittinger, supra note 91, at xv–xxiv (same); 
see also Brown, supra note 22, at 19 (tying the revival of natural law scholarship in the legal 
academy to the broader revival in Thomism). 
267.  See Connor, supra note 126, at 161 (promoting “Scholastic Philosophy”). 
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The depth of these critics’ knowledge of the natural law tradition 
was generally good, though their sophistication varied.  One of the most 
sophisticated Catholic legal scholars in this area was Francis E. Lucey, 
S.J.  Father Lucey led the Law School at Georgetown University as its 
regent268 for three decades.269  He was an outspoken advocate of natural 
law and a critic of Legal Realism. 
In Natural Law and American Legal Realism: Their Respective 
Contributions to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society, Father Lucey 
offered an erudite exposition of natural law.270  After reviewing the 
history of American jurisprudential thought, including Legal Realism, 
Lucey described the natural law tradition271 and explained the various 
relationships between natural and positive law.272  Most positive law, 
said Lucey, is what St. Thomas labeled determinatio, a specific rule or 
ordinance that varied with time and place.273  Consequently, lawmakers 
must utilize their judgment to determine how best to meet the 
challenges presented by their particular circumstances through positive 
law.274 
Kennedy’s knowledge of Neo-Scholastic thought appears to have 
been less robust.275  He had read and cited to the canonical texts and to 
 
268.  The regent was a position at the Jesuit law schools—and some others, such as 
Seton Hall, as well—held by a cleric.  The regent was an intermediary between the law 
school’s dean—usually a layman—and the university’s president, usually a cleric.  Our 
research indicates that the specific role and duties of the regent varied fairly dramatically by 
school and time period, based on factors such as the regent’s personality, education in 
American civil law, relationship with the university’s president, and the dean and faculty’s 
expectations.  See Breen & Strang, supra note 16, at 591–92 & n.217. 
269.  See THE FIRST 125 YEARS: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE GEORGETOWN 
UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 71–72, 93–138 (1995) [hereinafter THE FIRST 125 YEARS] 
(describing Father Lucey’s impact on the school). 
270.  Lucey, supra note 210, at 493. 
271.  Id. at 493–524. 
272.  Id. at 524–25. 
273.  Id. at 525. 
274.  See id. (stating that lawmakers will have to “resort to experimentation[ and] trial 
and error, to see what will best conform with the common good”); see also Brown, supra note 
22, at 9 (making this same distinction). 
275.  See generally supra note 200 and accompanying text.  This judgment is an inference 
from Kennedy’s scholarship, which, as we describe below, most frequently utilized the tools 
of American legal practice and, relative to Fr. Lucey, infrequently explicitly deployed 
arguments from Neo-Scholastic thought.  Of course, Kennedy’s knowledge of the natural law 
tradition may have been as robust as Fr. Lucey’s, and he may have prudently declined to 
utilize arguments that, he judged, may have been too foreign to his interlocutors and 
American legal scholars more generally. 
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contemporary Neo-Scholastic scholarship, to describe his own 
jurisprudential perspective.  In his 1941 contribution to the collection 
My Philosophy of Law, Kennedy described a “struggle . . . emerging 
between two polar and antithetical theories of law[:] . . . Scholasticism 
. . . [and] Realism,”276 and referred to St. Thomas and Pope Leo XIII.277  
The bulk of his scholarship responding to the Realists did not, however, 
expressly utilize Neo-Scholastic sources. 
Kennedy’s most significant contribution, however—displayed across 
two decades of scholarship—was his ability to vault the chasm 
separating most Neo-Scholastics and most Realists.  The jurisprudential 
architecture within which he worked was Neo-Scholasticism, but his 
training and education as an American civil lawyer enabled him to 
constructively engage with Realist claims in a way that other—
especially clerical—Catholic legal scholars found more challenging. 
Despite the natural law foundation of much of Catholic legal 
scholars’ critiques, a significant portion of their criticism of Realism was 
not particularly Catholic in nature.  Instead, these scholars utilized, in 
addition to analyses at home in the natural law tradition, the tools 
common to American jurisprudes of the era.278 
Kennedy is the best example of this.  For instance, he pointedly 
criticized the Realists for harboring a “fact-fetish.”279  The Realists 
emphasized the importance of “tangible” and “observable” facts over 
“the vaporous abstraction of principle or rule” so that law could be 
“divorced from the vice of metaphysical catch-words and airy ideas.”280  
In commenting on this theme in the work of many Realists, Kennedy 
noted that, through their rhetoric, the Realists were often guilty of 
reifying facts in the same way formalists of the late-nineteenth century 
had reified legal rights, duties, and concepts.281  As Kennedy observed, 
facts could be “just as elusive and nimble as principles and rules,” and 
 
276.  Kennedy, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 200, at 147.   
277.  Id. at 148, 159.   
278.  See, e.g., Kennedy, Cult of the Robe, supra note 200, at 192–93 (1945) (critiquing 
then-Judge Frank’s call for judges to cease wearing robes, and utilizing standard legal 
arguments, such as precedent).   
279.  Kennedy, Principles or Facts?, supra note 200, at 58, 63. 
280.  Id. at 58–59. 
281.  See id. at 58. 
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merely “[l]abelling [something] . . . ‘observable’ or ‘tangible’ does not 
make . . . [it] so.”282 
Forsaking the conceptualism of CLT, against which the Realists 
rebelled, Kennedy saw the Realists as embracing a conceptualism of 
science.  According to Kennedy, the Realists failed to “recall that 
science has its competing theories which are real even in the face of very 
simple facts.”283  Thus, Kennedy thought that the Realists were guilty of 
being “addicted to science-worship”284 and of naively believing in “the 
infallibility of scientific methods.”285 
Moreover, as Kennedy made clear, facts do not present themselves 
to the human mind in pristine form, untouched by “the human element 
of research.”286  Even if the distorting effects of personal feeling and bias 
are largely eliminated from the facts accumulated in the fact-finding 
process, Kennedy noted, “some norm or standard must be applied to 
these facts, however neatly piled.”287  Indeed, at the very least, the judge 
“must have a weighing machine with which to evaluate such definitely 
found facts.”288  As Philip Mechem, a non-Catholic critic of the Realists 
likewise observed in curt fashion, “[f]acts will not evaluate 
themselves.”289 
The corpus of Kennedy’s work stands out as well-researched, 
written, and argued, as the work of an American academic lawyer, and 
not the work of a philosopher, or a theologian, or someone unfamiliar 
with American legal practice.  The subjects of Kennedy’s scholarship fit 
squarely within American legal scholarship and included labor relations, 
 
282.  Id. at 59.  Kennedy shared this criticism with philosopher Morris Cohen, who 
similarly remarked, “it is . . . necessary to be on guard against the easy assumption that any 
proposition becomes true when someone labels it natural science.”  Morris R. Cohen, Book 
Review, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 171, 177–78 (1936) (reviewing EDWARD STEVENS ROBINSON, 
LAW AND THE LAWYERS (1935)). 
283.  Kennedy, Principles or Facts?, supra note 200, at 61–62.  As Morris Cohen 
similarly noted, it is “obvious that without some guiding principle, idea, or theory as 
hypothesis, we cannot even determine what facts to look for.”  Morris R. Cohen, Book 
Review, 31 ILL. L. REV. 411, 412 (1936) (reviewing THURMOND W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS 
OF GOVERNMENT (1935)). 
284.  Kennedy, Principles or Facts?, supra note 200, at 70. 
285.  Id. at 62.  This is what Cohen described as a “naive faith in the popular myth that 
science consists in observing the facts and ignoring theories.”  Cohen, supra note 282, at 412. 
286.  Kennedy, Principles or Facts?, supra note 200, at 61. 
287.  Id. at 63. 
288.  Kennedy, A Review of Legal Realism, supra note 200, at 368. 
289.  Philip Mechem, The Jurisprudence of Despair, 21 IOWA L. REV. 669, 678 (1936). 
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the New Deal, Legal Realism, the Supreme Court, stare decisis, and 
even law reviews.290  Kennedy’s writing shows that he was well-
acquainted with the bread-and-butter of American law—cases and legal 
doctrines291—and that he utilized the wide range of arguments that all 
American legal scholars would and could utilize.292 
The scholarly engagement of Brown, Rooney, Lucey, and Kennedy 
was complimented by contributions from many other strong Catholic 
legal scholars.293  Much of this other scholarship was of similarly high 
quality, though some was less powerful, and for two main reasons: first, 
as discussed above, some of the Catholic legal scholars who participated 
in the debate were not trained primarily or initially as American civil 
lawyers294; and second, like all schools of thought, some Catholic legal 
scholars involved in the debate over Legal Realism were simply not as 
good in their scholarship as others.295 
Though the Catholic legal scholars discussed above were able 
representatives of the natural law tradition, they were not major players 
in the worldwide Neo-Scholastic revival.296  Instead, they relied on a 
handful of primary sources—in particular, St. Thomas’ Summa 
Theologica—and the commentary of leading Neo-Scholastics, for the 
concepts, arguments, and claims used in their critique of American 
Legal Realism.297  For instance, Kennedy cited to St. Thomas and 
contemporary Neo-Scholastics, though much less frequently than he 
 
290.  See the titles of Kennedy’s articles cited supra note 200. 
291.  For example, in The Bethlehem Steel Case—A Test of the New Constitutionalism, 
Kennedy evaluated the New Deal Court’s modifications of its case law and how those 
modifications impacted a recent case by delving into that case law.  Kennedy, Bethlehem Steel 
(pt. 1), supra note 200, at 133.  Kennedy regularly cited to and discussed cases, statutes, and 
other legal materials, including prodigious footnotes.  See, e.g., Kennedy, Law and the 
Railroad Labor Problem, supra note 207 (citing to a wide array of sources in his first law 
review article).   
292.  See Kennedy’s articles cited supra note 200. 
293.  See, e.g., George W. Constable, Natural Law Jurisprudence and the Cleavage of 
Our Times, 39 GEO. L.J. 365 (1951) (providing a constructively critical evaluation of 
American Catholic legal scholars’ efforts up to that point). 
294.  See supra notes 259–60 and accompanying text (noting that the scholars, especially 
the members of religious orders, were trained primarily as philosophers and theologians). 
295.  See Richard O’Sullivan, The Bond of Freedom, 6 MOD. L. REV. 177 (1943) 
(arguing that the English common law was consistent with natural law and that common law 
countries should re-embrace their uniquely Christian common law heritage). 
296.  See MCCOOL, THE NEO-THOMISTS, supra note 266, at 50–152 (describing the 
contributions of the major Neo-Scholastic thinkers of the twentieth century). 
297.  See id. at 67, 117–52. 
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cited to standard American legal sources.298 
This lack of creativity is not a criticism of the work they produced.  
Rather, it shows that these scholars utilized their legal training as a 
bridge between the high-level philosophical work of Neo-Scholasticism 
and the jurisprudential debates in American legal thought.  Their role 
was not cutting edge research within a discipline outside of law like 
philosophy, economics, or physics.  Instead, like many legal scholars 
today, Catholic legal scholars in the 1920s–1940s utilized the resources 
of other disciplines to help them elucidate the law.299 
4. Catholic Legal Scholars’ Critique of Legal Realism 
Catholic legal scholars presented a host of arguments against the 
Legal Realists.  Most fundamentally, they contended that Legal Realism 
was substantively wrong and that its errors could be corrected only 
through adoption of the natural law tradition.300  Their critique focused 
on five points: (1) the natural law—the basis of positive law—is neutral 
and independent;301 (2) the positive law should be judged based on its 
correspondence, or lack thereof, to the natural law;302 (3) the current 
American legal system, though flawed, was fundamentally sound;303 
(4) although the law is not fully determinate, it is significantly so;304 and 
(5) judges should utilize natural law norms and prudence to decide, or as 
aids in deciding, underdetermined cases.305  We will review each of these 
contentions in turn. 
 
298.  See, e.g., Kennedy, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 200, at 148; Kennedy, 
Men or Laws, supra note 200, at 21 n.88 (citing to one Neo-Scholastic source among many 
other standard sources). 
299.  Perhaps the most successful example of this phenomenon is the law and economics 
movement, whose initial advocates, and many today, were and are not trained economists, 
such as Richard Posner.  Another prominent example is the Critical Legal Studies movement, 
whose advocates were academic lawyers who utilized the tools of philosophy, history, and 
religion to advance their claims, such as Duncan Kennedy. 
300.  See, e.g., infra notes 301–305 and accompanying text. 
301.  HERGET, supra note 39, at 230. 
302.  Kennedy, Portrait (pt. 1), supra note 200, at 11–15. 
303.  Kennedy, Pragmatism, supra note 200, at 64–65. 
304.  Brown, supra note 22, at 22. 
305.  Id. 
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By way of introduction, however, we believe that Catholic legal 
scholars generally presented a nuanced evaluation of Legal Realism306 
and that their response was not solely a critique.  They also 
acknowledged what they saw as the valuable contributions made by the 
Realists.307  For example, Catholic legal scholars agreed with Realist 
claims that social science was a valuable tool in the analysis of the 
consequences of legal doctrine.308  “No one can deny,” wrote James 
Thomas Connor, Dean of Loyola University New Orleans School of 
Law, “the vast erudition, the painstaking research, and the genuine 
intellectual power of the [Realists].”309  Kennedy, especially, appreciated 
Realist contributions.310  In The New Deal in the Law, Kennedy 
critiqued Realism as undermining stare decisis and the rule of law.311  
Nevertheless, he began by acknowledging the basic truth behind the 
Realist claims: “Judges are human beings and subject to the failings of 
mankind.  Law is to a considerable degree changing and certainty of 
prediction is impossible in all cases.”312 
That being said, with the rise of communism and Nazism, and 
especially with the onset of World War II, some Catholic legal scholars 
utilized intemperate rhetoric.313  They also sometimes focused on what 
they perceived as the most radical of the Realists and their claims.314  
Kennedy, in 1938, described the arrival of what he labeled the 
 
306.  See; Kennedy, Realism, What Next? (pt. 1), supra note 109, at 203 n.2; Kennedy, A 
Review of Legal Realism, supra note 200, at 363 (“Realism has made many worthwhile 
contributions to the science of law.”). 
307.  Indeed, on occasion they sounded like Realists themselves.  See Brown, supra note 
22, at 12 (noting that natural law rhetoric was used “as an instrument of economic oppression 
and social injustice”); see also id. at 13 (arguing that courts used natural law rhetoric to 
“prevent the alteration of the common law categories of contractual ability by legislation”). 
308.  Kennedy, Pragmatism, supra note 200, at 66. 
309.  Connor, supra note 126, at 168; see also id. (“The simple fact is that the best 
considered writings coming from the pen of contemporary legal philosophers have very much 
in them that is in entire accord with scholastic principles.”). 
310.  See Kennedy, The New Deal in the Law, supra note 200, at 533–35.  
311.  Id. at 534. 
312.  Id. 
313.  See, e.g., Kennedy, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 200, at 151–52 
(describing Realism, in an otherwise moderate essay, as a “goose-step philosophy”); see also 
SCHLEGEL, supra note 37, at 2 (describing the increasingly hostile reception of Realism 
during this period); Duxbury, supra note 45, at 139 (same). 
314.  See, e.g., Kennedy, Functional Nonsense, supra note 200. 
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“surrealist[s]” who “question[ed] the validity and utility of reason and 
principles, moral or legal, as worthwhile guides in the shaping of law.”315 
Catholic legal scholars took advantage of the newly available private 
papers of Justice Holmes, who was frequently cited and praised by Legal 
Realists.316  They argued that Holmes’s less attractive characteristics, for 
the first time fully available, reflected the logical conclusions of Legal 
Realism.317  For example, Kennedy argued that the New Deal Court’s 
dramatic shift in jurisprudential perspective was, in large measure, due 
to Holmes’s influence.318  Kennedy endeavored to show that “[a]n 
inspection of the philosophical fields in which [Justice Holmes] . . . 
labored discloses that the seeds of skepticism, cynicism and ‘can’t-helps’ 
which he planted are now producing a bumper crop of current doubts, 
despair and pessimism, tilled, cultivated and harvested by his devoted 
followers.”319  Father Lucey likewise relied on numerous citations to 
Justice Holmes’s personal papers to build his case against Realism.320 
Returning to their critique of Legal Realism, first, Catholic legal 
scholars maintained that positive law—to merit the label law—must be 
connected to natural law.321  If the positive law—statutes, administrative 
actions, executive orders, and judicial decisions—accurately reflected 
 
315.  Kennedy, Realism, What Next? (pt. 1), supra note 109, at 203–04; see also Kennedy, 
Men or Laws, supra note 200, at 12 n.3a (focusing on Jerome Frank’s relatively more robust 
Realist claims). 
Father Robert I. Gannon, S.J., president of Fordham University, cited “the peculiar 
horror and universal destruction of this atheistic war.”  Robert I. Gannon, S.J., What Are We 
Really Fighting?, 11 FORDHAM L. REV. 249, 253 (1942).  Hitler, he said, was “simply showing 
the world in his own inimitable way the logical conclusions of his atheistic premises.”  Id. at 
251.  This same line of thought had been smuggled into the United States by students who sat 
“at the feet of German professors in schools of philosophical sabotage.”  Id. at 252.  These 
men, as university professors and jurists, were intellectual “saboteurs” having “adopted as 
their philosophy, principles of rationalism and positivism which by eliminating the Divine 
Law and objective truth, eliminated all solid grounds for condemning” wrongful conduct.  Id.  
In America, however, Gannon said that people were “beginning to recognize as a nation that 
the real enemy of democracy is Atheism, whether it be adorned with a black swastika, a red 
star or a Ph.D.”  Id. at 254; see also Palmer, supra note 43, at 573 (providing a similar 
example). 
316.  See, e.g., Kennedy, Portrait (pt. 1), supra note 200, at 10. 
317.  See G. Edward White, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 
65–68 (1971). 
318.  Kennedy, Portrait (pt. 1), supra note 200, at 8. 
319.  Id. at 10. 
320.  Lucey, supra note 210, passim. 
321.  HERGET, supra note 39, at 230. 
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natural law, these scholars argued, then it was just.322  Positive law that 
comported with the natural law also satisfied the basic demand of 
justice—that each be given his due.323  In this way, even if positive law 
was the product of competing interest groups negotiating and doing 
battle in the political arena, it remained neutral between contending 
persons, classes, and other societal relationships.324  Positive law that 
met the requirements of distributive and commutative justice was 
therefore appropriately neutral.325   
According to Catholic legal scholars, the natural law tradition 
emphasized that positive law was the product of reason and human will, 
not solely will.326  Therefore, though acknowledging that human 
legislators and judges are shaped by their particular backgrounds—their 
class, religion, and race, for example—Catholic legal scholars contended 
that judges and legislators possessed the ability to utilize their rational 
faculties to create and articulate legal norms independent of their 
individual circumstances.327  As Kennedy summarized: 
True it is that scholasticism has faith in traditional law, in man, in 
his power to reason, in his free will, and in the capacity of the 
judge to decide legal problems according to rules and principles.  
Scholasticism does not contend that man is free from prejudice 
or emotion; that he never acts instinctively.  Far from it.  But the 
scholastic jurist believes that it is within the nature of mankind 
generally to subordinate these emotional factors.328 
As alluded to earlier, Catholic critics often argued that Realism was 
of-a-piece with the jurisprudential thought that paved the way for the 
rise of totalitarian regimes.329  Catholic scholars connected Realism to 
 
322.  Id. at 230–39. 
323.  3 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Pt. II-II, Q. 58, Art. 1, at 1434 
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Bros. ed. 1947). 
324.  See Brown, supra note 22, at 15 (arguing that positive law tied to natural law will 
create an “equilibrium between the whole and its parts and between the constitutive parts.”). 
325.  See id. at 9 (“Right and justice were based upon the harmony or fitness involved in 
the nature of things.”). 
326.  See Kennedy, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 200, at 148 (“Scholasticism 
strongly believes in the power of man to reason and to judge impartially in accordance with 
his freedom of will.”). 
327.  Id. at 151. 
328.  Id. at 153–54.   
329.  See Kennedy, Portrait (pt. 1), supra note 200, at 3 (explaining that the New Deal 
Court’s dramatic rate of overrulings was caused by “the full sweep of extreme jurisprudential 
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totalitarianism330 via legal positivism.331  They contended that Realism 
was a manifestation of positivism.332 
Specifically, these scholars argued—uncontroversially—that 
positivism was defined by its analytic separation of law from morality.333  
This separation neutered jurists and lawyers in nations infected with 
totalitarian ideologies.334  Focusing their energies on Germany and, to a 
lesser extent, the Soviet Union, Catholic scholars noted that significant 
portions of those nations’ legal establishments blithely—and often 
enthusiastically—supported totalitarianism.335  In the same way, 
Catholic legal scholars argued, Realism’s abandonment of a tie between 
law and morality336 opened the possibility that American law would be 
used for wicked ends.337 
Catholic critics were not alone in drawing this connection.  Lon 
Fuller, one of the most prominent American legal scholars of the 
twentieth century, engaged in a sustained criticism of Realism.338  Fuller, 
like his Catholic counterparts, argued that Realism was a manifestation 
of positivism.339  In his 1940 book, The Law in Quest of Itself, Fuller first 
 
isms parading the American scene”); Kennedy, A Review of Legal Realism, supra note 199, at 
373 & nn. 48–50. 
330.  ROONEY, supra note 220, at 114–36. 
331.  In keeping with then-contemporary terminology, Catholic legal scholars typically 
referred to legal positivism as the “Analytic School.”  Connor, supra note 126, at 169.  For 
one perspective on the connections between legal positivism and Realism, see Rumble, supra 
note 107, at 986–89. 
332.  Kennedy, A Review of Legal Realism, supra note 200, at 373.  Modern scholars 
have speculated that, though it does not appear that prominent Realists themselves were 
versed in positivist jurisprudence, they indirectly received knowledge of the school via Justice 
Holmes.  Rumble, supra note 107, at 988–89 & n.13. 
333.  This is generally known as the separation thesis.  See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT 
OF LAW 185–86 (2d ed. 1994) (“Here we shall take Legal Positivism to mean the simple 
contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain 
demands of morality.”).   
334.  See id. at 207–09. 
335.  Brown, supra note 22, at 23–24. 
336.  SEBOK, supra note 103, at 116.   
337.  See Kennedy, A Review of Legal Realism, supra note 200, at 373.  Although 
rejecting an ultimate jurisprudential link between positivism and totalitarianism, more-recent 
scholars have affirmed the link between Realism and positivism.  See, e.g., LEITER, Legal 
Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 
22, at 59, 67, 72 (emphasis omitted) (arguing that Realist claims “presupposed . . . Hard 
Positivism”). 
338.  See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 114; Fuller, supra note 181. 
339.  FULLER, supra note 114, at 51–52, 62. 
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briefly traced the intellectual history of legal positivism.340  He then 
argued that Realism was a “modern positivistic theor[y]”341  because it 
held that the “criterion of the existing law . . . [is] the field of fact”342 
found in “judicial behavior.”343 
Second, Catholic scholars challenged the Realists’ pragmatic 
orientation of law.344  Realists argued that the law should reflect “what 
works,” that law should be tested by its results.345  Catholic critics, by 
contrast, argued that the Realists lacked a standard by which to measure 
whether or not the law “worked.”346  “What test or standard of value 
does pragmatic jurisprudence offer,” Kennedy asked rhetorically, “to 
enable us to weigh the clashing ‘claims’ and wants’”?347  One cannot 
decide whether one legal norm rather than another leads to better 
consequences, Catholic scholars argued, unless one has identified what 
qualifies as better or worse.348  Catholic scholars challenged that the 
Realists elided this point349 and so left the law unmoored from a 
normative foundation.350 
Catholic scholars argued that natural law provided the needed 
metric.351  Positive law, they argued, must be consistent with natural 
law.352  Determining whether a positive law norm is consistent with 
natural law is more or less difficult depending on the context.353  Some 
natural law norms are clear, making it relatively easy to determine 
 
340.  Id. at 16–41. 
341.  Id. at 46. 
342.  Id. at 52. 
343.  Id. at 53; see also id. at 60–62 (summarizing Realism). 
344.  See Kennedy, Portrait (pt. 1), supra note 200, at 11–15. 
345.  See id. at 12–13. 
346.  See Brown, supra note 22, at 25 (“Devotion to this cause [(the natural law 
tradition)] will not only serve the ends of truth, but will contribute to the wide-spread 
socialization of the law by supplying a definitive authority—the absence of which is perhaps 
the greatest weakness in the sociological and realist movements.”); Kennedy, Portrait (pt. 1), 
supra note 200, at 13; Kennedy, A Review of Legal Realism, supra note 200, at 374. 
347.  Kennedy, Pragmatism, supra note 200, at 71. 
348.  See Brown, supra note 22, at 22; Kennedy, Portrait (pt. 1), supra note 200, at 13. 
349.  Brown, supra note 22, at 22. 
350.  Id. at 24–25; Kennedy, Pragmatism, supra note 200, at 71. 
351.  See Connor, supra note 126, at 169; Kennedy, A Review of Legal Realism, supra 
note 200, at 373; see also HERGET, supra note 39, at 229–30. 
352.  See Brown, supra note 22, at 9 (stating that natural law provided the “norm with 
which to criticize positive law”). 
353.  Id. at 22. 
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whether positive law norms conform to them.354  Natural law does not 
give clear guidance, however, for a significant portion of practical life 
that is governed by positive law.355  In these areas, legislators and judges 
must use prudential judgment to determine the best legal norm.356 
Since meeting the requirements of natural law left ample room for 
prudential judgment, Catholic scholars advocated use of the tools of 
analysis promoted by the Realists.357  There was, therefore, significant 
agreement between the two camps on this point.358  Catholic scholars 
acknowledged that the tools identified by Realists, such as social science 
data, were important to make accurate prudential judgments.359  
However, even in the context of prudential judgment, natural law 
continued to provide a standard for judgment: the flourishing of human 
beings.   
Relatedly, Catholic legal scholars argued that, in seeking to banish 
the concept of natural law and natural rights from legal theory, Legal 
Realism did not fit the American legal tradition.360  Catholic legal 
scholars frequently wrote that the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution, along with sizeable portions of positive law, were 
significantly influenced by and reflected the natural law tradition.361  
Realists, who rejected natural law, were therefore swimming against the 
current of American law in its deepest channels.362 
Third, Catholic legal scholars largely agreed with the Realists that 
American law needed reform.363  There was, however, clearly a 
difference in emphasis.  While many of the most prominent Realists 
focused their scholarship on remedying law that was out of step with 
 
354.  Id. 
355.  Id. at 15–16, 22. 
356.  Id. at 16. 
357.  Id. at 22. 
358.  See id. at 17 (“A law which ceased to grow could not be used as a means to achieve 
contemporary social objectives.”). 
359.  Kennedy, Pragmatism, supra note 200, at 66. 
360.  See Brown, supra note 22, at 11–12, 18. 
361.  Kennedy, Pragmatism, supra note 200, at 67–69.  Catholic legal scholars over-
stated their case when they suggested that the American Founders “sought to base the new 
American government on Thomistic principles.”  HERGET, supra note 39, at 237. 
362.  See Brown, supra note 22, at 23 (arguing that the “sweeping condemnation of the 
natural law basis of most of our public law . . . must ultimately lead to the repudiation of our 
traditional political order itself, because it was the natural law concept which molded and 
gave contour to the American State”). 
363.  See Kennedy, Pragmatism, supra note 200, at 64–65. 
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social reality, Catholic legal scholars tended to affirm the fundamental 
soundness of American law.364  For example, Walter Kennedy readily 
agreed that the recent and rapid industrialization and urbanization of 
American life made modification of labor law to fit these new social 
relationships an important goal.365  That being said, Catholic legal 
scholars pushed back against some of the more robust Realist claims 
that the American legal system was fundamentally out of step and hence 
unjust.366 
Fourth, Catholic legal scholars, though acknowledging openness in 
the law, rejected some Realists’ claims of more radical legal 
indeterminacy.367  For example, James Thomas Connor agreed that 
there is often “uncertainty in the outcome of judicial investigation.”368  
He argued, however, that legal indeterminacy was not thoroughgoing or 
systemic.369  According to Catholic legal scholars, legal reasoning 
operated to constrain judicial decision making.370  In fact, one of the 
most disturbing symptoms of Legal Realism, identified by Catholic 
scholars, was the judicial attitude that the law is relatively open—that 
judges were relatively unconstrained by traditional modes of legal 
reasoning371—resulting in an erosion of stare decisis.372 
Fifth, having recognized the limited openness of law, Catholic legal 
scholars emphasized that lawmakers—judges and legislators—should 
utilize their practical wisdom in those areas of openness.373  Among 
other benefits, Catholic legal scholars noted that grounding legal 
decisions in the natural law would “endow our basic social institutions 
 
364.  See id. at 67–69 (lauding the Declaration of Independence and the amended 
Constitution, and arguing that Legal Realism threatened this inheritance). 
365.  See Kennedy, Law and the Railroad Labor Problem, supra note 207, at 555–56 
(addressing the “present labor problems” in the railroad context and proposed legal 
responses); see also id. at 557 (criticizing “the historical school of jurisprudence” for “its 
failure to view contemporaneous changes”). 
366.  See Kennedy, More Functional Nonsense, supra note 200, at 75–76 (lauding “Our 
Lady the Common Law”); Kennedy, Pragmatism, supra note 200, at 76–77. 
367.  Brown, supra note 22, at 22. 
368.  Connor, supra note 126, at 168. 
369.  Id. 
370.  Kennedy, Portrait (pt. 1), supra note 200, at 3–4. 
371.  Kennedy, A Review of Legal Realism, supra note 200, at 367. 
372.  See Kennedy, Portrait (pt. 1), supra note 200, at 3 (arguing that Realism had caused 
the decline of stare decisis because it eroded traditional modes of legal reasoning). 
373.  Brown, supra note 22, at 22. 
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with relative stability.”374  Once again, these legal scholars found 
common ground with the Realists in urging the utilization of social 
science and other tools to aid judicial and legislative judgment.375  
However, they were relatively more cautious in their assessment of how 
much social science could contribute to legal reasoning.376 
Catholic legal scholars were, to an extent, on the sidelines of the 
major jurisprudential debates occurring at the time in the American 
legal academy.  Evidence for this includes the fact that most of their 
articles appeared in Catholic law school journals, while the Legal 
Realists’ work regularly appeared in top-tier law school journals.377  
When the Realists at elite institutions did occasionally engage with 
Catholic legal scholars, they would attempt to rhetorically marginalize 
their would-be interlocutors.378  Further, many of the major 
jurisprudential debates occasioned by Realist claims occurred without 
the participation of Catholic legal scholars.379  Thus, while Catholic legal 
scholars attempted to play the role of the Socratic gadfly, they failed to 
attract the same attention that Socrates managed to attain. 
That being said, Catholic legal scholars did garner some recognition 
from their Realist counterparts.  Their impact was exemplified by the 
exchange between Walter Kennedy and Felix S. Cohen.  Cohen 
published his seminal piece, Transcendental Nonsense and the 
Functional Approach, in 1935 in the Columbia Law Review.380  There, 
 
374.  Id. at 23. 
375.  Kennedy, Pragmatism, supra note 200, at 66. 
376.  Kennedy, More Functional Nonsense, supra note 200, at 88; Kennedy, A Review of 
Legal Realism, supra note 200, at 364–65. 
377.  See THE FIRST 125 YEARS, supra note 269, at 118 (“[A]s long as [Catholic scholars 
such as Father Lucy] . .  published in the legal periodicals of Catholic universities, elite law 
professors felt free to ignore them.”).  Although Catholic law schools strove to provide their 
students with a strong legal education, none of these schools was then widely considered to be 
among the nation’s best.  See Breen & Strang, supra note 16, at 555, 633–34.  Most Catholic 
law schools were not founded as legal centers of academic learning and scholarship; instead, 
they were primarily institutions of vocational training for the children of immigrants seeking 
entry into the professional classes of American society.  Id. at 578–84. 
378.  See THE FIRST 125 YEARS, supra note 269, at 118 (describing Mark DeWolfe 
Howe’s dismissive characterization of Father Lucey’s arguments as typical of a “Jesuit” and at 
base theological).  Unfortunately, contemporary scholars have continued to caricature and 
marginalize Catholic legal scholars’ criticism of Legal Realism.  See Duxbury, supra note 45, 
at 169–70 (maligning the Catholic legal scholars’ criticisms of Realism as “little more than 
crude attempts at proselytisation”). 
379.  See THE FIRST 125 YEARS, supra note 269, at 118. 
380.  Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. 
L. REV. 809 (1935). 
 1252 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:1203 
Cohen attacked what he characterized as the reigning jurisprudential 
regime mired in “supernatural terms.”381  The following year, Kennedy 
responded in the same provocative vein with an article creatively titled 
Functional Nonsense and the Transcendental Approach, published in 
the Fordham Law Review.382  In Correspondence, also published in the 
Fordham Law Review, Cohen attempted to rebut Kennedy’s primary 
claims.383  The prolific Kennedy once again took up the gauntlet with an 
article challenging Cohen’s reply and rearticulating his claims.384 
The Columbia Law Review, which had published Cohen’s original 
article, declined to publish Kennedy’s piece,385 but plainly Cohen 
believed that Kennedy’s criticisms warranted a serious and thoughtful 
response.  Still, the pecking order and degree of exposure was set.  
Cohen, the Realist, published an article in an elite law journal, while the 
Catholic scholar, Kennedy, played the role of respondent in a non-elite 
journal published by his home institution.  Lastly, following a short 
piece by Cohen, Kennedy again published a longer piece, again in a 
Catholic law school journal.386  So, while Kennedy’s claims did attract 
serious attention, he was clearly the “outsider looking into” the debate. 
Another reason that Catholic legal scholars were outsiders to the 
jurisprudential debate was that their jurisprudential perspective was new 
to American legal discourse.  Although a version of natural law had 
been the dominant perspective a century before, the Neo-Scholastic 
natural law tradition was a recent import to American shores via, 
primarily, Catholic immigration and the renewal of interest in Thomistic 
thought spurred on by Pope Leo XIII.387  Most of the non-Catholic 
participants in the jurisprudential debates of the 1930s and 1940s had 
little or no exposure to Thomistic natural law during their education.388  
Thus, most members in the American legal academy regarded Catholic 
legal scholars’ perspective as foreign, unorthodox, and presumptively 
outside the bounds of conventional academic discourse.   
 
381.  Id. at 811. 
382.  Kennedy, Functional Nonsense, supra note 200. 
383.  Felix S. Cohen, Correspondence, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 548 (1936). 
384.  Kennedy, More Functional Nonsense, supra note 200. 
385.  See, e.g., Kennedy, Functional Nonsense, supra note 200, at 272. 
386.  See, e.g., Kennedy, More Functional Nonsense, supra note 200. 
387.  J. DARYL CHARLES, RETRIEVING THE NATURAL LAW: A RETURN TO MORAL 
FIRST THINGS 130 (2008); Kennedy, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 200, at 159–60. 
388.  See CHARLES, supra note 387, at 65. 
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Relatedly, non-Catholic American legal scholars discounted 
Catholic legal scholars and their natural law perspective because of their 
affiliation with the Catholic Church.  For a variety of reasons, the 
Catholic Church was frequently viewed by Americans as either being or 
holding views incompatible with American values.389  For instance, Mark 
DeWolfe Howe, in a 1951 law review article, snidely remarked that the 
Catholic critics of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., were “so firmly 
grounded in the Catholic philosophy of law” that, if he were to attempt 
to address their criticisms directly, he “should find [himself] quickly 
engaged in a theological controversy beyond [his] competence to 
discuss.”390  According to Howe, given that John C. Ford and Francis E. 
Lucey were “members of the Jesuit Order,” their opposition to Justice 
Holmes was “almost inevitable” because of the fact that Justice Holmes 
was “a skeptic in matters of religion” who “denied the existence of that 
law of nature upon which the Catholic philosophy of law is based.”391 
5. The Attempted Institutionalization of Catholic Legal Thought’s 
Response 
In addition to their prodigious scholarship, Catholic legal scholars 
also utilized other outlets to rebut Realist claims and propound the 
natural law tradition.  Like other intellectual movements, these scholars 
recognized that Catholic legal thought would have a much greater 
chance of lasting success if they invested their movement with 
institutional forms of expression. 
Two mechanisms of attempted institutionalization merit some 
discussion.  First, many Catholic law schools either initiated or, more 
frequently, redoubled their curricular commitments to natural law.392  
Second, Catholic legal educators attempted to build academic fora 
through which the natural law tradition would be expounded.393 
 
389.  This view is now, once again, in vogue among some elites.  See Ronald A. Lindsay, 
The Uncomfortable Question: Should We Have Six Catholic Justices on the Supreme Court?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2014, 6:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/Ronald-a-lindsa
y/supreme-court-catholic-justices_b_5545055.html (last updated August 30, 2014, 5:59 AM), 
archived at http://perma.cc/W2W-R556 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), and questioning “the compatibility between 
being a Catholic and being a good citizen”). 
390.  Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV. 
529, 530 (1951). 
391.  Id. at 530–31. 
392.  See Connor, supra note 126, at 164. 
393.  See Brown, supra note 172, at 10. 
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Most Catholic law schools required students to take a course in 
jurisprudence and, in most instances, this course focused on 
Neo-Scholastic natural law.394  Beginning in the 1930s, many Catholic 
schools expanded their curricular focus on natural law.395  They did so to 
promote natural law and to combat the growth of Legal Realism.396 
One of the major challenges to this curricular reform was the 
absence of suitable instructional materials.  From the beginning of their 
reform effort, Catholic legal scholars called for the creation of materials 
that brought together natural law and American civil law in a way that 
was suitable for use in a modern law school classroom.397  These goals, 
however, were never realized.  For example, when serving as chairman 
of the American Catholic Philosophical Association’s Section on 
Jurisprudence in 1942, Miriam Theresa Rooney lamented the lack of 
such law school texts.398  In fact, the problem was doubly bad because, as 
Rooney noted, “we have not yet produced enough monographs based 
on original research to supply much of the data we need for the 
adequate text-book projected in 1937.”399 
Catholic legal scholars ultimately met with little success, outside of 
the field of jurisprudence, where they fashioned a modest amount of 
instructional materials.  Though even here, there was not an 
overabundance of options.  In 1924, Francis P. LeBuffe, S.J., a faculty 
member at Fordham Law School, organized and published his lecture 
notes as a jurisprudence text entitled Outlines of Pure Jurisprudence.400  
 
394.  See Connor, supra note 126, at 164 (referring to “those schools which offer” 
jurisprudence courses, indicating that some Catholic law schools did not offer such courses). 
395.  See Brown, supra note 172, at 5, 9–10 (noting that some Catholic law schools were 
starting to “hold themselves out in their [course] catalogues as presenting a specific 
[Scholastic] legal philosophy”).   
396.  See JOHN P. NOONAN, S.J., PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND GOVERNMENT 3–4 (1936) 
(stating that this book on jurisprudence was written to combat “Pragmatism,” “Materialism[,] 
and Hegelian Evolutionary Pantheism,” and because an earlier jurisprudence textbook was 
out of print); Brown, supra note 172, at 10. 
397.  Current Attacks Upon and Suggested Methods of Preserving Neo-Scholastic 
Jurisprudence, 13 PROC. AM. CATH. PHIL. ASS’N 186, 196–201 (1937) (comments of Professor 
Franklin F. Russell). 
398.  Rooney, supra note 236, at 201, 203. 
399.  Id. at 202. 
400.  FRANCIS P. LEBUFFE, S.J., OUTLINES OF PURE JURISPRUDENCE (1924); see also 
KACZOROWSKI, supra note 173, at 144–45 (describing the origins and publication of Fr. 
LeBuffe’s texts).  The text was published again in revised form in 1938 and 1947.  FRANCIS P. 
LEBUFFE, S.J. & JAMES V. HAYES, THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: WITH CASES TO 
ILLUSTRATE PRINCIPLES (4th ed. rev. & enlarged 1947); FRANCIS P. LEBUFFE, S.J. & JAMES 
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This text remained, in subsequent revised editions, the best Catholic 
jurisprudence text for law schools401 until the publication of Dr. John 
C.H. Wu’s jurisprudence casebook in 1958.402  By that time, however, 
the Neo-Scholastic wave had crested, Thomism no longer served as the 
unquestioned center of Catholic identity in higher education, and the 
impetus for natural law in legal education was on the wane. 
During this same time period, Catholic legal educators also 
attempted to create institutions in which natural law discourse could 
flourish.  Two prominent examples of this were the Natural Law 
Institute at Notre Dame Law School403 and the previously mentioned 
Section on Legal Philosophy within the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association.404  The goal of these institutions, together 
with several legal academic journals founded at this time,405 was to 
create a space that encouraged Catholic legal scholars to articulate 
natural law theory and to engage other schools of thought.406   
One of the most successful efforts to institutionalize the Catholic 
legal scholars’ Neo-Scholastic perspective was the Notre Dame Natural 
Law Institute.  It began as a conference in 1947 and then became an 
annual conference that published its proceedings.407  As it evolved, the 
Institute’s annual conference was replaced by an annual lecture on 
 
V. HAYES, JURISPRUDENCE: WITH CASES TO ILLUSTRATE PRINCIPLES (3d ed. rev. 
augmented 1938).  For a critical review of the 1938 edition, see Miriam Theresa Rooney, 
Book Review, 13 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 196 (1939). 
401.  See Miriam T. Rooney, Jurisprudence—A Teaching Problem, 4 CATH. LAW. 172 
(1958) (describing the lack of jurisprudence texts generally and from the perspective of 
Catholic legal thought). 
402.  JOHN C.H. WU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JURISPRUDENCE (Erwin N. Griswold 
ed., 1958). 
403.  See David C. Bayne, S.J., Notre Dame’s Natural Law Institute, 82 AMERICA 433, 
433–34 (1950). 
404.  Minutes of Meeting of December 30–31, 1935, 11 PROC. AM. CATH. PHIL. ASS’N 
194 (1935); see also Brown, supra note 172, at 10 (noting the extensive participation of 
Catholic legal scholars in the Section’s work); Brown, supra note 265, at x (describing the 
Section’s origin and purpose). 
405.  For instance, the Catholic Lawyers Guild of New York established an annual 
Natural Law Conference in 1954.  See Rooney, supra note 247, at 22 (publishing an address to 
the third annual Natural Law Conference). 
406.  Then-Dean Brendan Brown at Catholic University established a law review in 1950 
with the stated goal of institutionalizing scholarship from the natural law tradition.  Brown, 
supra note 263, at ix–x. 
407.  See Breen & Strang, supra note 16, at 615. 
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natural law and a journal, the Natural Law Forum.408  Both the lecture 
and journal (under another name) continue today and are well-
respected. 
Other efforts met with limited success.  The Section on 
Jurisprudence floundered in the reform efforts that initially motivated it.  
The Neo-Scholastic revival began to crack in the mid-to-late-1950s, 
giving way to internal divisions.409  Since Neo-Scholasticism formed the 
backbone of the Catholic legal scholars’ reform efforts, its exhaustion as 
an intellectual movement signaled the expiration of the coherence of the 
Catholic legal scholars’ reform efforts.410  The vigorous debate between 
Legal Realists and Catholic legal scholars, described above, both 
precipitated and structured the reform proposals of leading Catholic 
legal scholars.411  With the decline of Realism as a potent force in the 
legal academy, and other factors, such as the end of World War II, the 
perceived need for reform—the perceived need for distinctively 
Catholic law schools that carried forward the Neo-Thomistic natural law 
project—diminished.  This had the effect of undercutting the 
institutionalization of Catholic legal scholars’ Neo-Scholastic 
perspective. 
C. Summary of the Catholic Response to Realism 
In sum, beginning in the 1930s, Catholic legal scholars engaged in a 
vigorous, sophisticated, and nuanced critique of Legal Realism.  These 
Catholic legal scholars drew upon and advanced the contemporary 
Neo-Scholastic revival.  Ultimately, like their Realist interlocutors, the 
Catholic legal scholars faded from the scene as a coherent movement in 
the 1950s.  Unlike their Realist counterparts, however, the critical work 
of these Catholic scholars is now all but forgotten.  Below, we suggest 
why the standard histories of this period ignore or fail to appreciate the 
contributions made by these critical writers. 
 
408.  See Joseph O’Meara, Foreword, 1 NAT. L.F. 1 (1956) (describing the origins and 
evolution of the Natural Law Forum); Bayne, supra note 403 (describing the origin and 
evolution of the Natural Law Institute); Edward F. Barrett, The “Catholic” Law School and 
the Natural Law—The Notre Dame Experiment, 56 HOMILETIC AND PASTORAL REV. 904 
(1956) (same). 
409.  See Duxbury, supra note 45, at 175. 
410.  Similarly, a Natural Law Institute at Loyola New Orleans Law School, initiated by 
Brown after he moved there in 1954, exists today as an annual lecture. 
411.  See supra Part III. 
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IV. THE UNTOLD STORY:  
EXPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF CATHOLIC LEGAL THOUGHT IN THE 
HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 
Given the robust response by Catholic legal scholars to Legal 
Realism described above, the question must be asked: Why is there a 
gap in the standard historical narrative?  Why did most accounts of 
American legal history ignore the single largest body of criticism 
directed at Legal Realism?  Why did those accounts that acknowledged 
the critical response of Catholic legal scholars to Realism do so only in 
passing or dismiss the efforts of these scholars as religious and therefore 
both unpersuasive and incapable of informing American law? 
In raising these questions, we are not claiming that, on the merits, 
Catholic legal scholars had the better of the debate with the Realists.  
Nor is it our view that Legal Realism is un-deserving of the attention it 
receives in the standard telling of American legal history.  Plainly, 
Realism had an enormous impact on the development of American law 
and legal culture.  Instead, we are making the more limited claim that 
Catholic legal scholars presented widespread and plausible critiques of 
many Realist positions.  If that is true, then why did subsequent scholars 
fail to take note of their contributions entirely?  Or, in other cases, 
dismiss these contributions in a derisive manner? 
In the Part that follows, we consider three reasons that might be 
offered to explain the lack of attention paid to Catholic legal scholars’ 
critical response to Legal Realism (discussed at length above): (1) the 
relatively low number of Catholic legal scholars who critiqued Legal 
Realism compared to the number of its proponents; (2) the good faith 
exercise of historical judgment concluding that Catholic criticisms of 
Realism were not historically significant; and (3) the rejection of natural 
law theory by contemporary legal academics, combined with the 
mistaken view that natural law is necessarily religious, and the still 
powerful presence of anti-Catholicism in American society and 
academic culture. 
A. The Relatively Insubstantial Amount of Catholic Legal Scholarship 
Published in Response to Legal Realism 
Reading contemporary legal histories in a charitable light, the 
relative inattention devoted to the Catholic response to Legal Realism 
might be due to the relatively small amount of scholarship produced by 
Catholic legal scholars compared to the volume amassed by their Realist 
counterparts.  Moreover, what scholarship they did produce might have 
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escaped the notice of historians given the relatively un-prestigious 
Catholic journals in which they published, in contrast to the elite law 
reviews where Realist scholarship appeared. 
Legal Realism was a major movement in American law, one that 
holds a special place in the imagination of American lawyers.  Putting to 
one side the contested claim as to whether the Realists constituted a 
“school” of thought,412 no one disputes that a large number of legal 
academics, lawyers, and judges took up the Realist project.  Again, 
although the contents of the list are disputed,413 in his article, Some 
Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, Karl Llewellyn 
lists twenty law professors, judges, and lawyers whom he identifies as 
Realists.414  Clearly, others might be added to this number,415 but if 
Llewellyn’s list of twenty names is taken as a baseline, it exceeds the 
number of Catholic legal scholars writing in response to the Realist 
charge.416 
Even here the sheer number of authors writing in each camp fails to 
tell the whole story.  Every law school faculty has some members who 
are more productive in terms of their scholarly output, and others less 
so.  Generally speaking, the larger a school’s faculty, the more likely it is 
that the overall number of papers published will be substantial.  Further, 
greater productivity might also be expected at a school where teaching 
loads are lighter and student–faculty ratios are lower. 
The relatively small size of most Catholic law school faculties made 
it far less likely that they would produce scholarship of any kind, let 
 
412.  See supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text. 
413.  See HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 180–81 (stating that, of those listed, “only eight or 
nine can be regarded as having been at the forefront of legal thought” and that, in Horwitz’s 
judgment, “six were not sufficiently important or distinguished as scholars even in 1931 to 
have made the list”). 
414.  Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1226 n.18 (1931).  In addition to himself, Llewellyn counts the following 
among the Realists: Walter Bingham, Ernest Lorenzen, Charles Clark, Walter Wheeler Cook, 
Arthur Linton Corbin, Underhill Moore, Thomas Reed Powell, Herman Oliphant, Jerome 
Frank, Leon Green, Max Radin, Joseph Hutcheson, Samuel Klaus, Wesley Sturges, William 
O. Douglas, Joseph F. Francis, Edwin Patterson, Leon Tulin, and Hessel Yntema.  Id. 
415.  For a discussion of those whom Llewellyn might have included but left out, see 
HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 182–83. 
416.  Broadly interpreted, Catholic legal scholars critical of Legal Realism writing in 
legal periodicals included Walter Kennedy, Miriam Theresa Rooney, Brendan Brown, 
Francis Lucey, S.J., Paul Gregg, S.J., John Ford, S.J., William Kenealy, S.J., Karl Kreilkamp, 
Anton-Hermann Chroust, William Clarke, James Thomas Connor, Edward Hogan Jr., Ben 
Palmer, and Harold McKinnon. 
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alone scholarship that specifically took up the Neo-Thomistic project 
and engaged Legal Realism.  For example, in 1950 Fordham Law School 
had seven full-time faculty members and a student body of 656, and 
Georgetown Law School had thirteen full-time faculty and 888 
students.417  By contrast, in 1950 Yale Law School had twenty-six full-
time faculty members and a student body of 548, and Columbia Law 
School boasted twenty-one full-time faculty members and 650 
students.418 
More than this, the culture of Catholic law schools during this time 
was not oriented toward the regular production of legal scholarship.  
Rather, these institutions saw themselves primarily as schools of 
professional training designed to prepare men for the practice of law by 
providing them with a scientific understanding of law and the acquisition 
of basic lawyering skills.  A faculty member at a Catholic law school 
conceived of his role primarily as that of a classroom teacher.  Many 
faculty at these schools used what free time they had to maintain a law 
practice.  Moreover, when academic legal scholarship was produced at 
Catholic law schools, it was a relatively new thing.  Formal standards 
that required faculty candidates for tenure to compile a substantial 
record of scholarly publications simply had not yet been widely adopted. 
To see what this meant in practice, it is perhaps helpful to compare 
individuals.  Walter Kennedy was by far the most prolific of the Catholic 
authors noted above.419  No one else approaches Kennedy in terms of 
the number of law review articles published by him during the period in 
question.  Yet several Legal Realists—Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, 
Walter Wheeler Cook, Felix Cohen, and Thurman Arnold, not to 
mention Roscoe Pound—easily match or exceed Kennedy’s scholarly 
output.420 
 
417.  AM. BAR ASS’N, LAW SCHOOLS AND BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 1950 REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION 7, 11 (1950),  available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/standardsarch
ive/1950_review.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9A4U-3AU2. 
418.  Id. 
419.  See supra note 200. 
420.  From 1920–1940, Kennedy published at least seventeen law review articles and 
book reviews.  See supra note 200.  During this same time, Llewellyn published at least 
twenty-eight articles, Frank published at least thirty-five articles, Felix Cohen published at 
least twenty articles, Cook published at least thirty-seven articles, Arnold published at least 
sixty-five articles, and Pound published at least one hundred twelve articles.  See DALIA 
TSUK MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE: FELIX S. COHEN AND THE FOUNDING OF 
AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM 339–42 (2007); J. MITCHELL ROSENBERG, JEROME FRANK: 
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Even when Catholic legal scholars did publish, their work was not as 
widely disseminated as the work of their Realist counterparts.  This lack 
of exposure within the wider legal academy was in part due to the 
inability of these writers to publish in more prestigious and more widely 
read, non-Catholic law journals.  As one commentator noted, “[a]s long 
as [Catholic scholars] . . . published in the legal periodicals of Catholic 
universities, elite law professors felt free to ignore them.”421  Thus, for 
the most part, the Realists and their Catholic natural law critics were not 
true interlocutors.  They were merely verbal adversaries, one of whom 
labored in the relative obscurity of the pages of Catholic law reviews. 
The fact that Catholic critics published fewer articles than their 
Realist counterparts, and the fact that their work appeared in less 
prestigious journals, might help explain why the Catholic response to 
Realism has been overlooked in the standard accounts of American 
legal history.  However, this explanation seems unlikely.  The materials 
at issue are widely available and can be found with basic historical 
research techniques.  Although less voluminous than the Realists’ own 
scholarly output, the work of Catholic legal scholars remained 
substantial.  Discovering these works does not require research that is 
especially rigorous or astute.  Moreover, quite obviously, a few legal 
historians—Duxbury, Herget, Purcell—have discovered these materials 
and discuss them to some extent in their historical accounts.422  Purcell’s 
book is especially significant in this regard in that it was first published 
in 1973 and is widely read.  As such, it predates those historical accounts 
that ignore or give virtually no attention to the Catholic response to 
Realism—Kalman (1986), Horwitz (1992), Schleigel (1995), Feldman 
(2000)—by a substantial number of years.  Complete ignorance of the 
Catholic response to Realism is not a plausible explanation for its 
absence in most accounts of American legal history. 
 
JURIST AND PHILOSOPHER 165–67 (1970); FRANKLYN C. SETARO, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF 
THE WRITINGS OF ROSCOE POUND 22–76 (1942); TWINING, supra note 36, at 555–59 (select 
bibliography of Llewellyn’s works); WALTER E. VOLKOMER, THE PASSIONATE LIBERAL: 
THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL IDEAS OF JEROME FRANK 229–31 (1970); SPENCER WEBER 
WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 207–10 (2005) (listing the principal writings 
of Thurman Arnold); Cook, Walter Wheeler, HEINONLINE, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Autho
rProfile?collection=journals&base=js&search_name=Cook,%20Walter%20Wheeler (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8MJ4-U85M. 
421.  THE FIRST 125 YEARS, supra note 269, at 118. 
422.  See Duxbury, supra note 45; see also HERGET, supra note 39; PURCELL, supra 
note 1. 
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It is worth noting that the description set forth here—that Catholic 
legal scholars produced a smaller amount of scholarship relative to the 
Realists and that their written work received comparatively little 
exposure, largely confined to the parochial audience of Catholic 
periodicals—contradicts what others have said.  For example, Neil 
Duxbury acknowledges the existence of Catholic criticism of Realism 
but dismisses it as unscholarly.423  The work of these Catholic critics was, 
he says, “highly subjective” and “unsophisticated.”424  Duxbury doubts 
that few people outside of Catholic law schools would have been 
“persuaded by the repetitiveness and the sanctimoniousness of the 
majority of the Catholic detractors,” but he claims that “the Catholic 
critique did, after a fashion, make its mark on realism.”425  Indeed, he 
contends that “the cumulative effect of the various critiques put 
forward”—Catholic and otherwise—“was to strip realism of its vitality 
and its multi-dimensionality.”426  Under the influence of this “anti-
realist” campaign, “[r]ealism was subjected . . . to an essentially negative 
assessment” and even “caricatured.”427 
For Duxbury, the Catholic contribution to this process was not due 
to the salience of any of its critiques but to its sheer volume.  “So much 
of this literature was written that even legal realists who had departed 
from academia could not but notice at least some of it.”428  The 
description provided above does not support this contention.  Even 
Duxbury seems aware that it is not fully accurate.  Thus, he notes that 
“most of the natural lawyers’ attacks on realism were published in the 
Catholic law school journals and were unlikely to have made much of an 
impact in wide legal circles,”429 and that much of this criticism “failed to 
penetrate the mainstream of American legal scholarship.”430  Moreover, 
Duxbury—an Englishman, writing in 1992 and 1995—overlooks the fact 
that, at this point in American history, Catholics and Catholic 
institutions did not enjoy the kind of full and equal status that they do 
today.  The influence of Catholic periodicals was largely confined to a 
 
423.  See Duxbury, supra note 45, at 168–70. 
424.  Id. at 175. 
425.  Id. at 173. 
426.  Id. at 175. 
427.  Id. at 176. 
428.  Id. at 173. 
429.  Id.  
430.  Id. at 175. 
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Catholic audience.431  If few people read the Realist tracts contained in 
the pages of the Columbia Law Review, even fewer people read the 
Catholic criticism of Realism contained in the University of Detroit Law 
Review, let alone the Proceedings of the American Catholic 
Philosophical Society. 
In sum, the relative paucity of scholarship, and the relatively 
marginal journals in which Catholic legal scholars published, cannot 
account for the lacuna in most legal historians’ accounts.  The historical 
evidence was easily available, and a few historians did locate and 
describe Catholic legal scholars’ contributions.   
B. The Good Faith Exercise of Historical Judgment  
A more likely explanation is that the authors of these standard 
histories simply determined that the Catholic response to Realism was 
insignificant and therefore undeserving of attention.  In setting forth a 
historical narrative, every author must make editorial decisions.  Every 
writer of history must decide which aspects of the story are deserving of 
emphasis and which aspects may be downplayed, or even ignored, 
without distorting the truth.  Moreover, in reviewing a particular 
historical era or movement, it is the task of historians to attempt to 
explain the causes and effects of historical phenomena—to account for 
the fact that events turned out as they did and why. 
Following an honest assessment of the historical record, it would be 
plausible for a historian to conclude that the Catholic response to 
Realism had little effect upon the wider jurisprudential debate.432  The 
embrace of natural law by some Realists, such as Robert Hutchins and 
Jerome Frank (with whom this article began),433 might be dismissed as 
aberrational and in no way indicative of American legal academic 
culture as a whole.  Indeed, it would be plausible for an historian to 
conclude that the relative paucity of Neo-Scholastic authors and tracts 
indicates that Neo-Scholasticism simply was not convincing to the vast 
majority of American legal academics.  The relatively small volume of 
 
431.  Id. at 173. 
432.  See id. (“It is significant, too, that most of the natural lawyers’ attacks on Realism 
were published in the Catholic law school journals and were unlikely to have made much of 
an impact in wide legal circles.”). 
433.  But see id. at 175 (claiming that the Realists only “paid lip-service” to natural law 
but that “[n]ever did they embrace it” and that Frank “had never, in fact, placed much store 
in the Thomist critique of realism”). 
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articles produced by Catholic legal scholars and, indeed, the failure of 
the Neo-Scholastic movement to transform even Catholic legal 
education (as its most vocal proponents had urged), suggests that 
Neo-Scholasticism was unable to persuade even its ideal audience—
namely, fellow Catholic law professors—let alone those outside the fold. 
Indeed, although we have described the efforts of Catholic legal 
scholars to articulate the Neo-Thomistic understanding of law as a 
“movement,” the history recounted above shows that it ultimately was a 
failed movement.  The proponents of Neo-Scholasticism in law failed to 
create the institutions necessary to sustain it.  No Catholic law school 
succeeded in developing “a legal culture . . . under the influence of a 
Neo-Scholastic philosophy” as Brown had envisioned it.434  The teaching 
materials that Rooney and others said were essential for the success of 
the project435 were never generated.  Moreover, although the 
proponents of Neo-Scholasticism in the law knew that the “revival of 
natural law jurisprudence in the theo-philosophical sense w[ould] be 
short lived unless it [was] enforced by the active support of the faculties 
of Church law schools,”436 Catholic law schools were unable to fill the 
ranks of their faculties with teachers and scholars who had the desire or 
ability to bridge the gap between American law and Thomistic natural 
law, both in the classroom and in their written work.437 
Similarly, based on the lack of serious interaction between the 
Realists and their Catholic critics, it might be plausible for an historian 
to conclude that the Catholic response was of no consequence.  The one 
episode thought to stand in contrast to this general lack of interaction—
the exchange between Felix Cohen and Walter Kennedy recounted 
above438—is not to the contrary.  An historian might reasonably read 
Cohen’s response to Kennedy in the Fordham Law Review as Cohen 
describes it, namely, as an effort “to decline all responsibility” for 
certain ideas that Kennedy “erroneously ascribes” to Cohen.439  Thus, 
judging simply by it effects—the impact it had on jurisprudential 
 
434.  Brown, supra note 187, at 167–68 (emphasis omitted).  See generally Breen & 
Strang, supra note 16. 
435.  Rooney, supra note 236, at 201. 
436.  Brown, supra note 22, at 21. 
437.  See Breen & Strang, supra note 16, at 621–25. 
438.  See supra notes 380–86 and accompanying text. 
439.  Cohen, supra note 380, at 548. 
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commentary—a responsible historian might judge that the Catholic 
response to Realism was of no great moment. 
Aside from the exchange between Cohen and Kennedy, on those 
few occasions when Realist authors did respond to the criticisms posed 
by Catholic scholars, they did so only belatedly and not in the manner 
typical of academic debate.  For example, in 1942, three Jesuits—
Francis Lucey, Paul Gregg, and John Ford—each published a critique of 
Justice Holmes,440 whereas Mark DeWolfe Howe’s and Fred Rodell’s 
responses441 did not appear until 1951, almost a decade later.  Although 
Howe and Rodell acknowledged Lucey’s and Ford’s published works, 
they did not engage the substance of the Jesuit scholars’ criticisms in a 
meaningful way.  Instead, the focus of their retort was Lon Fuller’s 
criticisms of Justice Holmes.442  Moreover, some believe443 that it was 
only Ben W. Palmer’s provocatively titled essay Hobbes, Holmes and 
Hitler,444 published in the ABA Journal, that prompted the responses 
from Howe and Rodell.445  Absent this high profile essay, Lucey and 
Ford’s work may have gone almost entirely unnoticed.  Even when 
Howe and Rodell did respond, they did so more out of desire to defend 
Justice Holmes than a felt need to respond to intelligent criticism.  
Indeed, Rodell’s response—a magazine article, republished in the Yale 
Law Journal—was little more than a heart-felt defense of Justice 
Holmes, dripping with sarcasm, not an intellectual response to the 
arguments made by Justice Holmes’s Catholic critics.446  This is clear 
even from the title of Rodell’s piece: the Catholic critics of Justice 
Holmes, including Palmer, are not taken as serious scholars—they are 
only “Hecklers.”447 
 
440.  Ford, supra note 179; Gregg, supra note 262; Lucey, supra note 210. 
441.  Howe, supra note 390; Fred Rodell, Justice Holmes and His Hecklers, 60 Yale L.J. 
620 (1951); see also BURTON, supra note 171. 
442.  Rodell accuses Fuller of taking “more restrained potshots” at Justice Holmes, 
Rodell, supra note 441 at 621, whereas Howe engages in a more extensive critique of Fuller’s 
criticism of Justice Holmes, Howe, supra note 390, at 531–45. 
443.  THE FIRST 125 YEARS, supra note 269, at 118. 
444.  Palmer, supra note 43. 
445.  See Howe, supra note 390, at 530; see also Rodell, supra note 441, at 621.  It is also 
likely that a column by Hearst syndicated columnist Westbrook Pegler also prompted the 
responses from Howe and Rodell.  See Howe, supra note 390, at 529–30; Rodell, supra note 
441, at 620; see also Westbrook Pegler, Justice Holmes Became Idol of a Godless Cult, 
EVENING INDEP., Dec. 18, 1950, at 15. 
446.  See Rodell, supra note 441. 
447.  Id. at 620. 
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Those who heckle the speeches of great orators are accorded only a 
footnote to history, if that.  Likewise, reporting the remarks of a few 
disaffected law professors directed at Legal Realism would have been 
extravagant and unnecessary.  Responsible intellectual history would 
not require as much. 
Below, after a review of the pertinent literature, we draw three 
themes from the standard historical account, which, together, suggest 
alternative reasons for the lack of any or fair treatment of Catholic legal 
scholars. 
C. Three Factors Behind the Standard Narrative: The Contemporary 
Rejection of Natural Law, the Confounding of Natural Law and Religion, 
and the Prevalence of Secularism and Anti-Catholicism in American 
Society and Academic Culture 
The fact that the standard historical account ignores or devotes very 
little attention to the Catholic response to Legal Realism may reflect a 
sincere evaluation of its historical significance.  It may reflect the good-
faith conclusion that the Neo-Scholastic critique is undeserving of much 
attention insofar as it was unable to alter the conversation—to change 
the terms of the debate and forge a new consensus that reaffirmed the 
traditional understanding of natural law, adapted to modern social 
conditions.  Even if the standard historical account is explicable in these 
terms, a number of questions remain.  Specifically, this account does not 
explain the manner in which some histories dismiss the critique of 
Realism offered by Catholic legal scholars. 
For example, according to Neil Duxbury, the campaign against Legal 
Realism in the mid-twentieth century “may be regarded as a particular 
initiative of Jesuit law professors and theologians.”448  Although the 
legacy of Justice Holmes was at this time undergoing a general 
reassessment that recast Holmes in a negative light, for Duxbury, those 
Catholic scholars who criticized Holmes were guilty of “outbursts” as 
they “tended to come either from Jesuit law professors such as Lucey, or 
from journalists swayed by the mood of McCarthyism.”449  According to 
Duxbury, Catholic legal scholars were anything but subtle in their view 
of Realism.  For them, “natural law was the embodiment of the good 
and legal realism the epitome of evil”450 such that they were “unable or 
 
448.  Duxbury, supra note 45, at 165. 
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unprepared to conceive of realism as anything other than an out-and-out 
threat to the established American polity.”451  According to Duxbury, 
they saw Realism “as a legitimate cause for panic”452 and were willing to 
go to extremes to accomplish their goal of defeating it.  Contrary to the 
reading of Kennedy and other Catholic critics provided above,453 
Duxbury accuses these writers, and Kennedy in particular, of engaging 
in “a wholly negative reading of the literature” whereby “legal realism 
was sensationalised” and depicted as “a celebration of 
authoritarianism.”454  Duxbury concludes that “the natural lawyers’ 
efforts to discredit legal realism amounted to little more than crude 
attempts at proselytisation.”455 
Similarly, Laura Kalman notes that, with the rise of totalitarianism 
and the advent of World War II, Realism was subject to criticism as 
people were “less tolerant of a philosophy that was descriptive rather 
than normative.”456  According to Kalman, several legal academics 
“attacked legal realism,” including “a number of Catholic jurists who 
believed in natural law.”457  In a lengthy footnote accompanying this 
passage, Kalman snidely remarks that “the Catholic jurists were not 
located at any institutions of great prestige; most taught at law schools 
such as Georgetown, which were affiliated with the church.”458  From 
this she finds it “difficult to believe that the realists, an exceptionally 
brilliant group located chiefly at Yale by the 1930s, could not have run 
intellectual rings around them,” but the Realists “did not seem to want 
to do so,” reacting instead with “extreme defensiveness.”459 
In one fell swoop, Kalman casts doubt on the intelligence of the 
“Catholic jurists” based on the alleged inferiority of their home 
institutions and her assertion that the Realists could have “run 
 
451.  Id. at 169. 
452.  Id. at 171. 
453.  See supra Parts III.B.1–2. 
454.  Duxbury, supra note 45, at 172–73.  He further accuses Kennedy of being 
“determined to find nothing familiar or constructive in the literature of legal realism” and of 
“disparag[ing] the reliance by realists on the methods of the social sciences.”  Id. at 171.  
Again, this reading of Kennedy is at odds with the analysis of Kennedy’s work provided 
above. 
455.  Id. at 169–70. 
456.  KALMAN, supra note 30, at 121. 
457.  Id. 
458.  Id. at 267 n.101. 
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intellectual rings” around them.460  She then questions the academic 
integrity of the law schools where these “Catholic jurists” taught insofar 
as they “were affiliated with the church.”461 
Similarly, James Herget contends that the failure of the Catholic 
revival of Neo-Scholasticism was due to its inherently religious 
character.  Most American law professors and lawyers could not 
embrace the Neo-Thomistic iteration of natural law because “[t]o accept 
the medieval doctrine of natural law one had to accept the other 
trappings.”462  For Herget these “other trappings” include what, he says, 
natural law theory was historically invoked to justify.463  That is, 
according to Herget, “[a]part from the merits of the philosophy, it was 
difficult [for American legal academics] to accept a doctrine purporting 
to lead to democracy and justice that had historically justified a feudal 
system, slavery (in Aristotle’s time), and an ultra-authoritative, 
antidemocratic church structure.”464  The result of this was that “by the 
late 1950s it was clear that the Thomists were talking to themselves.”465 
Putting again to one side the historical accuracy of Herget’s claim, it 
seems clear that something other than the use of natural law to justify 
social practices and institutions not in keeping with contemporary 
American sensibilities was at work in the rejection of Neo-Thomism 
during the period in question.  After all, Herget is not suggesting that 
the Catholic legal scholars who challenged Legal Realism made use of 
Neo-Thomism to justify feudalism, re-establish slavery, or replace 
existing governmental structures with ultra-authoritative, anti-
democratic  structures.  Rather, it was, he says, the historical affiliation 
of the “medieval doctrine of natural law” with slavery, feudalism, and 
authoritarian, hierarchical church structures that somehow tainted Neo-
Thomism and so discouraged non-Catholic legal academics from 
embracing the natural law perspective.466 
One odd facet of this alleged account of the failure of the Catholic 
response to Realism is that institutions that are undemocratic and 
authoritarian are commonplace in American society—everything from 
 
460.  Id. 
461.  Id. at 267 n.101. 
462.  HERGET, supra note 39, at 238 (emphasis added). 
463.  Id. at 238–39. 
464.  Id. 
465.  Id. at 238. 
466.  Id. at 238–39. 
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the Episcopal Church, to the Yale Club, to the Rockefeller Foundation.  
Yet, when these qualities are associated with the Catholic Church they 
are thought to be so obnoxious as to disqualify a whole body of thought 
from consideration.  In a similar vein, it is well known that the political 
philosopher John Locke was a major investor in the English slave trade, 
and that he even helped to draft the Fundamental Constitutions of 
Carolina, which sought to preserve a feudal system and gave slave 
owners absolute power over their slaves.467  Yet this affiliation has not 
precluded the serious study and consideration of Locke’s thought by 
American academics, and even the identification of the American 
republic as fundamentally Lockean in origin.468  By contrast, the fact 
that the natural law theory championed by Catholic legal scholars had 
“historically justified a feudal system . . . [and] slavery (in Aristotle’s 
time)” supposedly made the Catholic response to Realism difficult for 
non-Catholics “to digest.”469 
That similar historical affiliations—“trappings”—might be 
disqualifying in the one instance and overlooked in the other suggests 
that some other reason was operative in the minds of those who rejected 
Neo-Thomism as an alternative to Realism.  It seems that only those 
“trappings” that carry the scent of incense burned at the altars of 
Romish churches are deserving of suspicion. 
For Herget, the “trappings” of natural law also included other 
aspects of Neo-Scholasticism.  He claims that “Thomistic natural law 
was unconvincing unless a scholar was willing to see the world through 
its accompanying and reinforcing metaphysics, epistemology and 
perhaps theology.”470  At the same time, Herget elsewhere indicates that 
adherence to natural law theory need not entail a specific religious 
commitment, to Catholicism or otherwise.471  For example, in 
introducing the notion of natural law, Herget observes that “[i]n 
Protestant countries the general idea of natural law was turned into a 
secular notion of natural rights”472 and “that popular ideas of natural 
rights in secular garb” played “an important part in the governmental 
 
467.  See James Farr, Locke, Natural Law, and New World Slavery, 36 POL. THEORY 
495, 499 (2008). 
468.  See, e.g., LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN 
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION (1955).   
469.  HERGET, supra note 39, at 238–39. 
470.  Id. at 238 (emphasis added). 
471.  See id. at 228. 
472.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 2015] THE FORGOTTEN JURISPRUDENTIAL DEBATE 1269 
and legal theory of the [American] founding fathers.”473  This is not to 
dispute the undoubtedly correct historical claim that the intellectual 
pedigree of natural rights in the American political order was not 
Thomistic.  It is to say that natural law need not be understood in 
religious terms, a fact that Herget acknowledges outside the Catholic 
legal scholar context.474 
Edward Purcell provides the most complete study of the Catholic 
challenge to Realism based on natural law, and its ultimate failure.  His 
conclusion, however, is the same as that of other authors addressing the 
topic.  That is, Purcell makes plain the fact that “relatively few non-
Catholics expressed interest” in the Neo-Thomistic proposal,475 and 
ultimately the “arguments [of Catholic scholars] . . . were simply not 
convincing to most American intellectuals.”476 
Purcell correctly explains one facet of the subjective motivation 
behind the Catholic response.  Catholics, unlike other American 
intellectuals, were especially motivated to oppose the newer 
jurisprudence precisely because “[t]he intellectual attitudes they 
associated with Legal Realism denied their deepest articles of religious 
faith and emotional conviction.”477  Realism and scientific naturalism 
denied the existence of an objective moral truth.  Yet, because of the 
Catholic belief in the ultimate unity of faith and reason—or, as Purcell 
says, “the close union between their religious faith and their 
philosophical training”478—Catholics perceived the newer jurisprudence 
as an assault on their identity as such.  Thus, they wrote not simply in 
defense of justice, the rule of law, and “their conception of democracy, 
but of their faith and their church.”479  Regrettably, if understandably, 
this emotional investment in the intellectual project led some Catholic 
scholars to respond in a “vitriolic tone” and with “extreme accusations,” 
a “defensive attitude that at times reached extreme proportions.”480 
Purcell is less successful in explaining the tepid response of non-
Catholics to the Neo-Thomistic critique of Realism and defense of 
 
473.  Id. at 229 (emphasis added); see also id. at 11 (noting that some but not all versions 
of natural law “include a theological basis that is not universally accepted”). 
474.  Id. at 228–29. 
475.  PURCELL, supra note 1, at 165. 
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democracy.  He opines that “the resolution that the Catholics provided 
for the crisis of democratic theory was highly questionable.”481  The 
dubious nature of the solution proffered was, he says, due to the “almost 
inextricable intertwining of their rational philosophy with their 
particular theology,” which “raised doubts as to where the one began 
and the other left off.”482  This confounding of religious faith and public 
philosophy was, says Purcell, underscored by the fact that “[i]t was 
certainly [their] religious faith, as any of . . . [the Catholic legal scholars] 
would have admitted, that made them so purposeful in their adherence 
to Thomism and their rejection of realism.”483  What is odd about this 
claim is that Purcell then cites to a series of articles by Mortimer Adler 
and a Dominican, Walter Farrell, O.P.484  Although certainly a Thomist, 
at the time, Mortimer Adler was also a secular Jew, not a Catholic.485  
Thus, at least in his mind and (it is reasonable to think) in the minds of 
others, the distinction between philosophical assent and religious 
adherence was clear. 
Similarly, Purcell notes that “[t]he Catholic faith in its fundamentals 
was indissolubly linked with a hierarchical institution that claimed [the] 
ability to interpret an absolutely true moral law, based on the truths of 
revelation and reason.”486  Herget makes a similar point in identifying 
the difficulty of “accept[ing] a doctrine purporting to lead to democracy 
and justice that had historically justified . . . an ultra-authoritative, 
antidemocratic church structure.”487  That Catholic critics of Realism 
had “a ready justification for democracy,”488 despite their undemocratic 
ecclesiology, strongly suggests that religion and Neo-Scholastic 
philosophy were distinct and could be separately considered.  This in 
turn suggests that something other than the tendency to confound 
religion and philosophy was at work in the failure of the Catholic 
critique of Realism to win a sizeable number of non-Catholic adherents. 
 
481.  Id. at 169. 
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Purcell concludes that “Thomistic rationalism, at least in the minds 
of most intellectuals, simply could not stand against the combined forces 
of pragmatism, scientific naturalism, and modern . . . philosophy.”489  
This may well account for why the Catholic response to Realism was 
ultimately unsuccessful, but it does not explain why historians have 
ignored, or dismissed, the Catholic response in the manner in which they 
have. 
A number of themes emerge from a careful reading of these texts.  
We believe that three themes are especially significant in helping to 
explain the relative lack of attention given Catholic legal scholars in the 
standard historical account: (1) skepticism concerning natural law; (2) 
the confounding of natural law and religion; and (3) secularism and anti-
Catholicism in American society and academic culture.  While the goal 
of every historian is to strive for a certain measure of objectivity and 
detachment, inevitably, every writer is in some way influenced by the 
biases and commitments that he or she brings to the source material.  
Here, we believe that the treatment of the Catholic response to Realism 
suggests that these biases and commitments were at work in setting 
forth the standard history.  Together, they account for the blindness of 
the historians to Catholic legal scholars’ contributions to the 
jurisprudential debate. 
1. Skepticism of Natural Law 
The first theme that emerges from a review of these histories is a 
deep skepticism with respect to natural law theory.  Indeed, the 
understated, though extremely potent, premise underlying these 
accounts is that natural law theory is patently unconvincing.490  Thus, the 
failure of the Neo-Scholastic critique of Realism was inevitable because 
non-Catholic American legal academics were too sophisticated to be 
seduced by the myth of an objective morality that could serve as the 
basis of law.491  The vast majority of American law professors were 
instead convinced by “the combined forces of pragmatism, scientific 
naturalism, and modern critical philosophy.”492  While Catholic critics 
“expressed great certainty in the power of reason” in exhibiting their 
 
489.  Id. at 170. 
490.  See, e.g., HERGET, supra note 39; KALMAN, supra note 30; PURCELL, supra note 1. 
491.  Duxbury, supra note 45, at 173. 
492.  PURCELL, supra note 1, at 170. 
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“fervent convictions,”493 the Realists were too bright to be taken in by 
their “crude attempts at proselytisation.”494  Although Realists could 
have “run intellectual rings around” their would-be peers at lesser 
schools, they chose not to.495  What is obviously wrong does not need to 
be refuted. 
The natural law critique put forward by Catholic critics enjoyed the 
limited success that it did only because of dramatic circumstances in the 
world.  Their critique did not appeal to the minds of law professors.  It 
played off the fears of the public and constituted, in today’s 
terminology, an extended reductio ad Hitlerum argument.496  Natural law 
succeeded in regaining a small place as “part of the mainstream of 
American jurisprudence” only “as a reaction against relativism and 
scientism and as a response to an ideological world war.”497 
Here, contemporary legal historians reflect the academic culture 
they inhabit, which has little regard for natural law theory.  Although 
the popularity of natural law has ebbed and flowed somewhat in legal 
academic circles, throughout the twentieth century, the dominant 
undercurrent has been one of suspicion and disdain. 
For example, in their Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to 
Jurisprudence, Jeffrie Murphy and Jules Coleman contend that classical 
natural law is teleological in nature, yet “teleological worldview[s]” are 
seen “as quaintly pre-scientific.”498  We live “in [a] post-Darwinian 
world” and see reality “in terms of mechanistic causation.”499  For 
Murphy and Coleman, “[t]he modern mind finds it difficult to accept 
that people have ends of purposes other than those they have set or 
accepted for themselves.”500  Indeed, they find the notion that human 
beings have a purpose, and that this purpose forms the basis of morality, 
to be “degrading.”501  Natural law theories are, they say, guilty of the 
“naturalistic fallacy” according to which one believes “that one can 
derive a theory of what ought to be the case from an account of what is 
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the case.”502  Thus, Murphy and Coleman reject natural law as being 
based on “the dogmatic acceptance of an implausible worldview” having 
nothing “to commend it to the rational person.”503 
Similarly, in his American Legal Thought from Premodernism to 
Postmodernism, Stephen Feldman argues that ethical relativism has 
made the natural law position no longer tenable.504  For Feldman, the 
conclusion of the Realist critique “meant that values no longer could be 
derived from abstract reasoning, and of course, the earlier rejection of 
premodernism meant that Realists could not locate values in some 
preexisting natural order.”505  We demand “that judicial decision 
making—including constitutional adjudication—be based on some 
objective foundation,” yet—“despite sundry attempts at rationalism, 
empiricism, and transcendentalism—legal theorists were unable to 
discover any such ground for the rule of law.”506  He concludes that 
“[e]thical relativism undermined any vision of judicial review grounded 
on a supposedly objective source, whether the written text, natural law, 
or anything else.”507 
Surely, other texts could be cited that view natural law theory in a 
more sympathetic light,508 but Murphy and Coleman’s and Feldman’s 
treatments of the subject are broadly representative of how the 
contemporary legal academy sees natural law theory.  Law professors 
are largely dismissive of natural lawyers who contend that ethical norms 
are natural and capable of being known through the exercise of reason, 
even as some skeptics perceive and feel the pull of such a perspective.509 
Not surprisingly, this dismissive view of natural law is found in the 
works of the Realists themselves.  Like Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr., many legal academics today find the idea slightly absurd that, in 
order to be “law” in the proper sense, a statute, administrative order, or 
judicial holding must be consistent with a non-posited source.  For 
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Holmes, “[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky 
but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be 
identified.”510  Rather, Holmes held that “[t]he jurists who believe in 
natural law seem to me to be in that naïve state of mind that accepts 
what has been familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors as 
something that must be accepted by all men everywhere.”511 
Other Realists were similarly skeptical of natural law.  According to 
Jerome Frank (in the first edition of Law and the Modern Mind), belief 
in natural law was not the intellectual defense of an idea.512  It was 
instead the desire for certitude—similar to a child’s desire for his or her 
father’s protection.513  According to Underhill Moore, “[h]uman 
experience discloses no ultimates.”514  Rather, ultimate standards of 
right and wrong “are phantoms drifting upon the stream of day 
dreams.”515 
For American legal historians, the debate between Realists, who fit 
squarely within the legal academy’s rejection of natural law, and 
Catholic legal scholars, who swam against the cultural tide, was not a 
debate at all.  Instead, we believe, based on statements by historians like 
Duxbury, Purcell, and Herget—along with other factors, such as the 
jurisprudential foreignness of Thomistic natural law and the exotic 
religious perspective of Catholic legal scholars—that a key reason the 
historians failed to appreciate Catholic legal scholars’ contributions was 
the historians’ own differing jurisprudential outlooks.  This comes 
through in the way the historians too-easily labeled the Catholic legal 
scholars as Catholic, Scholastic, and medieval.  Furthermore, the too-
quick dismissal of natural law as a legitimate jurisprudential perspective 
shows the work being done by the historians’ differing intellectual 
commitments. 
2. The Confounding of Natural Law and Religion 
A second theme present in the standard historical account is that 
natural law is unavoidably religious.  Contemporary historians have not 
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portrayed natural law theory as philosophy in the strict sense because of 
its close affiliation with Christianity in general and Catholicism in 
particular.  Thus, according to Herget, acceptance of the Thomistic 
version of natural law offered by Catholic legal scholars required a 
virtual baptism—an immersion in the cultural and intellectual life of 
Catholics.516  That is, to embrace natural law one needed to be willing 
“to see the world through its accompanying and reinforcing 
metaphysics, epistemology, and perhaps theology.”517  In the same vein, 
Purcell remarks that Catholic critics of Realism were not able to 
convince most American intellectuals because of the “inextricable 
intertwining of their rational philosophy with their particular 
theology.”518  As these authors portray it, assent to the metaphysical 
propositions that underlay the Thomistic understanding of natural law 
required a kind of religious commitment.  Whether this acceptance was 
described in terms of a willingness to be associated with the “trappings” 
of Catholicism,519 or an openness to conversion through 
“proselytisation,”520 the assent sought was not simply the intellectual 
assent of reason to a proposed philosophical truth but the conversion of 
a believer—the assent of faith. 
The effort to characterize the natural law response of Catholic legal 
scholars as religious begins by identifying those involved in the critique 
of Realism as Catholics, rather than as legal scholars who happened to 
make use of the natural law tradition.  Thus, Kalman refers to a number 
of individuals who “attacked legal realism” by name—Roscoe Pound, 
Lon Fuller, Rufus Harris, Philip Mechem, and Morris Cohen—and then 
to “a number of Catholic jurists who believed in natural law.”521  
Elsewhere she identifies the “Catholic jurists” who criticized the 
Realists as individuals who taught at less prestigious law schools 
“affiliated with the church.”522  Similarly, Duxbury says that criticism of 
Realism was “a particular initiative of Jesuit law professors and 
theologians.”523  Although Jesuits such as Francis Lucey, John Ford, and 
Paul Gregg were critics of Justice Holmes and the jurisprudence he 
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inspired, relative to other scholars, they were both rather late to the 
Catholic game of criticism and outnumbered by their lay colleagues.  
The critique of Realism by Catholic law professors began in the 1920s–
1930s by figures such as Walter Kennedy, Brendan Brown, and Miriam 
Theresa Rooney, whereas the Jesuits Duxbury cites wrote in the 1940s–
1950s.  Thus, here it seems likely that Duxbury employs the word 
“Jesuit” not merely as a descriptive but as a pejorative term meant to 
conjure up dark memories of the Counter-Reformation and Europe’s 
Catholic past—memories of which modern-day intellectuals are glad to 
be free.  Rather than locate the source of the critique in a number of 
priests belonging to the Society of Jesus, Duxbury has simply 
underscored the character of the critique that he identifies as Catholic 
and so has worked to bolster his rhetorical claim that “the natural 
lawyers’ efforts to discredit Legal Realism amounted to little more than 
crude attempts at proselytization.”524 
Here it is important to note that, in the context of contemporary 
academic discourse, the meaning of the word “religion” is virtually 
synonymous with “superstition.”  Plainly, not every American academic 
is a thorough-going secularist,525 but broadly speaking, in academic 
culture, religion enjoys the same intellectual stature as astrology, 
alchemy, and tarot card reading.  Indeed, many in the academy of today 
use the word “religious” as a kind of shorthand to describe beliefs that 
are personal and subjective (often, though not necessarily, 
idiosyncratic), and irrational.  They are irrational because religious 
beliefs “do not answer ultimately . . . to evidence and reasons.”526  They 
are instead, says Professor Brian Leiter, “insulated from ordinary 
standards of evidence and rational justification, the ones we employ in 
both common sense and in science.”527  Thus, he says that religious belief 
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is “a culpable form of unwarranted belief given those ordinary epistemic 
standards.”528 
Accompanying this view of religion is the view that it is a “regressive 
antisocial force that must be strictly confined to private life in order to 
avoid social division, violence, and anarchy.”529  This view enjoys 
support both as a matter of political morality and constitutional law as 
reflected in the anti-establishment principle of the First Amendment.530  
Because the religious character of an idea is thought to disqualify it from 
consideration as a basis for law, the coupling of natural law with religion 
is a convenient way in which to dismiss a lengthy tradition of thought 
and inquiry with little effort. 
John Dewey candidly admitted that because “most philosophers had 
been ‘brought up in the Protestant tradition,’ they ‘identified 
Scholasticism with the theological dogmas they do not accept.’”531  A 
certain disdain and intellectual condescension for religion is evident in 
the language employed by many of the Realists.  Indeed, it was a 
frequent trope employed by the Realists to describe a point of view with 
which they disagreed as “religious” or “theological”—because it was 
wrong as a normative matter, or because it made use of formal 
categories that were dispositive of the question at hand, or relied upon 
deductive logic. 
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L.J. 331 (1995). 
531.  JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A HISTORY 141 
(2003) (quoting John Dewey, in PRESENT-DAY THINKERS AND THE NEW SCHOLASTICISM: 
AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 29, 29–30 (John S. Zybura ed., 1926)). 
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For example, Felix Cohen makes use of religious references 
throughout Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach as a 
way of satirizing and repudiating the formalistic, categorical approach to 
law that was the focus of his critique.532  These references begin with the 
dream “heaven” of pure juridical concepts, a dream “retold, in recent 
years, in the ‘chapels’” of various schools of jurisprudence.533  The focus 
of his criticism is that “in every field of law we should find the same 
habit of ignoring practical questions of value or of positive fact and 
taking refuge in ‘legal problems’ which can always be answered by 
manipulating legal concepts in certain approved ways.”534  Framed in 
this way, legal questions are meaningless535 and “identical in 
metaphysical status with the question which scholastic theologians are 
supposed to have argued at great length, ‘How many angels can stand 
on the point of a needle?’”536  At the heart of this approach to law are 
“legal concepts” which Cohen describes as “supernatural entities which 
do not have a verifiable existence except to the eyes of faith.”537  His 
proposed solution—the functional approach to legal concepts—is, he 
says, “an assault upon all dogmas and devices that cannot be translated 
into terms of actual experience.”538  Proceeding in this fashion, Cohen 
seeks to refute “the traditional supernatural approach to practical legal 
problems,”539 “the dogmas of legal theology.”540 
Similarly, Thurman Arnold made frequent use of terms such as 
“religion,” “creed,” “faith,” and “theology”541 to criticize an opponent’s 
work—to describe what he regarded as a non-rational system of 
 
532.  Cohen, supra note 380. 
533.  Id. at 809. 
534.  Id. at 820 
535.  Id. 
536.  Id. at 810. 
537.  Id. at 821. 
538.  Id. at 822. 
539.  Id. at 813. 
540.  Id. at 833. 
541.  See, e.g., Thurman Arnold, Professor Hart’s Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 
1312 (1960) (responding to Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—Foreword: 
The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959)).  By referring to Henry Hart’s 
thesis as “Hart’s theology,” Arnold means to say that Hart’s view is “really a whole series of 
similar pompous generalizations dropped on the Court from the heights of Olympus.”  Id. at 
1299.  Arnold is doubtful that these generalizations will lead to the right result when 
combined with the method that Hart recommends, namely, “the maturing of collective 
thought.”  Id. at 1300–01 (quoting Hart, supra, at 100) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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organization and legitimization.  For example, in The Folklore of 
Capitalism, Arnold employs the word “creed” to refer to “attitudes 
which influence conduct and not . . . principles which actually control 
institutions.”542  A “creed” is found in the “moral and economic 
prejudices” of a group, “their desire for the approval of other 
members”543 through which they “become bound by loyalties and 
enthusiasms to existing organizations.”544  Arnold repeatedly uses 
phrases like “theological opposition,”545 “heresy,”546 “spiritual 
conflict,”547 “automatic religious opposition,”548 and “priestly 
opposition”549 to refer to those instances in which one’s prejudices and 
enthusiasm are challenged.  According to Arnold, “church creeds are 
not searches for universal truth”; rather, a “creed is important only as a 
symbol of unity.”550  For Arnold “[t]he logical content of creeds never 
realistically describes the institutions to which the creeds are 
attached.”551  Instead one must go beyond the symbols and “mythology” 
of an institution and examine “[t]he actual habits and attitudes which 
operate under the banner of the creed” and which “make the institution 
effective” to really understand it.552  In the same vein, Arnold would 
critically, albeit playfully, greet Robert Hutchins “Hello, Cardinal”553 
because the latter subscribed to natural law theory554 and not Arnold’s 
view that “‘[l]aw’ is primarily a great reservoir of emotionally important 
social symbols.”555  
One might plausibly argue that the Neo-Scholastic revival in law was 
“religious” at least in the attenuated sense that the Declaration of 
Independence is “religious.”  That is, the Declaration makes reference 
to “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God,” “the Supreme judge of 
 
542.  THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 9 (1937). 
543.  Id. at 3. 
544.  Id. at 10. 
545.  Id. at 3. 
546.  Id. at 5. 
547.  Id. at 4. 
548.  Id. at 10. 
549.  Id. at 12. 
550.  Id. at 32. 
551.  Id. at 33. 
552.  Id. at 32–33. 
553.  PURCELL, supra note 1, at 159 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
554.  See, e.g., Robert M. Hutchins, Natural Law and Jurisprudence, in NATURAL LAW 
AND MODERN SOCIETY 29 (1961). 
555.  ARNOLD, supra note 283, at 34.  
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the world,” “the protection of Divine Providence,” and the claim that 
“all men . . . are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights.”556  In a similar fashion, a number of the Catholic legal scholars 
who made use of Neo-Thomism in criticizing Realism made reference to 
God in their writings.  For example, in describing natural law, Francis 
Lucey referred to the fact that man has “certain fundamental duties and 
rights given him by God which no man has a right to destroy.”557  
Similarly, Brendan Brown said that the natural law proceeds “ultimately 
from God but immediately from human reason in which it was 
mirrored.”558   
But these references hardly amount to “proselytisation.”559  The 
Catholic scholars who criticized Realism did not base their natural law 
claims on any specifically Christian or Catholic doctrine such as the 
Resurrection, the Virgin Birth, transubstantiation, or the Immaculate 
Conception.  It is worth noting, moreover, that such a capacious 
understanding of “religion” would not only consign the Declaration of 
Independence to the ranks of the religious, it would also relegate much 
of Western philosophy to the same status.  Many philosophers—not 
only Aquinas, but Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Pascal, 
among others—refer to God or conclude that God exists, not by 
invoking the privileged authority of some sacred text or revelation, but 
based on the exercise of human reason.560 
Nevertheless, the purportedly religious character of the natural law 
critique of Realism offered by Catholic legal scholars may account for 
why these scholars have been so readily dismissed in the standard 
narrative of American legal history.  That is, like the Realists 
themselves, the authors of this history may view religion with suspicion 
and so see the natural law critique of Realism as an attempt to ground 
American law and jurisprudence in what are essentially religious 
premises.  From the references to “God” that appear from time to time 
in the works of Brown, Lucey, Rooney, and others, they may interpret 
the Catholic response to Realism as a fundamentally religious venture 
 
556.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1–2, 32 (U.S. 1776). 
557.  Lucey, supra note 210, at 524. 
558.  Brown, supra note 22, at 9. 
559.  Duxbury, supra note 45, at 170. 
560.  The point here is not to summarily conclude that these arguments for the existence 
of God are correct and the argument on the other side are wrong.  Instead, the point is that 
these arguments are properly understood as being philosophical in nature and not religious. 
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advanced under the guise of public reason—a theological wolf dressed 
in philosophical sheep’s clothing.  Such an interpretation fits with how 
some contemporaries of the Catholic legal scholars in the 1950s 
understood their critique.561 
3. Secularism and Anti-Catholicism in American Society and 
Academic Culture 
The account given above is certainly plausible—that the natural law 
critique of Realism offered by Catholic legal scholars was essentially 
religious in nature, and that this religious character disqualified it from 
serious consideration by most non-Catholic law professors at the time.  
Furthermore, legal historians today have similarly dismissed the work of 
Realism’s Catholic critics based on the reactions of these critics’ 
contemporaries and the historians own reading of the works of 
Kennedy, Rooney, Brown, Lucey, and others. 
Although this account is in some way plausible, still, questions 
remain: Why would the non-Catholic law professors of the 1930s–1950s 
be inclined to find “religion” in the natural law critique of Realism 
offered by Catholic legal scholars based on such slender evidence?  And 
why would those who write American legal history today be inclined to 
aver in this judgment absent more substantial proof? 
The answer to these questions can be found in the third theme that 
emerges from a reading of the texts quoted above.  If, as Purcell says, it 
was difficult for readers of the Catholic critique of Realism to tell where 
philosophy ended and faith began;562 if, as Duxbury claims, “the natural 
lawyers’ efforts to discredit legal realism” were “little more than crude 
attempts at proselytization;”563 if, as Howe claims, responding to the 
Catholic critics like Lucey would have quickly embroiled him “in a 
theological controversy beyond [his] competence to discuss,”564 then one 
ought to speak candidly about the religion in question—the religion to 
which conversion was thought required in order to find the natural law 
critique convincing.  This faith commitment was not some generic 
spiritual sentiment but a very specific religious tradition—
Catholicism—a faith that has had a complex and at times troubled 
 
561.  See, e.g., Howe, supra note 390, at 530–31. 
562.  PURCELL, supra note 1, at 169. 
563.  Duxbury, supra note 45, at 169–70. 
564.  Howe, supra note 390, at 530. 
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relationship with the wider American society in which it has dwelled and 
to which it has sought to contribute.565 
Although seldom discussed in popular histories today, anti-
Catholicism is deeply rooted in the history of the nation.  Arthur 
Schlesinger, Sr., famously described anti-Catholicism as “the deepest 
bias in the history of the American people.”566  The roots of this bias can 
be found in doctrinal disputes that gave rise to the Reformation in 
Europe and in the self-conscious founding of America as a Protestant 
nation.567  Having said this, historically, anti-Catholicism in the United 
States has not been so much opposition to religious ideas—a formal 
theological dispute—as it has been opposition to ethnic groups and 
classes associated with those ideas against whom native-born Protestants 
inherited a historical resentment—a resentment that was fueled by the 
fear of loss of political, cultural, and economic power brought on by 
successive waves of Catholic immigration.  During the antebellum 
period, this fear erupted into violence—riots in Catholic neighborhoods, 
the burning of churches and homes, and the vigilante murder of 
individuals—in Boston in 1837, Philadelphia in 1844, Cincinnati and 
Louisville in 1855, and San Francisco in 1856, being among the most 
famous examples.568  This fear also manifested itself politically in an 
explicit fashion in the American Party or “Know Nothings” in the 
1840s–1850s, the American Protective Association in the 1890s, and a 
resurgent Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s.569  
Anti-Catholic bias also manifested itself in law.570  Prior to the 
founding of the republic, several of the American colonies enacted 
 
565.  See generally MCGREEVY, supra note 531. 
566.  PHILIP JENKINS, THE NEW ANTI-CATHOLICISM: THE LAST ACCEPTABLE 
PREJUDICE 23 (2003) (quoting JOHN TRACY ELLIS, AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 149 (1956)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
567.  See MCDONALD, supra note 88, at 42 (“Some of the state constitutions adopted 
during the Revolution relaxed religious restraints, but so habituated were Americans to 
thinking in Protestant terms that few could conceive of a civil order in any other way.”); supra 
note 97. 
568.  See JAY P. DOLAN, THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY FROM 
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 201–03 (1985); CHARLES R. MORRIS, AMERICAN 
CATHOLIC: THE SAINTS AND SINNERS WHO BUILT AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL CHURCH 
60–63 (1997). 
569.  MCGREEVY, supra note 531, at 45, 124, 145. 
570.  PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002); Mitchell v. 
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“[H]ostility to aid to pervasively 
sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree that we [should] not hesitate to disavow . . . .  [It is 
a] doctrine, born of bigotry, [that] should be buried now.”). 
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statutes that barred Catholics from participation in the political process 
and even prohibited the practice of the Catholic religion entirely.571  In 
the first half of the nineteenth century, state legislatures sought to 
Americanize the Catholic Church and other hierarchical denominations 
by empowering the trustees of congregations over their clergy and 
bishops.572  Nativist concerns and an overt anti-Catholic animus also led 
to efforts to incorporate a doctrine of strict separationism into law.573  
The apex of these efforts was the attempt in 1875 to amend the federal 
Constitution with the proposed Blaine Amendment,574 a measure that 
would have expressly prohibited any government tax revenues or land 
“for the support of public schools . . . [that] shall ever be under the 
control of any religious sect.”575  The “religious sect” that the Speaker of 
the House, James Blaine, and his supporters had in mind was the 
Catholic Church and its system of diocesan-supported parochial schools 
that served as an alternative to the publicly financed “common schools” 
that taught their students a kind of non-denominational 
Protestantism.576  Although the Blaine Amendment narrowly failed to 
gain support in the Senate, thirty-seven states eventually adopted one or 
another version of it as part of their respective state constitutions.577 
The Second World War brought about greater acceptance of 
Catholics, who served in large numbers, side-by-side with other 
Americans, in every branch of the military, and in every theater of 
 
571.  DOLAN, supra note 568, at 84–85. 
572.  Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Disestablishment: Limits on Church Power and 
Property Before the Civil War, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 307, 311–12 (2014). 
573.  Marc D. Stern, Blaine Amendments, Anti-Catholicism, and Catholic Dogma, 
2 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 153, 167 (2004) (“It would be fruitless to deny that the Blaine 
Amendments taken as group were aimed at rebuffing Catholic efforts to obtain funding for 
their schools.  Finally, it cannot be denied that some of the rhetoric used in urging adoption of 
the Blaine Amendments in the nineteenth century was tainted by raw anti-Catholicism.”). 
574.  HAMBURGER, supra note 570, at 321–28. 
575.  4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875).   
576.  See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
577.  A few of these state measures preceded the failed effort to amend the federal 
Constitution, causing some to resist seeing these measures as being an outgrowth of the 
Blaine Amendment.  See Stern, supra note 573, at 168.  Nevertheless, the practice of calling 
these state restrictions “Baby Blaines” is commonplace.  For a useful resource that lists those 
states that adopted versions of the Blaine Amendment as part of their respective 
constitutions, the language of these measures, and cases applying them, see Blaine 
Amendments, BECKETT FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/the-blai
ne-admendments/#tab5 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5XLE-MFJP. 
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war.578  After the war, many Catholic families moved out of the 
“Catholic ghetto”—the urban, ethnic, parish-centered Catholic enclaves 
that their immigrant ancestors had constructed—and relocated to the 
then-burgeoning suburbs.  There they further assimilated into American 
society, living and working alongside non-Catholics, and sending their 
children to public schools such that “the Catholic population in the 
1960s could no longer be thought of as a foreign population.”579  The 
symbolic highpoint of this process of assimilation and acceptance was 
the 1960 election in which John Fitzgerald Kennedy—a Catholic and the 
great-grandson of Irish immigrants—was elected President of the 
United States.580  This represented a reversal, of sorts, of the 1928 
presidential election in which the Democratic nominee and Catholic 
governor of New York, Al Smith, was defeated in part because of a 
vitriolic campaign that focused on his Catholicism.581 
a. Anti-Catholicism at the Time of the Catholic  
Response to Legal Realism 
The transition, however, from pre-war suspicion and derision to 
post-war acceptance and assimilation was not seamless.  Indeed, what is 
remarkable is how, during the period just prior to Kennedy’s election, 
an especially virulent form of anti-Catholicism manifested itself at the 
highest levels of American society.  In 1949, Paul Blanshard published 
American Freedom and Catholic Power, a book that garnered a 
 
578.  See THOMAS BRUSCINO, A NATION FORGED IN WAR: HOW WORLD WAR II 
TAUGHT AMERICANS TO GET ALONG (2010). 
579.  PHILIP GLEASON, KEEPING THE FAITH: AMERICAN CATHOLICISM PAST AND 
PRESENT 63 (1987). 
580.  See MARK S. MASSA, CATHOLICS AND AMERICAN CULTURE: FULTON SHEEN, 
DOROTHY DAY, AND THE NOTRE DAME FOOTBALL TEAM 128–47 (1999).  Massa argues 
that it was only because Kennedy went to such great efforts to assure the public and other 
political actors that his religion was a purely private affair that Kennedy was able to gain the 
narrow victory that he did.  Id. 
581.  DOLAN, supra note 568, at 351; MORRIS, supra note 568, at 159 (noting the “anti-
Catholic hysteria that met Smith’s nomination,” including “rumors that the Pope would move 
to the White House or that Protestants would lose their citizenship” and “the burning crosses 
that lined Smith’s campaign travels through the South and Midwest”).  Anti-Catholicism is 
such an ingrained habit in the minds of some people that they condemn even as they 
perpetuate it.  See PAUL BLANSHARD, COMMUNISM, DEMOCRACY, AND CATHOLIC POWER 
227–28 (1951) (deploring “the prejudice and passions that were aroused during the Al Smith 
campaign” but affirming the “clear-eyed and unprejudiced apprehension about the possible 
effect of placing in the White House a man who was even nominally a disciple of a foreign 
power claiming certain rights over several million American Catholics in respect to important 
civic responsibilities”). 
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recommendation of the Book-of-the-Month Club and then “dominated 
the New York Times best-seller list for eleven months.”582  In the book, 
Blanshard eschewed both the age-old bigotry against the “Catholic 
people” based on ethnicity and class, as well as efforts to “curtail the 
rights of the Catholic Church as a religious institution.”583  He warned, 
however, that “the Catholic problem is still with us”584 in the form of the 
Catholic hierarchy, “an organization that is alien in spirit and control.”585  
He called for a “resistance movement designed to prevent the hierarchy 
from imposing its social policies upon our schools, hospitals, 
government, and family organization.”586  He urged people to oppose 
the “antidemocratic social policies of the hierarchy and to fight against 
every intolerant or separatist or un-American feature of those 
policies.”587  The policies Blanshard had in mind included Catholic 
parochial education in general and the use of public funds for textbooks, 
transportation, and tuition in particular;588 the practice of vowed 
religious women as teachers and in convents and monasteries;589 the 
existence of Catholic colleges and universities, “second-rate Catholic 
institutions of ‘higher learning’”;590 Catholic treatment of mixed-
marriages and the Church’s refusal to recognize civil divorce and 
remarriage;591 Catholic influence and control over the media;592 the 
Church’s suppression of science and its embrace of relics, apparitions, 
 
582.  Patrick McKinley Brennan, Are Catholics Unreliable from a Democratic Point of 
View? Thoughts on the Occasion of the Sixtieth Anniversary of Paul Blanshard’s American 
Freedom and Catholic Power, 56 VILL. L. REV. 199, 199 (2011). 
583.  PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER 347 (2d ed. 
1958) (emphasis omitted). 
584.  Id. at 13. 
585.  Id. at 3. 
586.  Id. at 346–47. 
587.  Id. at 347. 
588.  Id. at 94–124. 
589.  Id. at 87–94.  As an example of Blanshard’s disdain for Catholic women religious, 
he refers to nuns as “belong[ing] to an age when women allegedly enjoyed subjection and 
reveled in self-debasement,” and adorning themselves in “unhygienic costumes and their 
medieval rules of conduct,” id. at 88, where “medieval” is a pejorative term, see John T. 
McGreevy, Thinking on One’s Own: Catholicism in the American Imagination, 1928–1960, 84 
J. AM. HIST. 97, 102 (1997) (“To liberals, no more vicious epithet existed than the description 
of an idea as ‘medieval’ . . . .”); see also BLANSHARD, supra note 583, at 128 (referring to the 
clerical and religious vesture of priests, brothers, and nuns as their appearing “costumed”). 
590.  BLANSHARD, supra note 583, at 129–34. 
591.  Id. at 185–211. 
592.  Id. at 212–43. 
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and superstition;593 and the Church’s “master plan” to achieve a 
privileged position in the United States.594  Blanshard also pointedly 
objected to the Church’s opposition to eugenic sterilization, its rejection 
of modern views of sexuality and the use of birth control, and its refusal 
to endorse what was then termed “therapeutic abortion.”595 
What Blanshard referred to as the “American Catholic problem” 
could, he said, be traced not only to the formulation of these policies by 
an “alien-controlled hierarchy”596 but to their substance—a substance 
that Blanshard viewed as “incompatible with Western democracy and 
American culture.”597  For Blanchard, the Church’s aim was “to impose 
its own social, political, and cultural program upon the American 
community in the name of religion, although a large part of the program 
has no necessary connection with religion.”598  Of course “religion” for 
Blanshard was a purely private affair consisting of devotional practices 
confined to the church hall or the cloister, not the virtues and corporal 
works of mercy lived in the public square.  In this he assumes, but does 
not defend, a narrow, anemic, liberal-Protestant understanding of 
“religion” and assumes that others share this view with him.  Indeed, 
Blanshard and other post-war liberals insisted that religion was “an 
entirely private matter” that “must be separated from the state” and 
that “religious loyalty must not threaten intellectual autonomy or 
national unity.”599 
What is most remarkable about Blanshard’s book is not the popular 
success it enjoyed but the critical acclaim it received from American 
elites and intellectuals.  It is perhaps not surprising that the sociologist, 
naturalist, and educator John Dewey would praise Blanshard’s book for 
its “exemplary scholarship, good judgment, and tact.”600  After all, 
Blanshard was Dewey’s former student at the University of Michigan.601  
 
593.  Id. at 244–73. 
594.  Id. at 302–24. 
595.  Id. at 142, 160–84. 
596.  Id. at 70. 
597.  Id. at 325.  
598.  Id. at 346. 
599.  MCGREEVY, supra note 531, at 168. 
600.  McGreevy, supra note 589, at 97 (quoting Letter from John Dewey to Melvin 
Arnold (June 7, 1949)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
601.  Moreover, although Dewey was not a lawyer, he was a close collaborator and 
intellectual leader among the Legal Realists in their efforts to refashion law as a “scientific” 
discipline.  See John Dewey, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN 
SCHOLARS, supra note 200, at 73; John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal 
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But Dewey was not alone in his praise of Blanshard’s work.  Other 
notable figures, including Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell, were 
favorably impressed, and McGeorge Bundy described Blanshard’s book 
as “a very useful thing.”602  John Boas, writing in The Philosophical 
Review, said that Blanshard had “performed a great service to 
philosophers,” and John Coatman, writing in The Philosophical 
Quarterly, found Blanshard’s treatment of the subject “objective, 
scholarly, and restrained.”603 
Blanshard’s book, his subsequent 1951 volume, Communism, 
Democracy, and Catholic Power,604 and the critical acclaim that each 
book received, were reflective of the times.  As historian John 
McGreevy notes, Blanshard’s books were only “the most prominent in a 
flurry of analyses” that portrayed American Catholicism as the source of 
what was reactionary in American political and social life.605  Similar 
 
Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926); see also McGreevy, supra note 589, at 100 (on use of the 
word “scientific”). 
602.  For citations to these sources, see McGreevy, supra note 589, at 97–98 & n.3. 
603.  Brennan, supra note 582, at 199–200 (quoting George Boas, Book Review, 59 
PHIL. REV. 126, 127 (1950); John Coatman, Book Review, 2 PHIL. Q. 284, 284 (1952)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
604.  BLANSHARD, supra note 583.  In this book, Blanshard sought to explore the 
subject other American writers had “avoided,” namely, “the fundamental resemblance 
between the Vatican and the Kremlin.”  Id. at 1.  The fundamental resemblance, according to 
Blanshard, is that “[t]he Vatican and the Kremlin are both dictatorships,” different in some 
respects but similar in a way that “no cloudy ecclesiastical effusions can quite conceal.”  Id. at 
43.  The Catholic Church is fundamentally un-American in that “the fundamental thesis on 
which our whole [American] way of life is based . . . [is] that the majority of the people have 
the right to determine our future by free choice based on free discussion, with certain 
inalienable rights guaranteed to minorities.”  Id. at 4.  According to Blanshard, both the 
Soviet Union and the Vatican are run by an undemocratic, centralized authority that 
prohibits freedom of thought and expression, that demands obedience, and that engages in 
“thought control.”  Id. at 289.  Both organizations seek to “deify” their respective leaders, the 
Soviet Premier and the Pope.  Id. at 287–92.  Blanshard refers to Catholicism as “the Roman 
Catholic church-state,” which he describes as “a vast empire of churches, schools, hospitals, 
orphanages, monasteries, political parties, clerical-dominated governments, labor unions, 
embassies, newspapers—a world system of culture, discipline, and loyalty which in many 
respects outweighs in influence any single nation in the world.”  Id. at 3.  Although the 
Church’s message is one of “personal gentleness and love” and not “ruthlessness and force,” 
id. at 287, still, “Vatican power in America is pervasive and substantial,” id. at 295.  Thus, the 
United States should proceed in dealing with the Vatican only by first demanding certain 
concessions including that “no outside power should attempt to tell American voters how to 
decide any American political issue, especially when the outside organization gives its 
members no participating rights in arriving at the decision.”  Id. at 300–01. 
605.  McGreevy, supra note 589, at 104–05 (quoting Harold J. Laski, America—1947, 
165 NATION 641, 643 (1947)). 
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themes concerning the suspect nature of Catholicism in relation to 
American democracy and liberal society were sounded in the 1920s and 
1930s by figures such as Lewis Mumford, Reinhold Niebuhr, A. Powell 
Davies, Felix Frankfurter, E.C. Lindeman, André Siegfried, and 
Winfred Garrison.606  In the 1940s, “naturalist intellectuals organized a 
series of conferences . . . to rally their supporters” against what they saw 
as a rising tide of Catholic “absolutist” criticism.607  According to 
philosopher Horace Kallen, Catholics posed a dangerous threat because 
“their intent is a spiritual fascism, a moral and intellectual 
totalitarianism, which has its peers in those of the Nazis and their ilk.”608  
A democratic citizen should be capable of “thinking on one’s own.”609 
It was in this milieu that Fred Rodell and Mark DeWolfe Howe 
wrote their articles defending Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., against the 
criticisms of John C. Ford, S.J., and Francis E. Lucey, S.J.  Framing the 
matter in this way actually overstates the nature of their response.  
Howe expressly declined the opportunity to respond to Ford and Lucey 
directly since, according to Howe, their criticisms of Justice Holmes 
were “so firmly grounded in the Catholic philosophy of law” that, had 
he attempted to do so, Howe would have found himself “quickly 
engaged in a theological controversy beyond [his] competence to 
discuss.”610  Instead, Howe turned his attention to Lon Fuller’s criticisms 
 
606.  See id. at 98 & n.4, 106 & nn.30–31. 
607.  PURCELL, supra note 1, at 204. 
608.  Id. (quoting Horace M. Kallen, Freedom and Authoritarianism in Religion, in THE 
SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT AND DEMOCRATIC FAITH 3, 10 (1944)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
609.  McGreevy, supra note 589, at 98. 
610.  Howe, supra note 390, at 530.  Howe ostensibly eschewed the theological debate 
that Ford and Lucey purportedly invited, claiming a lack of competence.  This lack of 
competence did not, however, prevent Howe from seeming to join with Justice Holmes in 
rejecting “the outworn formulas of Calvinism and the threadbare precepts of Protestant 
morality,” id. at 533, and endorsing “the conviction that morality could no longer find its 
justification in a theology which science had shown to be unacceptable,” and the belief that 
“science had turned the creed of Harvard and his ancestors to dust and ashes,” id. at 535.  Nor 
did this supposed lack of competence prevent Howe from using the word “theological” as a 
derogatory expression.  See id. at 539 (stating that Justice Holmes “led American legal 
scholarship to follow the historical rather than the purely logical—even theological—
methods which had threatened to dominate legal thought”).  Howe’s statements concerning 
the relationship between science and morality—whether paraphrasing Justice Holmes, 
reflecting his own views, or both—should strike the reader, even the committed naturalist, as 
baffling.  How can science show that the Christian faith is wrong?  Surely Howe is not 
claiming (for himself or for Holmes) that modern, empirical science proves that God does not 
exist, or that Jesus was not God incarnate, or that the moral imperative to love others as 
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of Justice Holmes—criticisms, he says, Fuller had “most effectively 
stated.”611 
This move is telling because the same criticisms of Holmes set forth 
by Fuller that Howe singles out can be found in the works of Ford and 
Lucey, without any theological adornment.  For example, Howe 
identifies Fuller’s thesis as seeing Justice Holmes as a “child of 
Hobbes, . . . the American father of legal positivism” who insisted on a 
sharp distinction between law as it is and law as it ought to be.612  In 
contrast to the “positivist tendency in Holmes’s thought,” Howe found 
that Fuller “persuasively presented” the natural law perspective as an 
alternative.613  However, Howe believes that Fuller misread Holmes as 
espousing “the creed of an authoritarian,” holding “that might makes 
right, that the is is more important than the ought.”614  On the contrary, 
Howe argues that Holmes always maintained “that the ultimate source 
of law is the moral judgment of the community.”615  Here, Howe cites 
Holmes’s statement from The Path of the Law that “[t]he law is the 
witness and external deposit of our moral life,” and his statement in The 
Common Law that the “rules of law are or should be based upon a 
morality which is generally accepted.”616  In this, Howe believes that 
Holmes advanced the “more perceptive” understanding of law that 
views morality as the source of law “rather than its content.”617  Thus, 
for Howe, Holmes’s critics should “admit that they have exaggerated 
the positivist elements in his theory of law.”618 
Had Howe managed to overcome his alleged coyness in dealing with 
Jesuits for fear of being dragged into a theological fray, he might have 
observed how both Lucey and Ford concede that Justice Holmes 
acknowledges that all law is unavoidably moral in the sense that it 
expresses a normative preference, but not in the sense that such a 
 
Christ loved his disciples is empirically false.  Surely Howe is not making the category mistake 
of reaching a normative conclusion based on empirical premises. 
611.  Id. at 531. 
612.  Id. 
613.  Id. at 531–32. 
614.  Id. at 537 (focusing specifically on Fuller’s reading of Holmes’s Memorial Day 
Address).  
615.  Id. at 541. 
616.  See id. (quoting Holmes, supra note 115, at 459; O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON 
LAW 44 (1881)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
617.  Id. at 541–42. 
618.  Id. at 543. 
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preference is anything other than “the predominant power in the 
community.”619  To say that Justice Holmes subscribed to the view that 
“might makes right” is not to exaggerate Holmes’s positivism.  It is, 
rather, to take him at his word.  It is to acknowledge that if one is 
abused by the majority through the instruments of law—stripped of all 
dignity, of all property, and even of one’s own life—one has no legal 
principle upon which to voice an objection.  Because there is no 
“absolute principle or even a human ultimate that man always is an end 
in himself—that his dignity must be respected”620—then no particular 
individual need be counted among those who vie for power in the 
lawmaking arena.  For Justice Holmes, “the sacredness of human life is 
a purely municipal ideal of no validity outside the jurisdiction” such that 
when two groups “want to make inconsistent kinds of world[s]” there is 
no way to resolve the conflict “except [through] force.”621  If a human 
being is merely “a cosmic ganglion,”622 if there is “no reason for 
attributing to man a significance different in kind from that which 
belongs to a baboon or to a grain of sand,”623 then a human being 
possesses no inherent dignity that the law must recognize and respect.  
For Justice Holmes, “when it comes to the development of a corpus juris 
the ultimate question is what do the dominant forces of the community 
want and do they want it hard enough to disregard whatever inhibitions 
 
619.  Lucey, supra note 210, at 499 n.10 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Natural 
Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310, 314 (1920)).  In this same passage, Justice Holmes 
dismisses “[t]he most fundamental of the supposed pre-existing rights—the right of life”—
since “whenever the interest of society, that is, of the predominant power is the community, is 
thought to demand it,” then “the sanctity disappears.”  HOLMES, supra, at 314 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
620.  Ford, supra note 179, at 264 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to 
Dr. John C.H. Wu (Aug. 26, 1926) [hereinafter Letter from Justice Holmes to Dr. Wu], in 
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: HIS BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS 
AND PAPERS 186, 187 (Harry C. Shriver ed., 1936) [hereinafter BOOK NOTICES AND 
UNCOLLECTED PAPERS]); Lucey, supra note 210, at 503 n.21 (quoting same). 
621.  Lucey, supra note 210, at 498 n.5 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
to Sir Frederick Pollock (Feb. 1, 1920), in 2 HOLMES–POLLOCK LETTERS 36, 36 (Mark 
DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941)). 
622.  Id. at 499 n.9 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Dr. John C.H. 
Wu (May 5, 1926), in BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 620, at 184, 
185); Ford, supra note 179, at 269 (quoting same). 
623.  Lucey, supra note 210, at 498–99 n.9 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr., to Sir Frederick Pollock (Aug. 30, 1929), in 2 HOLMES–POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 
621, at 251, 252); see also Ford, supra note 179, at 268 (quoting same). 
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may stand in the way.”624  As Lucey summarized: “If there are no 
ultimate permanent objective values and no moral oughts, of course, 
anything which Society capriciously enforces is law, and Society can 
capriciously bring its force to bear in any direction.”625 
Lucey and Ford’s own views—regarding man’s place in the universe, 
man’s dignity, and the requirement that, in order to be law, a norm must 
reflect and protect this dignity—were plainly influenced by their 
adherence to Thomism626 and their biblical faith.  Their critique of 
Justice Holmes, however—thoroughly grounded as it was in Holmes’s 
own papers and correspondence—stands on its own merits, unmarred 
by religious bias. 
The point, however, is not that Ford and Lucey were correct in their 
analysis of Justice Holmes and that Howe was wrong.627  Rather, the 
point is that Ford and Lucey put forth arguments that were at least 
equal in sophistication to those put forth by Fuller (and perhaps in some 
ways more rigorous), but Howe chose to avoid responding to the 
substance of these arguments, dismissing them out of hand as “religious” 
and impenetrable—the product of “Jesuit” minds.628 
Rodell’s short article is no better.  Indeed, he mimics some of the 
major themes found in Blanshard’s book.  He begins by noting that 
“Catholic, and especially Jesuit scholars, plus Catholic laymen have 
been in the forefront of th[e] assault” on Justice Holmes.629  The core of 
Rodell’s response to this assault is psychological in nature.  Regardless 
of whether they are religious, or what their religious affiliation is, “[t]he 
single trait that binds together the critics of Mr. Justice Holmes . . . is a 
belief in some sort of Absolute, outside and beyond the minds of 
men”—a belief “the faithful” cling to presumably because there is some 
“comfort in believing,” a comfort that Holmes unsettled through the 
 
624.  Ford, supra note 179, at 264 (quoting Letter from Justice Holmes to Dr. Wu, supra 
note 620, at 187); Lucey, supra note 210, at 503 n.21 (quoting same) (alteration omitted) 
(emphasis omitted). 
625.  Lucey, supra note 210, at 508. 
626.  Id. at 524–32 (setting forth the postulates of “Scholastic Natural Law”); Ford, supra 
note 179, at 275. 
627.  On this point, however, in referring to the Jesuit authors Lucey, Ford, and Gregg, 
Albert Alschuler had this to say: “These writers understood Holmes better than the lawyers 
and scholars who viewed him as a liberal hero.  Some of them, however, did not enhance their 
credibility when they denounced Holmes’s agnosticism and linked him with Hitler.”  
ALSCHULER, supra note 114, at 204 n.21. 
628.  Howe, supra note 390, at 530. 
629.  Rodell, supra note 441, at 622.  
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“lurking fear” of doubt.630  According to Rodell, Justice Holmes held a 
“deeply democratic faith in man’s power of reason,”631 the capacity to 
think on one’s own.632  Echoing Blanshard’s charge against Catholics, 
Rodell describes those who ignore or denounce Holmes’s philosophy 
“as totalitarian-tended and hence unAmerican.”633  Indeed, just as 
Blanshard branded Catholicism as unwaveringly authoritarian, Rodell 
brands Holmes’s critics “authoritarians all, [who] will accept no moral 
code as truly moral that does not embody some timeless superhuman 
principles.”634  Those who denounce Justice Holmes do so out of their 
 
630.  Id. 
631.  Id. 
632.  The core idea in Blanshard, and a great deal of other anti-Catholic literature, is 
that the “central structure of the Church is completely authoritarian, and the role of laymen is 
completely passive,” BLANSHARD, supra note 583, at 22; that the hierarchy tells the people 
what to believe, and these “dogmatic utterances . . . do not admit of modification or change 
by the Catholic people,” id. at 23; and that the Church “stifle[s] self-criticism” and represses 
the flow of information “on matters of social policy” in a manner “directly contrary to the 
American conception of freedom of thought,” id. at 242.  As noted above, Rodell portrays 
those who subscribe to natural law in a similar way—as having a psychological need for 
certainty resulting in a penchant for that which is fascist and anti-democratic.  See supra notes 
629–37 and accompanying text.   
A similar theme—that Catholics automatically follow the commands of authority and 
fail to think for themselves—is also intimated in Howe’s essay.  He says that because “the 
Catholic philosophy of law is based” on natural law, “[i]t would have required no special 
insight to predict, twenty years ago, that Jesuit teachers of law would find Holmes’ skepticism 
philosophically unacceptable.”  Howe, supra note 390, at 531.  Howe need not bother with the 
question of whether they have adequately responded to Justice Holmes’s skepticism on the 
merits.  Thus, Howe need only dismiss the reflexive thinking of “Jesuit teachers of law” as 
such.  Id.  Because Catholics do not think for themselves, because they are programed to 
respond in a certain fashion, they have little to contribute to scholarly debate.  Howe briefly 
turns to Justice Holmes’s comment equating the significance of human nature with that of “a 
baboon or a grain of sand,” but he mischaracterizes Justice Holmes’s remark as a “question” 
rather than a conclusion.  Id. at 545.  Instead of exploring Justice Holmes’s position, Howe 
(like Rodell) ventures into the psychological, questioning whether those who resist Justice 
Holmes’s claim have stomachs “strong enough to accept the bitter pill which Holmes 
tendered us.”  Id.  Regardless of whether the version of natural law put forth carries with it all 
the “implications of divine authority,” it still reflects a desire for security, for “seeking shelter 
from skepticism beneath the deceptive security of a phrase.”  Id.  While acknowledging the 
legitimacy of inquiring into fundamental “standards of decency,” Howe worries that the then-
current turn to natural law reflects “a desire to reinstate the monarchy of absolutes,” id.,  “the 
comforts of the absolute,” id. at 546.  He fears that “this effort to revive the concept of natural 
law . . . will lead us unconsciously back to the shop-worn absolutes of an earlier day.”  Id. at 
545–46. 
633.  Rodell, supra note 441, at 622. 
634.  Id. at 623.  According to Rodell, it was enough for Justice Holmes that there were 
“no ultimate answers,” that morality was simply “the product of the innate decency of human 
beings.”  Id.  Justice Holmes’s own commentary on human nature, as found in his papers and 
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own “emotional need to feel that their personal dependence on some 
sort of safe-and-sound cosmic morality—call it God or Ultimate Truth 
or Natural Law—must be a part of every patriot’s creed.”635  Holmes 
was a severe critic of both “the authoritarianism implicit in Natural 
Law” and the belief that legal values come “out of some jurisprudential 
heaven.”636  The penultimate paragraph of Rodell’s essay appears as if it 
were lifted from the pages of Blanshard’s book.  There, he claims that 
those who read both Holmes and his detractors “will see which of the 
two conflicting views of life is more nearly fascist (authoritarianism is 
the essence of fascism) and which is more deeply democratic 
(democracy postulates the intelligence of each individual man).”637 
Rodell and Howe’s articles, standing alone, do not show that the 
kind of anti-Catholicism found in Blanshard’s writings was widely 
represented in the legal academy.  However, they do show that law 
professors were not immune to the prejudice against the Catholic 
Church that Blanshard popularized in his best-selling books under the 
guise of a sober, scholarly analysis of what he termed “the Catholic 
problem.”  Indeed, given the widespread support that Blanshard’s work 
enjoyed among other American elites and intellectuals, it would be 
surprising not to find similar support among American law professors.  
For his part, Blanshard was glad to note, at a lecture delivered at the 
Harvard Law School in 1950, that “the new movement against Catholic 
aggression is rising not on the fringes, the lunatic fringes of religion and 
fanaticism, but right in the hearts of American University leaders.”638 
b. Anti-Catholicism in the Historical Accounts of  
Legal Realism in the Post-JFK Era 
Even if it is conceded that a kind of anti-Catholic bias existed among 
American legal academics in the 1950s (when Catholic critics dared to 
challenge the stature of Justice Holmes), can this explain the current 
telling of American legal history?  Can this kind of bias account for the 
dismissive treatment of Catholic legal scholars’ response to Legal 
 
correspondence and addressed by Lucey and Ford, cast serious doubt on whether Justice 
Holmes actually believed in such innate decency.  See supra notes 619–26. 
635.  Rodell, supra note 441, at 622–23. 
636.  Id. at 624. 
637.  Id. 
638.  McGreevy, supra note 589, at 98 (quoting HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM, THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH AND POLITICS: A TRANSCRIPT OF A DISCUSSION ON A VITAL ISSUE 37 
(1950)). 
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Realism in the standard narrative of American legal history?  After all, 
we live in a post-JFK world—a world that, in many respects, celebrates 
diversity.  American society today is far more tolerant than it was during 
the time of Paul Blanshard.  It is a society that has benefitted from the 
social norm of anti-discrimination found in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the various state versions of that landmark legislation, and the 
cultural changes that these laws have both caused and reinforced.  Is it 
possible that the conventional narrative of American legal history today 
still bears the marks of this prejudice?  In response to this question, we 
offer three observations. 
i. The Passage of Time Since the First Histories of American Legal 
Realism 
First, it is important to note that in speaking of the historical account 
of American Legal Realism and its Catholic critics today, “today” refers 
not to a specific date but to a span of several decades.  Edward Purcell’s 
book was published in 1973, whereas Brian Tamanaha’s book came out 
in 2010.  During this period, the nation has undergone enormous 
change.  The country is now far more racially diverse and accepting of 
people from different backgrounds.  For example, in 1970 whites made 
up almost eighty-eight percent of the total population, whereas in 2010 
they made up only seventy-two percent.639  In the 91st Congress (1969–
1970), 11 members of Congress were African-American (including one 
senator), and 11 members of Congress were female (including one 
senator); in the 111th Congress (2009–2010), 42 African-Americans 
served in Congress (including one in the Senate), and 99 women served 
in Congress (including eighteen who served in the Senate).640  In the 91st 
Congress, seventy percent (375 members of the House and Senate) 
identified as Protestant, and twenty percent (109 members) identified as 
Catholic; in the 111th Congress, only fifty-five percent (292 members of 
 
639.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE WHITE POPULATION: 2010, at 3 tbl.1 (2011); 
Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 
to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and 
States tbl.A-7 (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 56, 2002), available at http://www.cen
sus.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/twps0056.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
H7HB-HACX. 
640.  JENNIFER E. MANNING & COLLEEN J. SHOGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL30378, AFRICAN AMERICAN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS: 1870–2012, at 47, 54 (2012); 
JENNIFER E. MANNING & IDA A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30261, WOMEN 
IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS. 1917–2014: BIOGRAPHICAL AND COMMITTEE 
ASSIGNMENT INFORMATION, AND LISTINGS BY STATE AND CONGRESS 79–80, 88 (2014). 
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the House and Senate) identified as Protestant, and thirty percent (161 
members) identified as Catholic.641  In 2008 the country elected its first 
African-American president, Barack Obama, who won re-election in 
2012.642 
Plainly, the subject of how the American people have come to terms 
with the social fact of their diversity and the interactions between the 
sexes and among the country’s various racial, ethnic, cultural, and 
religious groups is enormously complex.  The few statistics cited above 
provide only a crude snapshot, at best.  They are not offered to suggest 
that the various demographic groups that make up the nation have 
found a way to overcome all that divides them so as to live as equals in 
peace and harmony.  Sexism is still present in American culture, racial 
and ethnic bias still exists, and, in a post-9/11 world, tensions between 
various ethnic and religious groups have reemerged and taken on new 
forms.  Having said that, it would be wrong not to acknowledge that the 
America that emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth century is not 
only a more diverse but also a far more tolerant, open-minded, and 
accepting society than that which had preceded it. 
ii. The Persistence of Anti-Catholic Bias in American Society 
Second, despite all the positive changes that have taken place, anti-
Catholicism has proven to be a remarkably resilient form of prejudice.  
Although overt discrimination against Catholics simply on the basis of 
religious affiliation (in terms of disqualification from jobs or housing) is 
rare, both subtle and not-so-subtle forms of cultural bias persist and are 
widespread.  As historian Philip Jenkins has observed, “[s]ince the 
1950s, changing cultural sensibilities have made it ever more difficult to 
recite once-familiar American stereo-types about the great majority of 
ethnic or religious groups” such that today statements “that could be 
regarded as misogynistic, anti-Semitic, or homophobic” are no longer 
tolerated “and could conceivably destroy a public career.”643  There is, 
however, “one massive exception to this rule, namely, that it is still 
possible to make quite remarkably hostile or vituperative public 
 
641.  Faith on the Hill: 2008, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE 1, 5 
(Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.pewforum.org/2008/12/19/faith-on-the-hill-the-religious-affiliation
s-of-members-of-congress/, archived at http://perma.cc/745H-DC6T. 
642.  See Barack Obama, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/b
arackobama (last visited Apr. 8, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/Q38U-P4UP. 
643.  JENKINS, supra note 566, at 4. 
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statements about one major religious tradition, namely, Roman 
Catholicism.”644 
Contemporary anti-Catholicism manifests itself in a variety of ways: 
in how the news is reported,645 on editorial pages and in journals of 
opinion,646 and in art, entertainment, and advertising.  Comedians chase 
laughs, horror-movie producers seek to thrill and shock their audiences, 
and advertising executives covet attention of whatever kind they can get 
in attempting to sell products and services.  Thus, it is not surprising that 
the makers of media often turn to the Catholic Church and its rich 
tapestry of doctrines and symbols as source material for their particular 
ventures.  In this it is not always easy to discern whether a character who 
is identifiably Catholic (like a priest or religious sister) or the 
appropriation of Catholic imagery is intended to denigrate the 
Church.647  Sometimes, as in the case of the wildly popular novel and 
film The DaVinci Code, the author simply seeks to provide a form of 
entertainment, but others promote the work as history in order to serve 
an anti-Church agenda, exposing Catholicism as a fraud from its 
inception.648  At the same time, some actions are so outrageous—such as 
the desecration of the Eucharist at Mass by gay-rights protestors,649 or 
 
644.  Id. at 4–5. 
645.  The print, broadcast, and online media’s reporting of the clerical sexual abuse crisis 
in the Catholic Church was not evidence in itself of an anti-Catholic bias.  The story of the 
sexual abuse of children and young people by Catholic priests, and the response of bishops 
and other ecclesiastical authorities following the discovery of these heinous acts, was an 
entirely newsworthy story deserving of substantial attention.  However, the enormous 
attention devoted to the issue—relative to the attention devoted to similar scandals where the 
Catholic Church was not involved—suggests more than simply informing the public was at 
issue.   
646.  See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, The Archbishop vs. the Governor: Gay Sera, Sera, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 19, 2011, at WK8; Maureen Dowd, Forgive Me Father, for I Have Linked, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011, at A27; Maureen Dowd, Hold the Halo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2011, at 
WK8; George Weigel, Maureen Dowd’s Catholic Problem, NATIONAL REVIEW (June 21, 
2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/270110/Maureen-dowds-catholic-probl
em-george-weigel, archived at http://perma.cc/QZ33-TCWK. 
647.  See James Martin, S.J., The Last Acceptable Prejudice?, AMERICA, Mar. 25, 2000, 
at 8. 
648.  Chris Carpenter, Cultural Analysis: The Truth Behind the Da Vinci Code, 
CBN.COM, http://www.cbn.com/entertainment/books/carpenter_abanes_davincicode.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/K3JF-JHS8 (discussing Christians taking 
offense from any insinuation that The Da Vinci Code is true). 
649.  Jason DeParle, Rude, Rash, Effective, Act-Up Shifts AIDS Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
3, 1990, at B1; see also Megan Twohey, Gay-Rights Activists Protest at Holy Name Cathedral, 
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 2010, at 6. 
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radio personalities paying two people to have sex in a cathedral as a 
stunt for their broadcast650—that they are difficult to explain absent 
some kind of animus for the Catholic Church.  Indeed, it is difficult to 
imagine that, if the object of ridicule had been Judaism or the 
Presbyterian Church and not the Catholic Church, a play like Corpus 
Christi, which portrays a gay, modern-day Jesus living in Texas who 
performs a gay-wedding for two of his disciples, would ever have been 
produced on an off-Broadway stage, let alone made into a movie.651 
These incidents serve to highlight the difference between the anti-
Catholicism of the Know Nothings and the cartoons of Thomas Nast,652 
and the anti-Catholicism of today.  Unlike anti-Catholic prejudice in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the new anti-Catholicism is not 
based on ethnicity or social class.  It is not concerned with immigration 
or changes in the demographic composition of American society.  
Indeed, those who harbor a negative view of Catholicism may even 
favor the immigration of people from traditionally Catholic countries.653  
Moreover, although these themes emerge from time to time, the new 
anti-Catholicism is not especially concerned, as Paul Blanshard was, 
with the use of public funds to support parochial schools, or with the 
diplomatic status of the Holy See654 and the Vatican as the center of a 
 
650.  Two radio personalities in New York were fired for broadcasting a couple having 
sex in St. Patrick’s Cathedral in New York.  Deejays Fired over Cathedral Sex Stunt, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2002, at A28.  Not long after their dismissal, the two returned to the 
airwaves.  Paul Farhi, Opie & Anthony Get the Last Laugh, WASH. POST, June 26, 2006, at 
C1. 
651.  Jason Zinoman, A Modern, Gay You-Know-Who Superstar, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 
2008, at C2. 
652.  See MORRIS, supra note 568, at 66 (reproducing Nast’s cartoon “The American 
River Ganges” and describing it as “the most brilliantly poisonous of Thomas Nast’s popular 
anti-Catholic cartoons”); see also Melissa Musick Nussbaum & L. Martin Nussbaum, “The 
American River Ganges” Rising, FIRST THINGS (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.firstthings.com/w
eb-exclusives/2010/12/ldquothe-american-river-gangesrdquo-rising, archived at http://perma.c
c/BZH4-7JJT (commenting on Nast’s cartoon, comparing contemporary cartoons 
commenting on the priest sex abuse scandal and the Catholic hierarchy, and questioning the 
absence of similar cartoons depicting public school teachers given the higher incidence of 
child sexual abuse in the public schools). 
653.  JENKINS, supra note 566, at 20–21. 
654.  The Holy See’s place in international relations was well established, long before 
there was such a thing as the United Nations.  See generally ROBERT JOHN ARAUJO, S.J & 
JOHN A. LUCAL, S.J., PAPAL DIPLOMACY AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE: THE UNITED 
NATIONS FROM PIUS XII TO PAUL VI (2010); ROBERT JOHN ARAUJO, S.J. & JOHN A. 
LUCAL, S.J., PAPAL DIPLOMACY AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE: THE VATICAN AND 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FROM THE EARLY YEARS TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
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vast international conspiracy to undermine freedom and the American 
way of life.  It is instead concerned with the ideas associated with 
traditional Catholic moral teaching, especially as these ideas may 
influence both law and social practice. 
The flashpoints where this new prejudice typically emerges are the 
cultural issues of the day that excite the most controversy, that is, issues 
relating to sexuality and gender—the rights of LGBT individuals, same-
sex marriage and adoption, polygamy, pre-marital sex, sex outside of 
marriage, contraception, and abortion.655  With respect to each of these 
issues, the Catholic Church takes a position that, in the American 
context, is plainly counter-cultural.  The Church stands in opposition to 
the liberationist ethic that has come to define modernity since the latter 
half of the twentieth century and in favor of an older, alternate 
 
(2004).  Still, the question of whether or not the Holy See ought to enjoy international 
diplomatic personality, and particularly whether or not it ought to enjoy non-member 
permanent observer status at the United Nations, continues to be a topic of interest for law 
students and legal academics.  See, e.g., Yasmin Abdullah, Note, The Holy See at United 
Nations Conferences: State or Church?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1835 (1996); James Fantau, Note, 
Rethinking the Sovereign Status of the Holy See: Towards a Greater Equality of States and a 
Greater Protection of Citizens in United States Courts, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 487 
(2011).  That their arguments largely mimic the arguments put forth by those NGOs seeking 
to have the Holy See’s observer status revoked due to the Church’s opposition to abortion, 
contraception, and same-sex marriage reflects the new anti-Catholicism discussed in the text.  
See Catholics for Choice, The “See Change” Campaign: The Holy See at the United Nations: 
Church or State?, http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/campaigns/SeeChangeCampaign.asp (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ZZC2-UZGC.  They oppose the Holy See’s 
standing as a member of the international community because,  
[d]espite its non-voting status at the United Nations, the Holy See has stood as the 
major barrier to the UN goal of universal access to abortion and contraception for 
young girls and women throughout the world.  While the Church was unable to 
convince all countries—including the United States—of the evils of abortion, the 
Vatican, as a sovereign state, continues to play an important role at the negotiating 
table in areas in which the Church has a stake in helping to ensure the right to life 
and the dignity of the person. 
Anne Hendershott, What’s Behind the UN Attack on the Church?, CRISIS MAG. (Feb. 10, 
2014), http://www.crisismagazine.com/2014/whats-behind-the-un-attack-on-the-church, 
archived at http://perma.cc/VCC4-68MN.  For the perspective of the head of the Holy See’s 
delegation at the UN Conference on the Status of Women, held in Beijing in 1995, see Mary 
Ann Glendon, What Happened at Beijing, FIRST THINGS, Jan. 1996, at 30. 
655.  In addition to these perennially contested matters, Jenkins contends that certain 
intra-religious questions of ecclesial discipline and doctrine that also relate to sexuality and 
gender—priestly celibacy and women’s ordination—are also flashpoints, especially as these 
issues provide occasions for Catholics themselves to criticize the Church.  See JENKINS, supra 
note 566, at 44–45, 76–77.  Such internal squabbles are not in and of themselves evidence of 
anti-Catholicism. 
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anthropology that understands truth as constitutive of authentic human 
freedom.656 
To be clear, the mere act of opposing a given position that the 
Catholic Church happens to endorse—e.g., that same-sex “marriage” 
should not be legal,657 or that the law cannot legitimately recognize a 
“right” to abortion658—does not in and of itself constitute an act of anti-
Catholic bias.  Quite obviously, a great many reasonable people disagree 
with the Church and individual Catholics on any number of important 
matters, and the mere fact of their disagreement is not proof of bigotry.  
People can engage in respectful dialogue and reasoned discourse on the 
most contentious matters of the day free of prejudice, even where those 
conversations end in disagreement. 
The specter of anti-Catholicism is present, however, when a person 
strategically invokes religion as a way of dismissing a point of view with 
which he or she disagrees.  This argumentative strategy is more or less 
subtlety employed when someone deliberately refers to his or her 
opponent’s religious affiliation as “Catholic” or claims that the position 
espoused by his or her opponent is “Catholic” owing to its supposed 
religious origin or sectarian character.  In either case, the person 
identified as “Catholic” or as advocating for a “Catholic” position stands 
accused of violating one of the fundamental tenets of American political 
morality and constitutional law by attempting to impose a set of 
personal religious beliefs on the public as a whole. 
This strategy, which might be described as generally anti-Christian, 
is specifically anti-Catholic in that it plays off some of the poisonous 
stereotypes of Catholics that were prevalent in earlier times, without 
doing so explicitly.  Thus, as Ross Douthat has observed, “[t]he new 
 
656.  See John M. Breen, Neutrality in Liberal Legal Theory and Catholic Social 
Thought, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 513, 579–83 (2009). 
657.  CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, CONSIDERATIONS 
REGARDING PROPOSALS TO GIVE LEGAL RECOGNITION TO UNIONS BETWEEN 
HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS (2003), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/doc
uments/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homosexual-unions_en.html, archived at http://perma.cc
/J4WH-QAYV; CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, LETTER TO THE 
BISHOPS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ON THE PASTORAL CARE OF HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS 
(1986), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc
_19861001_homosexual-persons_en.html, archived at http://perma.cc/W3XW-ZCQK. 
658.  SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON 
PROCURED ABORTION (1974), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/docu
ments/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19741118_declaration-abortion_en.html, archived at http://perma.cc
/7HHN-4EQ4. 
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anti‐Catholicism is a more urbane pseudo-sophisticated version that 
regards the Church as a stumbling block to progress” on the neuralgic 
issues of the day.659  The message implicit in identifying a person as 
“Catholic” where he or she agrees with the Church’s position on one or 
another controversial topic is to suggest that such a person is docile and 
incurious—reflexively following the dictates of Rome.660  Because such a 
person subscribes to a religion marked by ritual and superstition, he or 
she may well be thought of as anti-intellectual and (depending on the 
issue) patriarchal, misogynistic, or homophobic—at least until such time 
as he or she “evolves” on the issue,661 embracing the position advocated 
by his or her erstwhile opponents.  Moreover, those who happen to 
agree with the Catholic Church’s position on one or another of these 
topics may be regarded as suspect, perhaps even considered un-
American—part of a large religious organization meddling in politics, 
inserting itself in cultural affairs, conspiring behind the scenes, and 
seeking to have the Pope and his fellow ecclesiastics dictate the policy of 
the state and the personal choices of individuals and families.  By 
contrast, those Catholics who dissent from the Church’s views on these 
topics are often portrayed as intelligent and emancipated—freed from 
the dogma of their unenlightened church and so reliable “from a 
democratic point of view.”662 
 
659.  Joan Frawley Desmond, Ross Douthat Scores Ryan’s Catholicism and Cardinal 
Dolan’s Election-Year Strategy, NAT. CATH. REG. (Aug. 28, 2012), 
http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/ross-douthat-scores-ryans-catholicism-and-cardinal-dol
ans-election-year-str/, archived at http://perma.cc/3BH2-6WER (quoting Ross Douthat). 
660.  See, e.g., Mark Stricherz, Ex-Democratic Lawmaker: Anti-Catholic Bigotry Drove 
Me to the GOP: Exclusive Aleteia Interview, ALETEIA (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.aleteia.org/e
n/politics/article/ex-democratic-lawmaker-anti-catholic-bigotry-drove-me-to-the-gop-exclusiv
e-aleteia-interview-5817480832352256, archived at http://perma.cc/37U7-DUJV (describing 
how Washington State politician Mark Miloscia was depicted in a political ad “donning a 
papal mitre and clutching rosary beads”). 
661.  The use of “evolution” as a trope suggests movement to a higher state of being.  Cf. 
Robin Toner, Shifting Views over Abortion Fog Gore Race, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2000, at A1 
(noting how Mr. Gore has changed on the issue from a sometime critic of abortion to a 
supporter of federal funding of abortion, and quoting NARAL’s Kate Michelman as 
describing Mr. Gore as having “evolved” on the issue); Josh Gerstein, Obama Evolves Again 
on Same-Sex Marriage, POLITICO (Oct. 20, 2014, 12:43 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/un
der-the-radar/2014/10/Obama-evolves-again-on-samesex-marriage-197348.html, archived at ht
tp://perma.cc/Q92N-G2F5 (noting how President Obama described his own views on same-
sex marriage as “evolving” in 2010, moved to favoring the matter politically in 2012, and 
discovered a constitutional right to same-sex marriage in 2014). 
662.  See Brennan, supra note 582, at 201.  Occasionally, Catholics are reminded that 
their participation in public life is contingent on their abandoning that which makes them 
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In characterizing a certain perspective on abortion or same-sex 
marriage as “religious”—whether in terms of it being generally 
“Christian” or specifically “Catholic”—those who oppose the Church on 
these controversial topics are able to declare that such a point of view is 
illegitimate—that it is unsuitable as a basis for law and public morality.  
Moreover, the implication is that those who agree with the Church’s 
point of view are attempting to institute a kind of theocratic rule.  Often 
this accusation is not implied but is overtly and aggressively stated by 
referring to opponents of same-sex marriage and abortion as the 
“Christian Taliban.”663  In either case, the still burning embers of anti-
Catholicism in this country are stoked, such that those who employ this 
strategy often succeed in dismissing an entire perspective out of hand, 
without ever addressing the merits of the allegedly “Catholic” or 
“Christian” position with which they disagree.  In this way they are able 
to win an argument without ever really having one. 
The specific effort to define opposition to abortion as broadly 
Christian and narrowly Catholic664 has a long and disgraceful lineage.  
 
Catholic.  See, e.g., Richard John Neuhaus, The Catholic Way of Being American, CRISIS 
MAG. (Feb. 1, 1996), http://www.crisismagazine.com/1996/the-catholic-way-of-being-american, 
archived at http://perma.cc/RG2Q-SLKU.  Neuhaus recounts the story of how when John 
O’Connor first became archbishop of New York in 1984 he made plain the Church’s teaching 
on abortion to Catholic public officials opposed to that teaching, and at a dinner he was told 
by one of the most influential editors in the country, “[W]hen John F. Kennedy was elected in 
1960, some of us thought that the question had been answered whether you Catholics really 
belong here, whether you understand how we do things around here.  But I must tell you 
frankly, Archbishop, that in the short time you’ve been in New York some of us are 
beginning to ask that question again.”  Id. 
663.  See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Just Think No, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2012, at A25 
(stating that, notwithstanding his youthful appeal, because of his anti-abortion politics, vice 
presidential candidate Paul Ryan is “just a fresh face on a Taliban creed—the evermore 
antediluvian, anti-women, anti-immigrant, anti-gay conservative core”); Stephen Pizzo, The 
Christian Taliban, ALTERNET (Mar. 27, 2004), http://www.alternet.org/story/18259/the_christi
an_taliban, archived at http://perma.cc/LL78-ZVUH (referring to “Christian fundamentalists” 
in the Bush administration who oppose abortion, same-sex marriage, and contraceptive based 
sex-education as “Christian Taliban”).  Some supporters of abortion rights and same-sex 
marriage reject the use the term, not because they regard it as slanderous and incendiary, but 
for fear of being seen as Islamaphobic.  See Andrea Grimes, Stop Calling U.S. Christian 
Lawmakers the ‘Taliban,’ RH REALITY CHECK (July 23, 2014, 12:17 PM), http://rhrealitychec
k.org/article/2014/07/23/stop-calling-u-s-christian-lawmakers-taliban/, archived at http://perma.
cc/5RD3-V34W (“[T]here is indeed a powerful, well-funded and rigidly patriarchal religious 
movement behind America’s most misogynist laws, and it isn’t any iteration of Islam.  It’s 
Christianity.”). 
664.  The claim of religious interference in the abortion debate has had to be revised 
over the years in light of changes in the composition of the pro-life movement.  The Catholic 
Church was at the forefront of pro-life efforts following the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe 
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Lawrence Lader and Bernard Nathanson, early proponents of the repeal 
of abortion laws and the founders of what is today known as NARAL 
Pro-Choice America, devised a “Catholic strategy” whereby they sought 
to portray “the Catholic Church as a political force, for the use of anti-
Catholicism as a political instrument, and for the manipulation of 
Catholics themselves by splitting them and setting them against each 
other.”665  Indeed, this is the standard prism through which most news 
organizations frame the issue—as a struggle between religious believers 
 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), creating a constitutional right to abortion.  See CYNTHIA 
GORNEY, ARTICLES OF FAITH: A FRONTLINE HISTORY OF THE ABORTION WARS 178–93 
(1998).  The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops helped to found the National 
Right to Life Committee, housing the organization in its offices after it was first established.  
Id. at 107.  A number of Christian denominations greeted the decision with enthusiasm, 
having already adopted a policy favoring a right to abortion.  See id. at 188.  At least some 
Protestants identified the pro-life position as narrowly sectarian, specifically Catholic, such 
that they even welcomed the Court’s decision in Roe, seeing it as step in favor of religious 
freedom and the separation of church and state.  See id. (quoting the Southern Baptist 
Convention news service’s response to Roe v. Wade saying that the Supreme Court had 
“advanced the cause of religious liberty, human equality, and justice” (internal quotation 
mark omitted)); MCGREEVY, supra note 531, at 262 (noting the same, and that a group of 
prominent evangelicals had “cautiously endorsed abortion law reform in 1968” in Christianity 
Today).  Thus, the argument that legal opposition to abortion is an unconstitutional 
establishment of religion focused on the Catholic Church.  See, e.g., McRae v. Califano, 491 F. 
Supp. 630, 691 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (case involving Establishment Clause challenge to the Hyde 
Amendment restricting federal government funds to pay for abortions, noting that “the trial 
was much concerned with the Roman Catholic position [on abortion] as contrasted with the 
view of Mainstream Protestantism, and with the action taken by Roman Catholic church 
organizations and clerical bodies”).  In the decade following Roe, the stance of many 
Evangelical Protestants and some denominations changed substantially such that many 
became major players in the pro-life movement.  See Gorney, supra, at 340–43 (discussing the 
Evangelical turn toward the pro-life cause); BERNARD N. NATHANSON, THE ABORTION 
PAPERS: INSIDE THE ABORTION MENTALITY 188–89 (1983) (noting that the Catholic Church 
led the opposition “from the very beginning of the abortion revolution” but that a decade 
after Roe “the pro-life group is now a far more ecumenical force that it was ten years ago”).  
Thus, the claim of abortion proponents that the pro-life position was specifically Catholic, and 
so unsuitable as a basis for law and policy, was recast as more broadly Christian or generally 
religious. 
665.  NATHANSON, supra note 664, at 178, 181; see also BERNARD N. NATHANSON 
WITH RICHARD N. OSTLING, ABORTING AMERICA 51–52 (1979) (describing the origin of the 
strategy); id. at 172 (“The pro-abortionists also seek to rule out discussion of abortion in 
advance because it is a ‘religious issue.’  Our movement persistently tarred all opposition with 
the brush of the Roman Catholic Church or its hierarchy, stirring up anti-Catholic prejudices, 
and pontificated about the necessity for ‘separation of church and state.’”).  Lader’s disdain 
for the Catholic Church and its involvement in the debate over abortion is on vivid display 
throughout his written work.  See LAWERNCE LADER, ABORTION (1966); LAWERNCE 
LADER, ABORTION II: MAKING THE REVOLUTION (1973); LAWRENCE LADER, POLITICS, 
POWER, AND THE CHURCH: THE CATHOLIC CRISIS AND ITS CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN 
PLURALISM (1987). 
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who want to use the instruments of government to curtail liberty, and a 
secular-minded public who desire greater freedom.666  As one member 
of the press candidly admitted, in reporting on the issue, “Journalists 
tend to regard opponents of abortion as ‘religious fanatics’ and ‘bug-
eyed zealots.’”667  As John Noonan has observed, “[J]ust as a racist press 
once identified every thief if possible as black, so the press identifie[s] 
every public opponent [of abortion] if possible as Catholic,” the 
implication being “[o]nly a Catholic would see the matter this way; there 
must be some quirk of Catholic dogma that makes Catholics take this 
extraordinary position” and attempt to impose it on others.668 
iii. The Presence of Anti-Catholic Bias in American Academic Culture 
Third, anti-Catholic bias is not only present in American society 
generally, it is also present in American academic culture specifically, 
including the culture of American law school faculties.  Sadly, Peter 
Viereck’s famous comment that “Catholic-baiting is the anti-Semitism 
of the liberals,”669 that anti-Catholicism is “the thinking man’s anti-
Semitism,”670 still rings true. 
One particularly egregious and highly publicized example of this sort 
of bias in the legal academy appeared in 2007 following the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart,671 a case in which the Court 
upheld a federal ban on the procedure commonly referred to as partial-
birth abortion.  In this procedure, clinically known as an “intact dilation 
and extraction,” the child in the womb is delivered in the breech 
position up to the point where his or her head lodges in the cervix.  At 
this point the physician performing the abortion forces a pair of scissors 
 
666.  MARVIN N. OLASKY, THE PRESS AND ABORTION, 1838–1988 (1988). 
667.  David Shaw, Abortion Foes Stereotyped, Some in the Media Believe, L.A. TIMES, 
July 2, 1990, at A1; see also David Shaw, ‘Abortion Hype’ Pervaded Media After Webster 
Case, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 1990, at A1; David Shaw, Bias Seeps into News on Abortion, L.A. 
TIMES, July 1, 1990, at A1; David Shaw, ‘Rally for Life’ Coverage Evokes an Editor’s Anger, 
L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1990, at A1.  This article and the other three articles in the series are 
available at Abortion Bias Seeps into News, NO VIOLENCE PERIOD, http://groups.csail.mit.ed
u/mac/users/rauch/nvp/media/media.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2015), archived at http://perma.
cc/ZJW8-ENH5. 
668.  JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE 
SEVENTIES 55 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
669.  PETER VIERECK, SHAME AND GLORY OF THE INTELLECTUALS 45 (1953), quoted 
in JENKINS, supra note 566, at 5. 
670.  JENKINS, supra note 566, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
671.  550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
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into the back of the head, opens them, then inserts a suction catheter 
thereby removing the fetal brains and collapsing the skull, allowing for 
the intact delivery of a dead child.672 
In a post on the University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog 
titled Our Faith-Based Justices, Professor Geoffrey Stone accused the 
five member Gonzales majority of rendering a decision based on their 
shared Catholic faith.673  After being severely criticized from many 
quarters for his remarks,674 Stone defended his comments, saying that it 
was “surely unfortunate,” but not surprising, to be accused of “anti-
Catholic bigotry.”675  In defense of his initial post, Stone said he simply 
wanted to understand “what makes the Justices tick” and to explore 
“whether the principle of separation of church and state should create a 
special responsibility on citizens, legislators, and judges not to impose 
their religious beliefs on other citizens.”676  He said that he simply 
wanted “to raise that question” and that he acknowledged that “the fact 
that all five Catholic Justices voted together . . . to make up the 5-to-4 
majority might have nothing to do with their religion.”677  
A plain reading of Stone’s original post shows that Stone was doing 
far more than simply “posing the question.”678  He leveled an accusation 
at the Gonzales majority based on the religious identity of the Justices, 
and when confronted with this fact and roundly criticized for it, he 
attempted to re-characterize what he plainly said as the quizzical 
musings of a legal academic.  He was not, as he said in his subsequent 
post, simply “pos[ing] the question and . . . invit[ing] people to think 
about it.”679  He was not acting as a law professor leading a seminar.  By 
 
672.  This and similar methods are described in Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 135. 
673.  Geoffrey Stone, Our Faith-Based Justices, U. CHI. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Apr. 20, 
2007, 3:01 PM), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/04/our_faithbased_.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/A4DQ-HX7U. 
674.  Robert Barnes, Did Justices’ Catholicism Play Part in Abortion Ruling?, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 30, 2007, at A13; Laurie Lin, Stone Cold: Jan Crawford Greenburg Blog-Smacks 
Her Former Dean, ABOVE THE LAW (Apr. 26, 2007, 12:19 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/geoff
rey-stone/, archived at http://perma.cc/QT8N-47FP; Edward Whelan, “Painfully Awkward”? 
No, Just Plain Stupid, ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y CENTER (Apr. 24, 2007), http://eppc.org/publica
tions/painfully-awkward-no-just-plain-stupid/, archived at http://perma.cc/59P4-NQUC. 
675.  Geoffrey Stone, Faith Based Justices (Again), U. CHI. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Apr. 25, 
2007, 9:09 AM), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/04/faith_based_jus.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/AMQ7-WYGF. 
676.  Id. 
677.  Id. 
678.  Id. 
679.  Id. 
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his own words, he was pointing something out—“a painfully awkward 
observation”—something that he thought was “telling.”680  “What, then, 
explains this decision? . . .  All five justices in the majority in Gonzales 
are Catholic.”681  He was in fact leveling an accusation against the 
Gonzales majority, namely, that in deciding the case they “all fell back 
on a common argument to justify their position.”682  According to Stone, 
this argument rested on the moral conclusion that the procedure closely 
resembles infanticide and is “immoral” and may be prohibited “even 
without a clear statutory exception to protect the health of the 
woman.”683  But according to Stone, “[b]y making this judgment, these 
justices have failed to respect the fundamental difference between 
religious belief and morality” by resolving the “profoundly difficult and 
rationally unresolvable question” of “[t]he moral status of a fetus.”684 
Stone’s plea of innocence of the charge of anti-Catholic bias is 
misleading and would be comical but for his use of the passive voice: 
“[I]t is certainly not appropriate for the state or the justices to resolve it 
on the basis of one’s personal religious faith.”685  But the piece ends not 
with a question but a conclusion.  Stone says that the Gonzales majority 
chose “not to follow” the example of other judges (like Justice Brennan) 
whom Stone admires, who did not decide legal questions based on their 
personal religious faith.686 
Although Stone’s blog post is a particularly prominent example 
(made worse by his attempt to portray what he said in a positive light, as 
an open-ended question rather than a definitive conclusion), it is by no 
means the only example of the argumentative strategy described above 
wherein a point of view is first defined as “Catholic” or “religious” and 
then the point of view and the person proposing it are condemned as 
seeking to impose a sectarian belief on the public at large.  Numerous 
examples of this strategy can be found in the legal academic literature 
on abortion,687 contraception,688 fetal and embryonic research,689 and 
 
680.  Stone, supra note 673 (“It is mortifying to have to point this out.  But it is too 
obvious, and too telling, to ignore.”). 
681.  Id. 
682.  Id. 
683.  Id. 
684.  Id. 
685.  Id. 
686.  Id. 
687.  Perhaps the most famous iteration of the thesis that the pro-life position on 
abortion is inescapably religious in legal academic literature is Laurence H. Tribe, The 
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now same-sex marriage.690  This literature typically does not involve the 
same inflammatory rhetoric found in the slogans of the Know Nothings, 
the work of Paul Blanshard, or even the popular press of today, but the 
reader is meant to reach the same conclusion.   
It might be suggested that the authors of these academic texts are 
entitled to the presumption that their views are not tinged with anti-
Catholic bias or religious prejudice, that they perceive a genuine 
constitutional problem—an effort to establish religion—in those legal 
measures designed to restrict abortion or same-sex marriage.  This is 
surely the case.  But the presumption of good faith and the absence of 
anti-religious bias is a rebuttable presumption—a presumption that is 
overcome when no effort is made to demonstrate the supposedly 
religious character of the point of view with which they disagree, aside 
from noting the religious affiliation of those who endorse it and the 
mere repetition of their own conviction that the point of view is in fact 
religious.691  Indeed, the presumption seems no longer warranted when a 
 
Supreme Court, 1972 Term—Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life 
and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973).  This thesis, however, has had many historical 
antecedents, see, e.g., GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL 
LAW (1957), and subsequent followers, see, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Privacy, 
Religious Disestablishment, and the Abortion Decisions, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES 148 (Jay L. Garfield & Patricia Hennessey eds., 1984); Jed Rubenfeld, 
Rubenfeld, J., Concurring in Roe v. Wade and Concluding That the Writ of Certiorari Should 
Be Dismissed as Improvidently Granted in Doe v. Bolton, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD 
HAVE SAID 109 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005). 
688.  See, e.g., Robert F. Drinan, S.J., Book Review, 73 HARV. L. REV. 608 (1960) 
(reviewing ALVAH W. SULLOWAY, BIRTH CONTROL AND CATHOLIC DOCTRINE (1959)).  
This book review responds to the historic tendency to treat opposition to contraception as 
being religious in character.  Id.at 612.  Catholics did work politically against legislative 
reforms to make contraceptive more widely available before the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Griswold v. Connecticut.  See MCGREEVY, supra note 531, at 228–49.  Opposition to 
contraception certainly may derive from religious premises, but not as a matter of logical 
necessity.   
689.  See, e.g., Jane M. Friedman, The Federal Fetal Experimentation Regulations: An 
Establishment Clause Analysis, 61 MINN. L. REV. 961 (1977); Larry J. Pittman, Embryonic 
Stem Cell Research and Religion: The Ban on Federal Funding as a Violation of the 
Establishment Clause, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 131 (2006). 
690.  See, e.g., Gary J. Simson, Religion By Any Other Name? Prohibitions on Same-Sex 
Marriage and the Limits of the Establishment Clause, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 132 (2012). 
691.  Examples of this strategy of determined assertion and reaffirmation without 
argument include David R. Dow, The Establishment Clause Argument for Choice, 20 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 479 (1990); Robert L. Maddox & Blaine Bortnick, Webster v. 
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Politics, and Morality, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2005); Paul D. Simmons, Religious Liberty 
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plainly secular rationale for the law in question is offered and its 
opponent demurs and confidently reiterates that the real purpose is 
religious and constitutionally impermissible.692 
But what can account for this bias in the legal academy if, as we are 
to presume, law professors today are not bigoted against Catholics in a 
conscious and deliberate way, like the Know Nothings and the Klan 
were in earlier times?  Why would law faculty members who expressly 
disavow any prejudice toward those who are Catholic be negatively 
disposed toward the arguments put forth by those who are identified as 
Catholic? 
Some explanation for this might be found in the fields of cognitive 
and social psychology.  A burgeoning literature in law has copiously 
borrowed from these disciplines over the last several decades as legal 
scholars have sought to develop new ways to think about social 
problems and to improve the formation of legal rules and the process of 
adjudication.  For example, some legal scholars explored the 
phenomenon known as “implicit bias” in the form of stereotypes and 
attitudes towards groups and individuals based on race and gender.  
Notwithstanding a person’s overt rejection of racial prejudice, he or she 
may unconsciously harbor a negative evaluative disposition toward 
members of a racial group or hold a mental association between that 
group and a given negative trait.693  These legal scholars suggest that a 
correct understanding of this phenomenon can inform how the law 
should approach anti-discrimination and affirmative action in 
employment,694 and the treatment of racial minorities under the criminal 
law.695  Others have examined the phenomenon of “motivated 
 
and Abortion Policy: Casey as “Catch-22,” 42 J. CHURCH & ST. 69 (2000); Paul D. Simmons, 
Religious Liberty and the Abortion Debate, 32. J. CHURCH & ST. 567 (1990); John Morton 
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Statutory Abortion Regulation, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1191 (1990); Karen F.B. Gray, Case 
Comment, An Establishment Clause Analysis of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 24 
GA. L. REV. 399 (1990). 
692.  See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Same-Sex Marriage and the Establishment Clause, 54 
VILL. L. REV. 617 (2009) 
693.  See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006). 
694.  Tristin K. Green, Race and Sex in Organizing Work: “Diversity,” Discrimination, 
and Integration, 59 EMORY L.J. 585 (2010); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: 
A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006). 
695.  L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 2035 (2011); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 
(2012).  
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reasoning,” which “refers to the tendency of individuals to conform their 
assessments of evidence—from empirical data to logical arguments, 
from credibility assessments to brute sense impressions—to some goal 
extrinsic to factual accuracy.”696  “Cultural cognition” is a type of 
motivated reasoning that “promotes congruence between a person’s 
defining group commitments, on the one hand, and his or her 
perceptions of risk and related facts, on the other.”697  “Identity-
protective cognition” is a kind of motivated reasoning “that occurs when 
individuals selectively credit evidence in patterns that affirm the status 
of groups to which they belong.”698 
Although untested empirically in this context, concepts like implicit 
bias and motivated reasoning may provide a potentially powerful 
explanation for why the critique of Legal Realism by Catholic legal 
scholars received so little attention in the standard account of American 
legal history and why the authors who did acknowledge the work of 
these Catholic scholars dismissed their contributions in such a derisive 
manner.  The authors who responded to the Realists were, quite 
conspicuously, Catholic, and both the defenders of Realism and the 
legal historians of the era identified them as such.  Indeed, the fact that 
some Catholic critics were Jesuit priests was clearly a point of some 
interest for some historians.699  It is, of course, stating the obvious to 
note that Catholic priests have been the victims of vicious stereotypes 
throughout much of American history.  Dismissing their critique as 
“theological” and “religious”—as mere “proselytization”—both 
affirmed the in-group status of the majority of non-Catholic and secular 
legal academics and gave a ready-made answer to those who might 
otherwise feel challenged by a natural law critique of Realist premises.  
Yes, indeed, “We are all realists now.”700 
One factor that might account for this phenomenon is a lack of 
interaction on the part of non-Catholic faculty with Catholics.  In the 
make-up of law school faculties, Catholics are under-represented 
relative to their percentage in the general population.  According to a 
 
696.  Dan M. Kahan, Laws of Cognition and the Cognition of Law, COGNITION, Feb. 
2015, at 56, 58 (emphasis omitted). 
697.  Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, Donald Braman, Danieli Evans & Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech–Conduct Distinction, 
64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 859 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
698.  Kahan, supra note 696, at 58 (emphasis omitted). 
699.  Duxbury, supra note 45, at 163. 
700.  KALMAN, supra note 30, at 229.  
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survey conducted by James Lindgren in 1996, Catholics and Orthodox 
Christians make up 26% of the full-time working population, but they 
account for only 13.7% of law school faculty positions.  By contrast, 
Jews account for only 2% of the general working population but make 
up 26.4% of law faculty.701  In and of themselves, these figures are not 
evidence of anti-Catholic bias on the part of law school faculties.  They 
do not show that Catholic candidates for law faculty positions have been 
discriminated against in the hiring process.  Moreover, these figures do 
not indicate the distribution of Catholic and Orthodox Christians among 
various law schools.702  Perhaps most important of all, these figures do 
not indicate whether those law professors identifying themselves as 
Catholic are only nominally Catholic, practicing Catholics who 
participate in the liturgical life of the Church but who separate their 
faith from their professional life, or Catholic intellectuals—scholars 
whose life and work are informed by the nearly two-thousand-year-old 
Christian intellectual tradition.  These figures do, however, suggest that 
those individuals who might be predisposed to be somewhat more 
sympathetic to a Catholic point of view are under-represented in the 
legal academy.703 
Although no empirical study on the implicit bias or motivated 
reasoning of law professors with respect to Christians generally or 
Catholics specifically (if any) has been conducted, a recent study of law 
school rankings indicates that some such bias exists.  In 1999 Monte N. 
Stewart and H. Dennis Tolley noticed that, in the U.S. News & World 
Report rankings of the nation’s law schools, academics tended to rank 
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religiously affiliated law schools lower than did lawyers and judges.704  
Although the rankings that secular schools received from academics and 
practitioners also diverged, the divergence was not as significant.705  The 
authors then decided to expand their investigation to cover the period 
1999–2003 and to take into account certain variables that might explain 
the divergence.706  They concluded that “[t]he divergence between the 
respective assessments of academics and practitioners of religiously 
affiliated law schools is sufficiently greater than their divergence relative 
to secular law schools to be statistically significant”; that “[t]he more 
conservative a religiously affiliated law school is generally perceived to 
be relative to contemporary cultural/moral issues, the lower the 
academics’ assessment is, compared to that of the practitioners”; and 
“[t]he divergence . . . is not due to any differential in scholarly activity as 
measured by the number of articles published annually either per school 
or per faculty member.”707  Thus, the ranking of religiously affiliated law 
schools by law professors as a whole seemed to turn on the negative 
value they attribute to a religious voice and presence in legal education. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have described the widespread and thoughtful 
intellectual response to Legal Realism set forth by leading Catholic legal 
scholars during the 1920s–1940s.  Although the scholarship on the Legal 
Realist movement is voluminous, this literature has either ignored, or 
casually dismissed, the contributions of these contemporary Catholic 
legal scholars.  This gap is surprising because, as demonstrated above, 
the critiques offered by Catholic legal scholars constituted the single 
largest body of criticism directed at Legal Realism.  This gap is doubly 
surprising because the arguments offered by Catholic legal scholars 
were generally thoughtful and nuanced, in large measure because they 
built on the worldwide Neo-Scholastic revival then taking place.  This 
Article has sought to provide a more balanced account of what these 
authors said and in so doing reintroduce their critiques into the still-
ongoing conversation concerning Legal Realism and its legacy. 
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We described these all-but-forgotten Catholic legal scholars as a 
jurisprudential movement, similar to their Legal Realist interlocutors.  
Like other intellectual movements, these Catholic scholars sought to 
institutionalize their movement in various ways.  As we illustrated, their 
ultimate failure to do so helped lead to their movement’s eclipse and 
then collapse in the late-1950s. 
We ended by suggesting why later historians have failed to either 
acknowledge or appreciate the contributions made by Catholic legal 
scholars during this period.  We argued, based on these historians’ own 
statements and other circumstances, that this absence is best explained 
by the marginal place of Catholicism in American intellectual life, as 
well as the historians’ own differing jurisprudential and religious 
commitments. 
